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ABSTRACT +:: 
Much current research within Behavioral Decision'Theory suggests 
that the intuitive judge and decision-maker utilises a wide range 
of simplifying strategies (heuristics) in order to reduce the 
information-processing demands upon his or her limited cognitive 
capacity. While such strategies are assumed to be valid, their 
operation is often held to account for severe and systematic 'errors' 
of judgement. Such 'errors' are typically referred to as biases, 
and, it is argued here, demonstrations of biases have recently 
been interpreted, both within and outside psychology, as evidence of 
a general cognitive fallibility on the part of the'human judge 
and decision-maker (the 'cognitive cripple' hypothesis). 
A critique of the heuristics, biases, and bounded rationality 
model outlines a number of theoretical and empirical difficulties 
associated with the research paradigm., In particular it is concluded 
that, although the use of any specific heuristic may be seen as 
dysfunctional under some task conditions, this need not often or 
always be the case. It is also argued that the lack of direct 
empirical investigations of the functional aspects of heuristic 
use represents a fundamental deficiency within the Behavioral 
Decision Theory literature. 
A multi-methodological programme of empirical research investigates 
one functional implication of heuristic use: that of individual 
choice efficiency in the classical risky'choice paradigm. Results 
indicate that there does indeed appear to be a functional dimension 
to heuristic use in the context of randomly or factorially generated 
gambles. The implications of the results for general models of 
risky choice, and the heuristics and biases paradigm, are'discussed. 
It is concluded that the question of the. cognitiveýfallibility, or 
otherwise, of the individual judge and decision-maker'is far from 
resolution, and that the-'cognitive cripple' hypothesis may be an 
untenable generalisation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The thirty years since the publication of Ward Edwards' (1954a) 
seminal article, The Theory of Decision, have seen a rapid development 
of the scientific study of human judgement and decision-making. Today 
the subject is not only of interest to psychologists, but also to 
students of a wide variety of disciplines: for example, engineering, 
medicine, operations research, economics and management science. 
Indeed, the rapid growth of Behavioral Decision Theory (cf. Edwards, 
1961) is a testimony to the many stimulating theoretical and empirical 
issues that have emerged over this period. A cursory survey reveals, 
as with any academic discipline, competing theories and methodologies 
(with their associated protagonists, and hard fought battles), 
contradictory conclusions, promising areas yet to be explored, and 
once-promising areas that have been studied to extinction. 
The current dissertation is an inquiry, both theoretical and 
empirical, into perhaps the central meta-theoretical question to 
have preoccupied researchers within the field of Behavioral Decision 
Theory: the fallibility, or otherwise, of intuitive judgement and 
decision-making. 
In an early review, Peterson and Beach (1967) offer the following 
conclusion: 
'Experiments that have compared humanVinferences with 
those of statistical man show that the normative model 
provides a good first approximation for a psychological 
theory of inference. Inferences made by subjects 
are influenced by appropriate variables and in 
appropriate directions' (Peterson and Beach, 1967, 
pp. 42-43). 
However, ten years later, Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein.. (1977) 
paint a somewhat more pessimistic picture: 
i, 
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... the view of humans as good 
intuitive statisticians 
is no longer paramount. A psychological Rip van Winkle 
who dozed off after reading Peterson and Beach (1967) 
and roused himself only recently would be startled by 
the widespread change of attitude exemplified by 
statements such as "..: man's cognitive capacities are 
not adequate for the tasks which confront him" (Hammond, 
1974, p.. 4), or "... people systematically violate the 
principles of rational decision-making when judging 
probabilities, making predictions, or otherwise 
attempting to cope with probabilistic tasks" (Slovic, 
Fischhoff and Lichtenstein, 1976, p. 169)"' (Slovic, 
Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein, 1977, p. 3). 
The contrast between these two quotations is clear. In the 
intervening years of Rip van Winkle's slumber the view of the 
individual as a (fairly) rational intuitive judge and decision- 
maker had been widely challenged. According to the more recent 
view the individual is characterised by a degree of (imputed) 
incompetence, sometimes succeeding, but sometimes apparently failing, 
to adhere to, some of the simplest of the principles of 'rational' 
inference and decision. In sum, the current model of the individual 
suggests that he or she is a biased and 'sub-optimal' judge and 
decision-maker. 
In hindsight it is apparent that in the late 1960s and early 
1970s Behavioral Decision Theory experienced its first major paradigm 
shift. If there is a seminal article that marks that shift it is 
the highly influential work of Tversky and, Kahneman, Judgment Under 
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (1974; see also Slovic, 1972, 
for an earlier, but similar work). . Indeed, Tversky and Kahneman 
have latterly been described by Jerome Bruner as decision-making's 
'own revisionists' (1979, p. 93). It-is the paradigm. prompted by 
the work of these researchers and their' colleagues-, (which is termed 
here the heuristics, biases, and bounded rationality model) that.., 
will be the focus of the critical. review, and subsequent empirical 
studies, tobe reported here. -- -.: :,. 
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This dissertation is organised into eight principal Chapters, 
which conceptually divide into two sub-groups. Chapters 1 to 4 
inclusive review, and present a critique of, the relevant literature 
within Behavioral Decision Theory. Chapters 5 to 8 inclusive report 
the empirical programme arising from the critique, and the principal 
conclusions to be drawn from the research. 
The four review Chapters follow, broadly, an historical 
progression. The dissertation commences, in Chapter 1, not with 
psychology, but with a brief discussion of the mathematical origins 
of the normative concepts of probability and utility, both of which 
are central to the development of Behavioral Decision Theory as an 
empirical science. Chapter 2 charts research conducted during the 
initial period of-that development, from approximately the early 
1950s to the later 1960s. The principal focus in this second 
Chapter, reflecting as it does the dominant empirical paradigm of 
this period, is the question of the description, in terms of models 
derived from the normative theories of probability and utility, 
of individual decision-making under risk. 
In Chapter 3 we document the alternative paradigm, the heuristics, 
biases, and bounded rationality model, that arose in the early 1970s 
in response to the apparent psychological sterility of the early 
normative-based, descriptive models of human inference and decision. 
This is followed, in Chapter 4, by an extensive critique of the current 
interpretation typically placed upon the cumulative findings of the 
heuristics. and biases research. In addition to a number of general 
criticisms, the argument here focuses upon the contention that the 
lack of direct empirical investigations of the functional aspects 
of heuristic use represents a basic deficiency within the current 
Behavioral Decision Theory literature. 
- xiv - 
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The empirical programme represents a direct response to the 
deficiency identified in the critique. The approach adopted across 
the studies is expressly multi-methodological. In Chapter 5a 
simple investigation of individual choice efficiency in the context 
of randomly generated sets of risky options (matrices) is reported. 
By investigating performance in this particular context this study 
is relevant not only to the heuristics, biases, and bounded rationality 
model discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, but also a number of issues raised 
in Chapter 2, during the discussion of early research into decision- 
making under risk. In a second empirical study, reported in 
Chapter 6, process-tracing methods are employed to investigate 
individual choice processes in the matrix task. A subsidiary, 
computer simulation study, arising from the behavioural model of 
the choice process constructed from the process-tracing data, is 
reported in Appendix B7. Finally, Chapter 7 documents a third 
behavioural study, exploring one implication of the process-tracing 
model. 
The principal conclusions to be drawn from the research programme 
reported in this dissertation are reviewed and discussed in 
Chapter 8. The findings are discussed in the context of both 
general models of risky choice and the heuristics, biases, and 
bounded rationality model. 
r ýý 




HISTORICAL ORIGINS I 
PROBABILITY AND UTILITY THEORY 
I. Introduction 
Our review commences not with psychology, but with a cursory 
survey of early theories of probability and utility. Although 
philosophers have been concerned for centuries with the problem 
of the logical determinants of rationality, the first mathematical 
treatments of this issue can be traced to statistics and economics. 
Particularly relevant are the formal theories of probability, 
which have arisen primarily from the former discipline, and utility 
from the latter. As we shall see in the following Chapters, the 
concepts of probability and utility are central to the initial 
development within psychology of Behavioral Decision Theory, and 
today continue to influence its development. Hammond, McClelland, 
and Mumpower comment that: 
'The study of judgement and decision-making has two 
primary sources - economics and psychology. And 
mathematics hovers above, beyond, or around them, 
thus providing the logical context for the study 
of judgement and choice' (Hammond, McClelland, and 
Mumpower, 1980, p. 21). 
We shall defer, for the present at least, the difficult question 
of whether mathematics does provide a suitable 'logical context' 
within which to describe, or even prescribe, judgement and decision 
behaviour (although see March, 1978).. The aim'in the'current- 
Chapter is more limited; specifically, to review some of the early 
developments within statistics and'economics that have culminated 
in the modern concepts of probability and utility, and provide the 
mathematical'framework upon which BehavioralDecision'Theory, 'and 
-2- 
mathematical decision theory (e. g. Raiffa and Schlaifer, 1961; 
De Groot, 1970) are based. For current purposes the treatment of 
these is illustrative rather than exhaustive. 
This Chapter is organised in three sections. In the first 
section the common probability concepts are discussed. The second 
section outlines the development of the modern theory of utility. 
Finally, a short conclusion section notes the normative implications 
of these concepts for behavioural research. 
II. On Probability and the Doctrine of Chances 
Central to statistics, and hence to decision-making, is the 
notion of probability. Its formal definition is not without 
considerable controversy, despite its common usage within everyday 
discourse. At least four major definitions, and countless minor 
ones, are evident in the statistical literature. In keeping 
with the generally accepted terminology, these major approaches 
will be referred to as follows: classical, frequency, subjective, 
and logical probability (e. g. see Barnett, 1973; Hacking, 1975; 
Weatherford, 1982). 
i. Classical Probability 
The concept of mathematical probability first dates from early 
studies of the age-old art of gambling. The sixteenth-century 
Italian mathematician Cardano (see, Ore, 1953) 
1 introduced, and 
Laplace (1820/1951) subsequently formalised, the classical definition 
of probability; i. e. the ratio of favourable outcomes in a game 
of chance to the total number of possible equally likely outcomes. 
Thus, the probability of throwing two, sixes with two dice is obtained 
by dividing the number of ways in which two sixes can be obtained 
(i. e. one) by the total number of possible outcomes (thirty-six)., 
-3- 
Assuming that all outcomes are equally likely with an unbiased 
dice, the probability is therefore 1/36. However, the classical 
definition is not without serious limitations, both practically 
and theoretically. In practical terms it limits the scope of 
probability calculations only to those situations where all outcomes 
are equally likely. Such a restriction makes the classical approach 
untenable as a general definition of probability, since many 
mutually exclusive events will not be equally likely: for example, 
when a dice is biased. Theoretically, the classical definition is 
in effect circular, since the term equally likely means, if it is 
to mean anything at all, equally probable. While undoubtedly useful 
to gamblers in Cardano's time, and to those who gamble today, the 
classical definition is primarily of historical interest only to 
modern statisticians. The lasting legacy of the classical approach 
is, however, the probability calculus; for example, the specification 
that probability be mathematically represented as a number between 
nought and one, and the various combinatorial-rules. The calculus 
is today little changed from its early 'classical' form. 
ii. Relative Frequency Probability 
The relative frequency definition of probability arose primarily 
as a result of the problems associated with the classical approach. 
It is attributed by Barnett (1973) to John Venn (see Venn, 1888), 
although Raiffa (1968) notes that Denis Poisson utilised a similar 
definition as early as 1837. Specifically, probability is defined 
to be the limiting value of the relative frequency of favourable 
outcomes over an infinite series of identical trials. By providing 
an empirical basis for probability assessment, ' the relative frequency 
approach renders problems such as that of biased dice mathematically 
tractable. That is, the probability of two sixes is approximated 
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by the relative number of times that two sixes occur over a long 
series of pairs of throws, and if the dice are biased this value 
should deviate - from 1/36. 
From a scientific perspective, the relative frequency approach 
is much in keeping with the empiricist tradition, and it is often 
held by its proponents to be the only objectively valid basis for 
probability. While such a position is clearly somewhat 
tautological, the relative frequency approach has undoubtedly been, 
and still is, of considerable practical value in circumstances 
where long-run data are available. 
I 
iii. Subjective Probability 
Subjective, or personal, probability is perhaps the most 
important from a psychological perspective. In contrast to the 
frequentist approach, subjective probability emphasises the notion 
of probability as personal degree-of-confidence (Bernoulli, 1713), 
or degree-of-belief (De Morgan, 1847), in the occurrence of an event. 
Thus, probability is viewed as a behavioural, as opposed to a purely 
empirical, construct: that is, resulting from an individual's 
state of knowledge about the world, rather than being an objective 
property of the world. Thus, the subjective probability of any 
event can legitimately vary across individuals as a function of 
their knowledge of that event. 
While subjective probability is an intuitively plausible, and 
psychologically unobjectionable concept, its mathematical-treatment, 
I 
and in particular the central question of its measurement, remains 
a controversial issue within statistics. Formal treatment of this 
problem was first attempted, independently, by-Ramsey (1926/1964) 
and De Finetti (1937/1964). Both"authors, `in'an attempt to 
axiomatise a numerical measure of subjective probability, introduce 
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the idea that its measurement can proceed from an analysis of an 
individual's preferences amongst bets. Both also comment upon 
the central notions of coherence and consistency. For an individual's 
subjective probabilities to be subject to. numerical representation, 
and if they are to conform to the probability calculus, his or her 
preferences amongst bets (and hence by implication his or her 
subjective probabilities) must be both coherent and consistent. 
Coherence requires that the subject be rational to the extent 
that the relationships between his or her subjective probabilities 
do not allow the possibility of the construction of a bet that is 
preferred, but that entails a certain loss. For example, if 
P(E) is not equal to its complement 1- P(E) then a 'Dutch Book' 
can be constructed, conditional upon the event E, where the 
individual is bound to lose whatever happens (e. g. see Weatherford, 
1982, V. 1). Consistency requires that an individual's preferences 
be logically non-contradictory; for example, they must be 
transitive. These requirements are generally expressed in terms 
of a number of commonsense axioms to which the individual's 
preferences must adhere (e. g. see Savage, 1954, for the most 
generally accepted axiom system). 
It is important to note that the theory of subjective 
probability, while having considerable behavioural significance, 
is primarily normative. The coherence and consistency axioms 
are an attempt to define formally rational probability judgement. 
As De Finetti comments: 
'... it is essential to point out that [subjective) 
probability theory is not an attempt to describe 
actual behavior; its subject is coherent behavior,, 
and the fact that people are only more or less 
coherent is inessential' (De Finetti, '1964, p. -111; 
emphasis added). 
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The question of whether people are more or less coherent is 
clearly not a central question for the statistician. However, 
for the psychologist investigating decision-making this issue is 
important, as we shall see at a later stage. 
iv. Logical Probability 
The final approach to probability, that of the logical or 
'necessary' school (e. g. Carnap, 1950; Jeffreys, 1961; Keynes, 
1921), appears, in its strict form, to be the least relevant to 
behavioural issues. Logical probability addresses the degree of 
logical implication that exists between statements. Explicit in 
this view is the conditional notion of probability as the rational 
conviction in the truth of any particular statement given other 
information; for example, the probability that an hypothesis is 
true given a certain body of data. As such logical probability 
is viewed by its proponents as an. extension of formal logic, ±and 
therefore independent of any personal, subjective interpretation. 
Given a set of data there is one, and only one, degree of truth 
that can be assigned to an hypothesis. For current purposes, it 
will be sufficient to note here that the logical school has been 
influential upon the development of subjective probability by way 
of its elaboration of formal Bayesian methods (e. g. see Lindley, 
1965a, 1965b) for updating probability estimates in the light of 
new information. 
We shall not give a detailed account of the theoretical 
controversies that surround the four approaches (see Weatherford, 
1982, for an illuminating philosophical account). It-is important 
to note in summary, however, that the four definitions are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive. For example, the classical 
definition' might be viewed as one variant of the logical approach2. 
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Furthermore, the probability calculus is relatively undisputed 
across all four approaches. Where differences between the approaches 
do appear, their influence is manifest most directly at a practical 
level. The classical approach is limited to situations where 
equally likely outcomes can be relatively unambiguously defined. 
While the relative frequency concept does not suffer from this 
particular limitation, its applicability is also limited if 
guidance is required with respect to the large class of unique, or 
vaguely defined, events that often face the practical decision-maker. 
From a logical perspective this latter problem is more tractable, 
although not necessarily straightforward; that is, the decision- 
maker should seek to evaluate the logical degree of confidence in 
the statement in question, as implied by the available, relevant 
evidence. The logical approach may, however, be unsatisfactory in 
practice for a number of *reasons. For example, the body of evidence 
considered relevant to the problem may be large and of variable 
reliability, the weight to be applied to any given piece of evidence 
may be difficult to ascertain except in a. subjective sense, and 
there may be doubts as to exactly what constitutes relevant evidence 
anyway! It is perhaps the greatest advantage of the subjective 
approach that it does provide at least rudimentary guidance under 
such circumstances. Since all probabilities are degrees-of-belief, 
simply ask the decision-maker what he or she feels the probability 
is. Or, for complete methodological rigour, perhaps construct a 
" number of hypothetical wagers conditional upon the event in question. 
However, precisely who the decision-maker should be, and whom we 
choose to believe if two people legitimately produce significantly 
different estimates, is another matter, and one not without considerableI 
-8- 
practical significance. Of course, where sufficient empirical 
data are available, there may in fact be little practical difference 
between the subjective, logical and relative frequency approaches. 
Where it is not, the decision-maker may have difficulty in choosing 
an appropriate method. 
The conclusion that might be usefully drawn from the preceding 
discussion is that for all practical purposes no single definition 
of probability will suffice (see Bartlett, 1962). Consequently, it 
becomes a matter of judgement as to the most appropriate approach 
to adopt in any given situation. Nevertheless, all four 
perspectives are primarily normative. For the practical scientist, 
then, utilising any one particular definition entails adopting, 
implicitly or explicitly, a specific normative framework. Three 
basic frameworks are evident: logical, empirical and coherence/ 
consistency. The logical and classical approaches prescribe 
probability judgement on the basis of a priori logical principles. 
Their normative basis is thus'essentially deductive. In contrast 
to this, the relative frequency approach is inductive, with the 
correct basis of probability judgement arising from empirical 
observation of the 'true' state of the world. The subjective 
approach offers the less restricted normative framework of 
coherence and consistency. The decision-maker may hold any, belief 
or set of beliefs as long as those beliefs conform to the requirements 
of coherence and consistency. The coherence requirements are not 
strictly logical dictates, but merely a set of plausible. constraints, 
justified on intuitive grounds, that the sensible judge might 
reasonably be expected to adhere to-(though see Lopes, 1981, 
1983; MacCrimmon and Larsson,. 1979;, and Slovic and Tversky, 1974, 
for critical discussion of this point). ' All four approaches, -by. 
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offering such normative guidelines, prescribe the bases of 
rational probability judgements. 
III. Utility 
The second concept of central importance to decision-making 
is that of utility. Any decision-making problem is fundamentally 
one of action. (Wald, 1950). Hence, Barnett suggests the 
following: 
'Any procedure with the ... aim of suggesting action to be taken in the practical situation, by processing 
information relevant to that situation, is a 
decision-making procedure' (Barnett, 1973, p. 13). 
Associated with any possible course of action will be a number 
of consequences. Such consequences may be single or multiple, 
personal or societal, immediate or discounted in time, certain 
or just probable. In order to be able to assess the desirability 
of any particular act, and in particular in order to compare the 
desirability of different acts, formal mathematical representation 
of the worth of the associated consequences is required. The 
worth to the decision-maker of any specific consequence can be 
viewed as a gain, or alternatively as a loss. 
The problem of action, given a number of possible alternatives, 
can be resolved by proposing that the decision-maker should choose 
the alternative that optimises some function of worth;, either 
maximisation of gain, or alternatively minimisation of loss. 
The optimisation principle is the cornerstone of not only economics 
and decision science, but also of disciplines such as physics, 
biology and cybernetics (Bordley, _1983; 
Schoemaker,: 1981), and 
Edwards finds the maximisation principle 'psychologically 
unobjectional' (1954a, p. 382), on the grounds that, any experimental 
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choice data can, post hoc, be interpreted as having resulted from 
the decision-maker having maximised something or other! Of 
specific interest to the mathematician, economist and psychologist 
have been the particular functions of worth that the decision-maker, 
ideal or real, might in actuality seek to maximise. 
In the context of risky decision-making, and specifically 
that of gambling, Expected Value maximisation was perhaps the 
earliest optimisation principle to emerge. Briefly, given any 
gamble with N outcomes (01" ....., ON), with known payoffs 
associated with each outcome (v1, ....., vN), and known probabilities 
associated with each outcome (P1, ....., P N-" where i%1 Pi 
1), 
the mathematical Expected Value associated with that gamble is 
given by the sum of the payoffs, weighted multiplicatively by 
their associated probabilities of occurrence. That is: 
N 
Expected Value (EV) =E pivi 
i=1 
In'statistical terminology, the Expected Value of a gamble is 
referred to as the first moment of the probability distribution 
over outcomes (Coombs and Pruitt, 1960). For the rational decision- 
maker gambles with negative EV are undesirable, those with positive 
EV desirable. Furthermore, given a choice between any two 
gambles, the decision-maker should seek to maximise EV; that is, 
choose the one with maximum EV (or be indifferent if EVs are equal). 
It follows from this that the 'fair price' for a gamble should be 
equal to its EV. 
The precise origins of the'Expected Value. -maximisation principle 
are unclear. The justification of its use in the statistical 
literature generally relies upon some form of long run'argument, 
in similar fashion to the justification often offered for the-relative 
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frequency definition of probability. That is, given sufficient 
repeated plays at any particular gamble, the long run average 
winnings for each play should approximate to the Expected Value. 
However, it has been clear for at least two centuries that 
individuals do not always seek to maximise Expected Values. 
For example, why should people purchase insurance where, if the 
insurer is to make a profit, the Expected Value of any policy 
must be less than that of the status quo act? It was as a 
result of considering the problem of insurance, and the now classic 
St. Petersburg Paradox3, that Daniel Bernoulli (1738/1967) was 
led to suggest that man actually seeks to maximise Expected Utility, 
rather than Expected Value. Bernoulli proposed that the subjective 
worth of money is not linearly related to money, but can be viewed 
as a negatively accelerated function of monetary value. The 
subjective worth of money Bernoulli termed. utility, which he 
suggested would explain the attraction of insurance. Bernoulli's 
'solution' to these problems is of considerable historical interest. 
Here was perhaps the first example of the revision of a normative 
principle (by introducing personal values, a procedure that maintains 
the specific form of that principle) in an attempt to account-for 
observed choice behaviour. 
During the late nineteenth century the notion of decreasing 
marginal utility gained wide acceptance amongst economists interested 
in the theory of riskless consumer choice (e. g. Marshall, 1890; 
also see Stigler, 1950, A, 1950b, for a review), but, the early ,. 
twentieth century saw the-demise of-'classical' utility, theory 
as an adequate descriptive theory. It was. eventually, superceded 
in economics by the more parsimonious indifference curve methods 
(see Edgeworth, 1881; 
, Hicks and 
Allen,. 1934). 
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The modern notion of utility can be attributed to Ramsey 
(1926/1964) and, more recently, the classic work of Von Neumann 
and Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1947). 
Ramsey's work went largely unnoticed at the time of its publication. 
He demonstrates the constraints under which a direct measure of 
subjective worth will exist, as an heuristic device, in order to 
develop an axiomatisation of subjective probability. He thereby 
theoretically resolves the problem of inferring subjective probabilities 
from monetary bets, where the subjective worth of the payoffs cannot 
necessarily be assumed to be linear with monetary value. 
While Ramsey's work was pioneering, that of Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern is regarded as the seminal treatment of the subject. 
The primary importance of their work is that they resolve the 
issue of the-prescriptive status of the utility concept. ' They 
commence by advancing as axioms a number of intuitive coherence 
requirements that the rational decision-maker's preferences 
reasonably ought to adhere to; for example, comparability, 
transitivity and substitutability. Then they demonstrate that 
a coherent preference structure is a necessary and sufficient 
condition for the numerical representation of the decision-maker's 
preference ordering. That is, given two alternative states, 
A1 and A2, there will exist for the coherent decision-maker real 
numbers, or utilities, U(A1) and U(A2), such that if and only if 
A1 is at least as preferred to A2, then U(A1) > U(A2).. Explicit 
within the Von Neumann and Morgenstern system is the proposition 
that an adequate. method for . assigning. 
individual utilities can be 
based upon an_analysis. of the individual's preferences amongst 
alternative gambles (e. g. see Raiffa's, -1968, Basic Reference 
Lottery Ticket method). Finally, they-demonstrate that the 
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decision-maker must act so as to maximise Expected Utility, if 
choice is to represent his or her true tastes (and hence be 
rational; cf. Marschak, 1950). Thus, Von Neumann and Morgenstern 
demonstrate analytically the result intuitively recognised by 
Bernoulli, two centuries earlier. 
Two salient features-of the Von Neumann and Morgenstern 
system are worthy of note. Firstly, it provides a radically 
different conceptual basis to utility than the classical approach. 
Specifically, the classical notion that choice is determined by 
utility is reversed, in a somewhat counter-intuitive fashion. 
Preference and choice is held to be prior to utility assignment. 
Luce and Raiffa comment as follows: 
'In this [Von Neumann and Morgenstern) theory it 
is extremely important to accept the fact that 
the subject's preferences among alternatives and 
lotteries came prior to our numerical characterisation 
of them. We do not want to slip into saying that 
he preferred A to B because A has higher utility; 
rather, because A is preferred to B, we assign A 
the higher utility' (Luce and Raiffa, 1957, p. 22). 
Thus the notion of preference, as employed, here, serves an 
operationalising function, rather than arising as a behavioural' 
product of the subject's utility. Secondly, while the Von Neumann- 
Morgenstern theory addresses an important behavioural issue, it is 
nevertheless primarily a normative theory, -in precisely the same 
sense that subjective probability theory is. By presenting 
intuitive coherence/consistency axioms, specific guidelines for 
rational decision-making are developed (i. e. maximise Expected 
Utility). Other systems, employing different coherence axioms, 
but essentially similar arguments, have subsequently--. been constructed 
(e. g. ' Herstein and Milnor, 1953; ' Hausner, '1954; '' Luce and Raiffa, 
1957; Savage, '1954). 
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IV. Conclusion 
For current purposes it will not be necessary to present here 
a detailed critique of the Von Neumann-Morgenstern result (e. g. 
see Schoemaker, 1982), or probability theory. However, it is 
important to recognise that the coherence requirements for utility 
and subjective probability measurement are essentially analogous, 
and hence both concepts have come to assume a fundamental position 
within decision science. Perhaps the most comprehensive set of 
axioms prescribing coherent preference are those proposed by Savage 
(1954) in his treatment of. both utility and subjective probability, 
within the framework of his Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) model. 
For the practical psychologist investigating decision behaviour, 
the normative issues raised are of some importance. This is because, 
in the same way that the study of perception requires an adequate 
characterisation of the stimuli that are to be perceived, the study 
of judgement and decision would be vacuous without an adequate 
characterisation of the probability and utility concepts. In so 
far as the theories of probability and utility are primarily 
normative, such a requirement will inevitably entail explicitly 
or implicitly adopting a particular normative framework as a basis 
for operationalising these concepts. In a recent review, Einhorn 
and Hogarth ask: 'Why are normative theories so prevalent in 
judgement and choice ...? ' (1981, p. 53). In part our 
discussion 
of probability and utility theory indicates one possible reason 
for this. The psychologist, by adopting any particular definition 
of probability or utility, must in consequence also adopt an 
associated prescriptive framework. That is, the description of 
actual behaviour cannot be entirely separated from the prescription 
of the statistician (unless we are to remove mathematics from the 
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field of human judgement and choice entirely). Our discussion 
of Behavioral Decision Theory in the following Chapters will return 
to this important issue at a number of points. Particularly 
instructive will be the distinction that has been made between the 
logical, empirical and coherence/consistency criteria, since 
Behavioral Decision Theory, despite its understandable subjectivist 
bias, makes frequent use of all three, as standards against which 
human performance is to be compared. That these criteria are 
subject to dispute within statistics is a point of some importance 
if questions of human competence are to be addressed. Where 
experimental evidence indicates departures from rationality when 
subjects judge probabilities and utilities, a thorough analysis 
of the nature of that rationality will first be required. 
t 
,-.. 
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NOTES 
1. Ore's (1953) work contains an English translation of 
Cardano's classic work, The Book of Games of Chance. 
2. Similarly, Good (1962) argues that both relative 
frequency and logical probability might be fundamentally 
interpreted within the subjective framework. 
3. The St. Petersburg Paradox is as follows. A fair coin 
is tossed until the first head appears (on týe Nth trial). 
At this point the game ends, and one wins £2 . Thus, if 
heads appear on the first toss, one wins £2; on the 
second, £4; on the third, £8, etc. Since the Expected 
Value of this gamble is infinite (EV =2x (/)1 +4x (/)2 
+8x (/)9 + ..... ), its fair price is also infinite. 
And hence the Expected Value maximiser should be prepared 
to pay any amount, however large, for just one play. 
However, few individuals would risk more than a modest 
amount on such a wager (see Lopes, 1981, for a recent 
discussion of this). Bernoulli's proposed resolution of 
this paradox was that by substituting utility for monetary 
value in the St. Petersburg problem (and by assuming that 
personal utilities are negatively accelerated, or marginal 
decreasing, with respect to monetary value), the gamble's 
Expected Utility can be shown to have a definite limiting 
value. Thus, for any given individual there will be a 
specific 'fair price "beyond which he or she will not be 
prepared to bet. 
ýýýý' ". t 
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CHAPTER 2 
HISTORICAL ORIGINS II 
DECISION-MAKING UNDER RISK 
Introduction and Summary 
In the previous Chapter we have briefly discussed the four 
principal approaches to probability theory: classical, frequency, 
logical, and subjective. It has been noted that, despite practical 
and theoretical differences, some still unresolved today, all four 
approaches share the feature of being primarily normative. Similarly, 
the modern principle of maximisation of Expected Utility, attributable 
to Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947), is a prescriptive theory of 
rational choice. We have suggested that one consequence of this 
is that the task of describing decision behaviour, if carried out 
within the conceptual frameworks provided by such theories, cannot 
be entirely disassociated from the normative issues that they raise. 
As we shall see at a later stage, this legacy remains within 
Behavioral Decision Theory today, although the purpose of the 
current Chapter is, however, more limited. We review here the 
initial impact of the. normative theories of probability (particularly 
subjective probability) and utility upon psychological research, 
and in particular early studies within Behavioral Decision Theory 
of decision-making under risk1. 
Normative probability and utility theory undoubtedly provide 
an intuitively appealing conceptual framework within which to explore 
the problem of actual decision behaviour. Specifically, the 
concepts of subjective probability, and utility, and the principle 
of mathematical expectation, suggest the possibility that such 
behaviour (in at least a limited number of contexts) can theoretically 
- 18 - 
be subject to mathematical modelling, and hence ultimately to 
prediction. As the discussion in the previous Chapter illustrates, 
the primary prescriptive principle for rational decision is that 
of Expected Value maximisation (EV). Furthermore, Bernoulli 
(1738/1967) suggests, and Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) 
justify, the use of Expected Utility (EU) for normative decision- 
making, and Savage (1954) formulates the axiomatic basis of the 
Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) model as a prescriptive theory. 
Edwards (1955) subsequently introduces the Subjective Expected 
Value (SEV) model, and comments upon the potential of all four 
derivations of the expectation principle as descriptive models of 
choice. We can define here these four variants of the expectation 
principle, which differ only with respect to whether probabilities 
and values are treated as subjective or objective2, to be the class 
of expectation based models. One reason for the appeal of the 
expectation based models as possible behavioural constructs is 
undoubtedly their mathematical simplicity. A second reason is, 
as we have seen, that they provide base-line definitions of rational 
decision (albeit contentious ones) against which actual decision- 
making can be compared. A third, somewhat more pragmatic reason 
is the ability of such models to generate predictions that can be 
subject to conveniently operationalised empirical investigation; 
for example, by employing gambling experiments. 
Of principal interest throughout this Chapter will be the 
question of whether expectation based models, or derivations from 
these models, do in fact provide an adequate description of decision- 
making under risk, particularly at the level of the psychological 
processes underlying such behaviour. Our major contention will 
be that, under general task conditions, expectation based models can 
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as a first approximation describe such behaviour, but that they 
are insufficient as representations of the decision-maker's 
specific psychological processes (e. g. see Payne, 1973). That is, 
they are insufficient in the descriptive substantive sense (cf. 
Sage, 1981). This argument is constructed with reference to 
evidence drawn from three interrelated sources, which represent the 
dominant empirical traditions within early Behavioral Decision 
Theory: firstly, general tests of goodness of fit between. choice 
data and the predictions obtained from expectation based models; 
secondly, empirical investigations of the strictly descriptive class 
of 'moment oriented models', based upon mathematical expectation 
(EV) and higher order moments about the mean, such as variance and 
skewness; thirdly, studies that indicate that under specific task 
conditions individuals may exhibit systematic violations of the 
axioms underlying EU and SEU theory. These three traditions are 
reviewed in separate sections of this Chapter. Treatment of the. 
relevant empirical evidence is by design illustrative, rather than 
exhaustive, since the primary aim here is to provide an historical 
forward to the more recent theoretical and empirical developments 
within the field. 
' I. General Tests of Expectation Based models 
Central to the question of the descriptive validity of expectation 
based models is the question of the measurement of an individual's 
beliefs and values, in the form of subjective probability and utility 
functions. Subjective probability and utility theory suggest that 
this is theoretically possible. However, the reality is somewhat 
different. Generally, the more 'psychological' a particular model 
(e. g. SEU as opposed to EV), the more problematic, as a result of 
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the difficulties associated with measurement, will be the 
construction of adequate empirical tests of the model. At one 
extreme EV maximisation - never seriously held to be an adequate 
descriptive model - can be readily falsified as a general theory 
of decision-making under risk by the demonstration of subjective 
probability and utility functions for specific individuals that 
do not correspond one-to-one with objective probability and monetary 
value. At the other extreme, SEU maximisation can be rigorously 
defended if empirical results prove contradictory on the grounds 
that the experimental procedure failed to assess the subject's 
'true' subjective probabilities3 and utilities (Anderson, 1979). 
Hence, ultimately any set of choices, however bizarre, can be 
rationalised within the SEU framework by a judicious post hoc 
combination of 'true' subjective probability and utility functions 
(Fischhoff, Goitein and Shapira, 1981; Luce, 1962). 
The problem of measurement is compounded by the fact that the 
elicitation methodology suggested by subjective probability and 
utility theory requires, firstly, the a priori assumption that the 
expectation model holds as a descriptive theory, and, secondly, 
independent specification of the form of one input variable in 
order to assess the other. That is, assuming that the SEU model 
holds, knowledge of an individual's utility function for money is 
required in order to assess any subjective probabilities by means 
of his or her preferences amongst bets (and vice versa). Such 
procedures, given that the ultimate goal is to test the descriptive 
validity of the expectation model, can be objected to on the grounds 
of circularity. That is, in order to assess the subjective values 
with which to construct a test of, for instance, SEU, we need to 
assume first that SEU holds. It has, however, been argued that such 
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a procedure is not necessarily circular if the elicitation and test 
phases involve structurally dissimilar gambles (Restle, 1961). 
One method of circumventing the dependence of subjective 
probability assessment upon utility (or vice versa) is to introduce 
assumptions with respect to the form of the independent variable 
employed during the elicitation phase. Preston and Baratta 
(1948) utilise the procedure first suggested by De Finetti (1937/ 
1964) in order to investigate the relationship between subjective 
and objective probability. Their subjects are required to bid with 
play money for gambles of the form, 'x probability to win ' points'. 
By assuming that the subjects' utility for the play money is linearly 
related to its numerical value, and that the offers reflect 
indifference between the bid and the gamble, subjective probabilities 
can be readily calculated. Their results indicate a tendency to 
underestimate high and overestimate low probabilities, with equality 
at approximately p=0.2 (see also Griffith, 1949, for similar 
results). Mosteller and Nogee (1951), following Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1947), apply the converse assumption in order to 
assess individual utility functions. That is, they assume that 
the stated odds in a poker dice game are equivalent to their subjects' 
individual subjective probabilities of success. They present their 
subjects with sets of bets constructed from basic poker hands', with 
the odds associated with each hand clearly explained and constantly 
available. They calculate, from bid data for each hand, each 
subject's individual utility function for money. For the subjects 
employed, students and national guardsmen, fairly smooth utility 
functions emerge over the range 0-100 ', although Mosteller and Nogee 
do report some inconsistencies and methodological problems4. The" 
major criticism of both studies concerns the assumption'that objective 
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and subjective probabilities and values can be treated as 
equivalent. In both cases, no independent check of this 
assumption was attempted. Thus, it would appear that no firm 
conclusions can be drawn from either study. 
The issue of relationship between subjective and objective 
probability, and in particular its assessment independent of utility, 
is not unequivocal. Psychophysical experiments investigating the 
judgement of proportion generally indicate that a one-to-one 
relationship exists between subjective estimates and objective 
(i. e. relative frequency) probability, although some distortions 
appear to occur at extreme values. Either underestimation of low 
and overestimation of high proportions (Pitz, 1965,1966; Shuford, 
1961), or the reverse effect (Ehrlick, 1964; Stevens and Gallanter, 
1957). The research program by John Cohen and associates (see 
Cohen, 1960,1964,1972, for overviews) has provided a large number 
of findings on the relationship between objective and subjective 
probability. In general, these results indicate that under a 
number of specific task conditions judgements of subjective probability 
may not correspond to objective criteria, and suggest that experiments 
that rely-upon the assumption of a one-to-one relationship between 
subjective and objective probability, as in Mosteller's and Nogee's 
study, must be interpreted with considerable caution. Edwards 
(1953,1954b, 1954c), in a series of gambling experiments, reaches 
a similar conclusion, finding preferences for specific levels of 
probability that, he suggests, are difficult to account for on the 
basis of non-linear utility functions. He concludes that preference 
amongst gambles will depend not only upon utility but also subjective 
probability, a finding that leads him (Edwards,, 1954a), to'propose 
the general SEU model as a descriptive theory of choice. 
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Davidson, Suppes, and Siegel (1957) present the first sound 
method for measuring utility via the SEU model. Utilising the 
method first suggested by Ramsey (1926/1964), they identify an event E 
with a subjective probability of occurrence that is equal to its 
subjective probability of non-occurrence (defined by indifference 
between an outcome conditional upon the occurrence of E, and the 
same outcome conditional upon E)5. By offering subjects gambles 
conditional upon such events the utilities of the associated outcomes 
can readily be calculated in standard units, since the subjective 
probabilities cancel. They interpret their results as being 
supportive of the SEU model, although the experiment can be criticised, 
on the previously noted grounds of circularity, because they do not 
subsequently employ the obtained utility bounds to predict choices 
with different gambles6. The interest in this study lies perhaps 
more in the specific methodology (see Coombs and Komorita, 1958, for 
a similar procedure), which allows the problem of measuring subjective 
probability independently of utility to be overcome. 
More recently Coombs, Bezembinder, and Goode (1967) report a 
measurement-free test of all four expectation based models. They 
construct a set of two outcome gambles that allow the a priori 
specification of the patterns of choice data that would reject each 
of the four models for any particular subject. Clearly, since EV, 
SEV and EU are specific cases of the most general SEU model, they 
are more likely to be conclusively rejected. If SEU is rejected 
for any individual it follows that EV, SEV and EU will also be 
rejected, while conversely if EV is rejected this does not, imply 
that SEU will be also. Hence it is not surprising that Coombs 
et al report that, where testing is possible, EV maximisation is 
rejected for a high proportion of their subjects (between 80 and 90% 
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over two experiments). Correspondingly, very few of their subjects 
(5-10%) could have SEU rejected. These results are suggestive, 
although inconclusive for two reasons. Firstly, 'the test criteria 
employed only allow the rejection of any particular model, and not 
its confirmation, since they are derived from necessary and not 
necessary and sufficient conditions. Hence, the conclusion that 
SEU is rejected for only a few subjects does not provide conclusive 
confirmation that the model holds. Secondly, the robustness (or 
'unfalsifiability') of -the SEU model makes it difficult to reject 
in any event. Tversky (1967), in response to the first of these 
problems, constructs a stricter test of the SEU model based upon 
both necessary and sufficient conditions. Furthermore, by employing 
conjoint measurement (Luce and Tukey, 1964) he is able to construct 
simultaneously subjective probability and utility functions for his 
subjects. Tversky's stimuli consist of factorially designed sets 
of two outcome gambles and sets of riskless offers, which his subjects 
are required to bid for. In general his results are favourable to 
the SEU model7; i. e. the data satisfy his necessary and sufficient 
conditions. In particular he demonstrates that subjective probability 
and utility contribute independently to the worth of a gamble (see 
also Wallsten, 1971). 
In sum, the early general tests of expectation based models 
provide only inconclusive support for their descriptive validity. 
However, perhaps with the exception of the EV model, neither do 
they provide evidence of systematic departures from such models. 
As Tversky comments: 
'After more than fifteen years of the experimental 
investigation of decisions under risk, the evidence 
on the descriptive validity of the SEU model is 
still inconclusive. In view of the extreme 
generality of the model on the one hand and the 
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'experimental limitations on the other, it seems 
that the basic question is not whether the model 
can be accepted or rejected as a whole. Instead 
the problem is to discover which of the assumptions 
of the model hold or fail to hold under various 
experimental conditions' (Tversky, 1967, p. 201). 
It is perhaps important to recognise that in none of the studies 
cited above has the central issue been that of judgemental competence. 
Several factors account for this, not least the inconclusive nature 
of the results. Certainly, with some exceptions these studies 
indicate that choices and bids are approximately in accord with 
the predictions provided by the expectation based models. And 
none of the studies reports conclusive and systematic deviations 
from the models. Furthermore, the methodological problems that 
are a feature of such general tests provide the focus for much 
of the research, at the expense of a consideration of the specific 
psychological processes that might account for the results (beyond 
somewhat simplistic motivational concepts such as risk-seeking, 
risk-aversion, or utility for risk). Perhaps in any case the 
conclusion that man appeared to gamble (approximately) well was 
at the time something of an uninteresting finding. 
II. Moment Oriented Models 
A second approach to the problem of describing risky decision- 
making is provided by the strictly descriptive class of moment 
oriented models. -Typically the theoretical emphasis with such 
models is on the attempt to improve the predictive power of the 
EV model by incorporating objective higher order moments of the 
probability distribution over outcomes, such as variance and 
skewness 
B. 
Unlike the expectation based models, the moment 
oriented approach has no normative basis, and is intended to 
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be purely descriptive. Hence, if an individual has a preference 
(for example, for a specific level of variance at a constant 
expected value)the rationality or otherwise of such behaviour 
cannot be analysed within the framework of a normative theory. 
The suggestion that variance might mediate, independent of 
Expected Value, preference amongst gambles is not a new one 
(e. g. see Allais, 1953; Fisher, 1906; Tintner, 1942). In 
particular the notion of variance preference has been operationally 
equated to a 'utility for risk' (Royden, Suppes, and Walsh, 1959). 
This follows from the observation that one of the major differences 
between a gamble and a sure option is that the latter has zero 
variance. Hence, utility for risk might be manifest as a specific 
preference for variance. However, there is no reason, beyond 
that of intuitive appeal, necessarily to equate variance specifically 
with utility for risk. As Coombs and Pruitt (1960) suggest, 
the term variance preference can refer to a preference for an 
measure of dispersion that is monotonic with variance. That is, 
individuals who appear to exhibit variance preferences need not 
necessarily be assumed to be sensitive to the precise numerical 
variance of a gamble. 
Edwards (1954d), in an early empirical study utilising two 
outcome gambles with zero Expected Value and differing variance, 
finds only marginal evidence for variance preferences. However, 
Royden, Suppes, and Walsh (1959) report strong variance preferences 
between risky and riskless options, although their results are 
conditional upon the assumption that utility is linear with money, 
and hence might be explained by non-linear utility functions (cf. 
Edwards, 1961). Coombs and Pruitt (1960) in a critique of'Edwards' 
(1953,1954b, 1954c) Probability preference experiments note that 
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within the gambles that he employs variance is completely confounded 
with the probability levels, and that therefore some of his results 
can be interpreted within a variance preference model. Employing 
a paired comparison task with two outcome zero Expected Value 
gambles, Coombs and Pruitt systematically vary variance and skewness. 
They conclude that their results are most parsimoniously explained 
by preferences for specific levels of variance, with certain second 
order skewness effects. Approximately one-third of their subjects 
prefer low, one-third high, and one-third intermediate variance. 
Interesting though these results are, there remains the theoretical 
objection that an equally parsimonious explanation might be offered 
in terms of individual non-linear utility functions. Other 
studies that offer similar conclusions to those of Coombs and Pruitt 
include Davidson and Marschak (1959), Lichtenstein (1965), Littig 
(1962), and Van der Meer (1963), although in a more recent field 
study in a Las Vegas casino Fryback, Goodman, and Edwards (1973) 
note that variance preferences may not be an absolute phenomenon, 
but may be mediated by contextual variables such as the range of 
variances presented within the experiment. This finding would 
appear to lessen the predictive power of moment oriented models. 
A more serious, methodological criticism can be made of many 
of the variance preference studies. As Edwards (1961) rightly 
suggests, with normal two outcome gambles skewness is necessarily 
confounded with probability, and when Expected Value and probability 
are held constant variance is confounded with the payoffs. Thus 
the two simple rules 'choose the gamble with the maximum payoff' 
and 'minimise the maximum loss' might account for much of the data 
that suggests the existence of variance preferences. Slovic and 
Lichtenstein (1968a, 1968b) present the first investigation of the 
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independent influence of probabilities and payoffs when unconfounded 
with higher order moments. They employ a special type of 'duplex 
gamble' (Figure 2.1). 
Figure 2.1 
Example Duplex Gamble 
Win 01 Lose ý4 
Win 0 Lose 0 
PW . 4,0, W 
1, PL . 2, OL =4 (from Slovic and Lichtenstein, 
1968a, p. 6). 
Each duplex gamble consists of two discs, one disc for winnings 
and one for losses, To play the gamble a pointer is spun on both 
discs to determine the joint payoff. Thus a subject can both 
win and lose, win and not lose, lose and not win, or neither lose 
nor win. The probabilities of winning and losing are represented 
as sectors of the discs. Such a gamble allows the construction of 
sets of bets where the four basic 'risk-dimensions', PW, %w, PL, and 
OL, are unconfounded with the underlying moments (unlike the standard 
two outcome gamble, where PW =1- PL Slovic and Lichtenstein 
propose that a gamble can be characterised, on. the basis of the 
four risk-dimensions, as a multidimensional stimulus. They 
further suggest that an individual's evaluation of a gamble will 
be primarily influenced by, firstly, the. need to simplify the 
information-processing demands of the task and reduce cognitive 
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strain (cf. Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin, 1956) and, secondly, 
importance beliefs about the relative weight to be accorded to 
each of the four risk-dimensions. Hence one possible simplifying 
strategy, for an individual who believes the win dimension to be 
the most important, might be 'maximise the possible gain'. A 
further more complex example might be 'maximise the possible gain, 
unless PL is large, in which case minimise the possible loss'. 
All such simple strategies are, in the sense proposed by normative 
probability and utility theory, strictly incoherent. That is, 
adherence to such rules can be shown, under specific circumstances, 
to lead to violations of one or more of the coherence/consistency 
axioms (e. g. see Lindley, 1971, Chapter 9, for demonstrations of 
this). 
In their first study Slovic and Lichtenstein (1968a, Expt. 1) 
employ a factorial design (three levels each of Pw,. $W, PL, and OL) 
in order to construct a set of duplex gambles with independently 
varying risk dimensions. There are three major conclusions: 
firstly, that many of the subjects' responses are overwhelmingly 
determined by only one or two of the risk-dimensions, although the 
specific dimensions are different for different individuals; 
secondly, that contrary to SEU theory a majority of the subjects 
weight PW more than PL, indicating a possible interaction between 
probability and the sign of the payoff; thirdly, that ratings of 
the attractiveness of the gambles correlate most highly with PW, 
whereas bids correlate most highly with Ow and L, 
indicating the 
possibility that response mode can influence attractiveness (see 
also Andriessen, 1971; Lichtenstein and Slovic,, 1971; Sjdberg, 
1968). Slovic and Lichtenstein explain this latter result in 
terms of information-processing considerations, arguing that bidding 
- 30 - 
causes individuals to focus more upon the payoff than does 
rating. However, Slovic's and Lichtenstein's method does not 
enable them to identify the specific decision strategies employed, 
beyond- this general tendency to weight the risk-dimensions 
differentially. 
In a second experiment, designed to investigate probability 
preferences, Slovic and Lichtenstein (1968a, Expt. 2) compare 
choices between sets of duplex gambles and standard two outcome 
gambles similar to those used by Coombs and Pruitt (1960). They 
argue that the confounding of the risk-dimensions in standard 
gambles of equal Expected Value makes the probability preference 
interpretation ambiguous, and that a competing explanation can be 
offered in terms of the overweighting of specific risk-dimensions 
by particular individuals. Specifically, they hypothesise that 
stable preferences for high probabilities (across different levels 
of variance, but with Expected Value held constant) might be explained 
by the differential overweighting of PW and PL, while preferences 
for low probabilities might be explained by the overweighting of 
Ow and OL. This hypothesis is partially supported. Subjects 
who exhibit stable preferences for high probabilities with standard 
gambles also have high regression weights for PW and PL derived 
from the duplex set. This finding is, however, suggestive rather 
than conclusive, since again specific strategies are not identified. 
However, Slovic and Lichtenstein do suggest that both importance 
beliefs and the information-processing demands of the task will 
influence the evaluation of a bet. That is, the need to reduce 
cognitive strain necessitates the use by, subjects of simple risk- 
dimension oriented strategies, and the precise-form of any 
particular strategy will-be mediated across subjects by task 
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characteristics (see also Slovic, 1969 ; Slovic, Fischhoff, and 
Lichtenstein, 1977; Slovic, Lichtenstein, and Edwards, 1965), and 
between subjects by importance beliefs. This conclusion is 
parsimonious with their data, and represents a serious challenge 
to the descriptive validity of both moment oriented and expectation 
based models (see also Lichtenstein, Slovic, and Zinc, 1969). 
In a second paper Slovic and Lichtenstein (1968b) investigate 
the. importance of variance preferences in risky decision-making. 
In their first experiment (1968b, Expt. 1) subjects bid for pairs 
of duplex and parallel standard gambles. Each pair of duplex 
and parallel standard gambles have equal Expected Value, and equal 
values on the four basic risk dimensions. But, due to the increased 
number of outcomes, the duplex gamble has lower variance than its 
parallel standard form9. Slovic and Lichtenstein hypothesise 
that variance effects will'be manifest by strong preferences 
between such pairs. Specifically, an individual who prefers 
low variance should consistently bid more for the duplex gamble, 
while one who prefers high variance should bid more for the parallel 
standard bet. However, decision strategies based upon the 
displayed values on the risk-dimensions would lead subjects to 
bid equally for both. They report significant differences 
suggestive of variance preferences for only three of their nineteen 
subjects, and a partial replication with higher payoffs (1968b, 
Expt. 2) yields similar results. Slovic and Lichtenstein interpret 
their results as follows: 
'The most parsimonious explanation of the present 
results, as well as behaviors previously labelled 
as variance preferences, would seem to be that. the 
decisions of most persons are determined by factors 
such as non-linear subjective probabilities and 
utilities or by strategies that employ only the 
stated probabilities and payoffs', (Slovic and 
Lichtenstein, 1968b, p. 654). 
- 32 - 
In a set of complementary studies Payne and Braunstein (1971) 
report systematic preferences between pairs of duplex gambles with 
different displayed values on the PW and PL risk dimensions (between 
pairs), but equal underlyin§ distributions. They conclude that: 
'It is not possible to account for the observed 
preferences in such pairs on the basis of particular 
moments of the distribution, as both members of these 
pairs have identical distributions' (Payne and 
Braunstein, 1971, p. 15). 
It might be argued here that the duplex gambles are such 
highly specialised stimuli that in fact these experiments may 
say more about duplex gambles than they do about risky decisions 
in general. However, despite this the duplex experiments are of 
considerable importance, particularly since they represent perhaps 
the first examples within Behavioral Decision Theory of an explicit 
information-processing approach to decision-making under risk. 
Furthermore, the risk-dimension model appears to provide the more 
phenomenological explanation of risky decision-making, while at 
the same time not necessarily being incompatible with the findings 
that support the predictive validity, under general task conditions, 
of expectation based or moment oriented models. This is because, 
as Payne and Braunstein suggest: 
... familiar abstractions of gambles, such as expected 
value and variance, may be good predictors of choices 
amongst pairs of gambles only because they correlate 
with the relevant [risk dimension] variable(s)' 
(Payne and Braunstein, 1971, p. 18). 
The risk-dimension model proposed by Slovic and Lichtenstein, 
to which we shall return at a later stage of this dissertation, has 
stimulated what is often termed the 'risk-dimensions versus moment 
oriented debate' (e. g., see Aschenbrenner, 1978; Libby and Fishburn, 
1977; Payne, 1973; Schoemaker, 1979). Despite the more recent 
development of relatively sophisticated models within the, moment 
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oriented paradigm (e. g. portfolio theory [Coombs, 1975]), this 
debate has tended to support the form, if not necessarily the 
substance, of Slovic's and Lichtenstein's original conclusions. 
III. Axiom Violations 
A number of empirical studies indicate that an individual's 
preferences may, under specific task conditions, be contrary to 
the axioms underlying normative EU and SEU theory. As the discussion 
of normative probability and utility theory (Chapter 1, this volume) 
has illustrated, the axiomatic systems provide the logical foundation 
for the derivation of the result that the rational individual, if 
his or her preferences are to reflect his or her true tastes, 
should act as if to maximise EU (or SEU). Clearly, evidence of 
systematic violations of specific axioms would represent a serious 
challenge to the descriptive validity of the expectation based 
models. 
The Allais paradox (1953) is perhaps the best known demonstration 
of the violation of one of the axioms underlying the EU model; 
specifically, the axiom known as the 'sure-thing-principle' 
(Savage, 1954). The sure-thing-principle states that, if two 
alternatives have a common outcome under nature, then preference 
between these alternatives should be independent of this common 
outcome10. Commenting upon Allais' example, Savage (1954: 5.6) 
accepts its intuitive appeal, and admits that his own initial 
preference is contrary to the sure-thing-principle. Nevertheless, 
Savage goes on to suggest that by restructuring the problem he at 
least-is convinced of the need to rescue Expected Utility theory 
by revising his initial preferences. He also proposes that with 
most gambles the sure-thing-principle will be an intuitively reasonable 
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requirement to adhere to. 
However, Ellsberg (1961), in a discussion of a similar 
paradox involving uncertainty rather than risk, reports that not 
all individuals as statistically competent as Savage are prepared 
to revise their intuitive preferences (see also Becker and Brownson, 
1964, for a controlled empirical study of the Ellsberg paradox). 
And MacCrimmon (1968), employing experienced business decision- 
makers as subjects, reports some violations of the sure-thing- 
principle in both the Allais and Ellsberg problems. But he also 
notes that post-experimental discussion of the implications of this 
axiom succeeded in convincing most of his subjects to admit to a 
'mistake', and to revise their initial preferences (see though 
MacCrimmon and Larsson, 1979, for a more recent discussion). 
Unfortunately, MacCrimmon's success here may have less to do with 
the intuitive appeal of the sure-thing-principle than with the 
demand characteristics associated with his discussion sessions 
(Slovic and Tversky, 1974). 
Several recent explanations of the Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes 
have been proposed. Kahneman and Tversky (1979a; Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1981) explain the counter-normative response in terms 
of the 'certainty effect'; i. e. the differential weighting by the 
judge of certain and uncertain outcomes. Thus, the violation of 
the sure-thing-principle is reinterpreted as a bias associated with 
probabilistic thinking. Phillips (1983), commenting upon a version 
of the Allais paradox empirically investigated by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1981), suggests that it may in fact be premature to 
describe these paradoxes as 'violations' of normative decision 
principles, without first having gained an adequate understanding 
of the individual's cognitive representation of the problem. And 
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Lopes (1983) argues that under certain circumstances it might be 
entirely reasonable to violate the sure-thing-principle, on the 
grounds that the normative model might fail to incorporate as 
relevant factors of the problem that are quite legitimately 
important for the individual judge (cf. also March, 1978). 
MacCrimmon (1968) also investigates whether subjective 
probability and utility interact. Central to the SEU model is the 
assumption that the judgement of the subjective probability of 
an event should not be influenced by the value of the outcome of 
that event. He reports some evidence to support such an effect 
but, as in the case of the Allais and Ellsberg problems, attributes 
this to 'mistakes' on the part of his subjects. Other research 
is less conclusive. Irwin and associates, in a comprehensive 
research program (Irwin, 1953; Irwin and Graae, 1968; Irwin and 
Metzger, 1966; Irwin and Snodgrass, 1966) report some interaction, 
although not systematic (see also Slovic, 1966). And Edwards 
(1955) notes that some of the data from his probability preference' 
experiments may indicate a possible interaction between the sign 
of a bet (i. e. positive or negative Expected Value) and the 
probability preference effect. 
A third axiom investigated by MacCrimmon (1968) is transitivity. 
A preference order across the consequences A, B and C is defined 
to be transitive if A. > B and B-C implies that A>C (where 
'>' represents 'is at least as preferred to'). An intransitive 
preference ordering occurs if an individual simultaneously prefers 
A>B, B>C and C>A (except in the case of complete indifference)11. 
This axiom is central to both subjective probability, and utility 
theory since, in order to assign a numerical index to the individual's 
beliefs and values, it is first necessary to assume that his or her 
- 36 - 
preference structure is transitive. Furthermore, its intuitive 
justification as a central principle of rational choice lies in 
the fact that an intransitive decision-maker can theoretically 
be infinitely. exploited as a 'money-pump' (Edwards, Lindman, 
and Phillips, 1965, p. 273). MacCrimmon, in common with others 
(e. g. Davis, 1958; Edwards, 1953; Griswold and Luce, 1962; 
May, 1954), concludes that preference is generally transitive. 
However, a serious problem exists with general tests of transitivity 
(and particularly of weak stochastic transitivity) that are constructed 
from complete sets of factorially generated pairs of options. 
Since in such sets there is, usually only a 
_small 
proportion of 
potentially transitive orderings it becomes almost impossible to 
discriminate, on the basis of the-observed proportion of actual 
intransitivities, the truly intransitive individual and one who is 
merely inconsistent (Morrison, 1963). One solution to this 
problem is first to identify potentially intransitive sets of 
options, as a basis for empirical study. In an elegantly designed 
experiment Tversky (1969) employs a lexicographic semi-order model 
to generate such a set of gambles. The lexicographic semi-order 
model predicts that an individual will ignore differences on 
dimensions (i. e. either probability or payoff) that are below a 
criterion value, and that this will lead to an intransitive 
preference ordering across certain specific sets of gambles. 
Although some pre-selection of subjects is necessary, in order, to 
identify potentially 'intransitive individuals, the results support 
Tversky's original hypothesis. Subsequently, Montgomery (1977), 
employing a think-aloud procedure (but only five subjects), has 
replicated this result. Montgomery is also able to confirm the 
use by some subjects of a lexicographic semi-order type rule when 
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evaluating such gambles. However, like Tversky, Montgomery 
pre-selects potentially intransitive subjects, and hence the 
generality of this. result can be questioned. Ranyard (1977) 
finds that only nine out of twenty-nine unselected subjects 
produce intransitive preference patterns, while Lindman and Lyons 
(1978) report twenty-two from a subject sample of forty-two. 
The importance of Tversky's experiment, like the duplex studies 
of Slovic and Lichtenstein (1968a, 1968b), lies in the fact that 
he attempts to account for his results in terms of an explicit 
information-processing model. As Tversky notes: 
'The main interest in the present results lies not so 
much in the fact that transitivity can be violated 
but rather in what these violations reveal about 
the choice mechanism and the approximation method 
that governs preference between multidimensional 
alternatives' (Tversky, 1969, p. 46). 
The conclusion to be drawn from the studies reported in this 
section is that by the end of the 1960s a small number of 
demonstrations of 'departures' from normative theory had been 
observed. At the time these findings were certainly not unequivocal, 
particularly because highly specific task conditions were typically 
required to elicit the effects (and hence questions remained with 
respect to generality). However, these findings were sufficient 
to suggest to a small number of researchers that the dominant 
paradigm within Behavioral Decision Theory, that of expectation 
maximisation, might be inadequate as a truly descriptive model of 
decision-making under risk. 
IV. Conclusion 
The evidence that we have briefly reviewed illustrates the 
major psychological approaches to the description of decision-making 
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under risk during the period from 1954 to the late 1960s. The 
majority of this research adopts a theoretical position inherited 
from normative probability and utility theory: that is, that 
risky decision behaviour can be described, at least as a first 
approximation, in terms of models derived from the principle of 
mathematical expectation. Despite methodological difficulties 
we have seen that such models receive some, support in the context 
of general sets of risky options. However, a number of studies, 
typically employing highly specific options, suggest that the 
psychological processes underlying decision-making under risk 
may entail the use of strategies that are incompatible with the 
normative theory. The evidence indicates that both expectation 
based and moment oriented models may be inadequate in a 
descriptive substantive sense. This is further reinforced by 
the fact that, despite evidence supportive of models such as SEU, 
individuals may nevertheless intuitively violate certain axioms 
(and be difficult to persuade otherwise), a point that is perhaps 
best illustrated by the contrasting implications of Tversky's 
SEU (1967) and iintransitivity (1969) studies. In the next 
Chapter we review. the alternative paradigm that arose within 
Behavioral Decision Theory as a result of the accumulation of 
these-contradictory findings. 
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NOTES 
1. Edwards (1954a) makes a distinction between three 
categories of choice situation: risky, riskless, and 
uncertain. Riskless choice, traditionally the domain 
of classical utility theory and economics, is 
characterised by alternatives whose outcomes are certain. 
That is, outcomes that are independent of external chance 
events. Risky choice involves alternatives with uncertain 
outcomes, where the uncertainty can be expressed in 
numerical form via probability theory. A gamble contingent 
upon the toss of a 'fair' coin would be included in this 
category. Choice under uncertainty occurs when 'propositions 
about the future exist to which no generally accepted 
probabilities can be attached' (1954a, p. 391): for 
example, a gamble contingent upon the outcome of a unique 
event, such as Smith winning the next election. Our 
discussion of probability theory suggests of course that the 
theoretical status of this taxonomy depends to some extent 
upon one's judgement as to the appropriate way in which to 
characterise events, and the role of probability theory in 
representing such uncertainty as exists. For example, 
Edwards and Tversky (1967, p. 255) suggest that in practice 
all choice may involve some uncertainty, and that therefore 
the riskless/risky distinction may be externally vacuous. 
The distinction between risk and. uncertainty becomes similarly 
fuzzy (and perhaps mathematically vacuous) from a subjective 
probability perspective. Thus, while risky and uncertain 
events might be qualitatively, and perhaps psychologically 
distinct, a subjectivist would argue that their associated 
probabilities can, and should, be subject to equivalent 
mathematical treatment. 
2. Our discussion of probability and utility theory clearly 
indicates that the existence of objective probabilities 
and values is a contentious issue. 
3. For recent reviews of some of the commonly-employed procedures 
for subjective probability assessment, see Stäel von Holstein 
and Mathesen (1979), and Wallsten and Budescu (1983). 
4. For example, Mosteller and Nogee (1951) note that one subject 
was particularly superstitious towards one specific hand, 
on the grounds that he felt that it was unlucky for him! 
5. The device that Davidson, Suppes, and Siegel (1957) employ, 
after having rejected coins and ordinary dice, is a six- 
sided die printed with two nonsense syllables (e. g. ZEJ and 
Z0J), each syllable appearing on three of the faces. 
Pilot studies indicated that the subjective probabilities 
of throwing ZEJ or its complement ZOJ satisfied the 
equiprobability criteria for most subjects. , 
6. Also, as Davidson, Suppes, and Siegel (1957) rightly concede, 
the utility bounds that they obtain might be partly a"function 
of the specific gambles that they utilise. -''Since their method 
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requires that the experimenter constructs a specific 
set of gambles for each subject, the possibility of 
methodological artifacts is raised. 
7. Although Tversky (1967) does also. report that his 
subjects generally overbid (in comparison to the 'fair 
price') for risky offers, and. junderbid for riskless offers'. 
he suggests that these results can only be accounted for 
by admitting a utility for gambling (cf. Royden, Suppes, 
and Walsh, 1959), or by assuming that subjective probabilities 
do not sum to unity. Neither of these explanations is 
compatible with the SEU model. 
8. Payne (1973, footnote p. 439) rightly notes that, although 
variance and skewness are commonly referred to as the 
second and third moments of the probability distribution 
over outcomes, they are technically the second and third 
moments about the mean. The first three moments, for a 
standard two outcome gamble (p win w, 1-p win y), are 
formally defined as follows: 
Expectation (first. moment) = pw + (1 - p)y 
Variance (second moment) = p(1 - p)(w - y)2 
Skewness (third moment) _ 
12 
'Ir(l -0 
(Coombs and Pruitt, 1960, p. 267). 
9. Note that the need to have equal values on the risk-dimensions 
of both duplex and standard gambles necessitates the use 
of a very specific type of duplex bet; i. e. one where 
P=1- PL. 
10. The Allais Paradox is as follows: 
Consider which gamble-is preferred in Situation X and 
Situation Y. 
Situation X Probability To win 
Gamble 11 £1,000,000 
Gamble 2 .1 £5,000,000 
. 89 £1,000,. 000 
. 01 £0 
Situation Y Probability To win 
Gamble 3 . 11 £1,000,000 
. 89 £0 
Gamble 4 . 10 £5,000,000 
. 90 £0 
Allais argues that it is reasonable to choose Gamble 1 in 
Situation X and 4 in Situation Y. The reasoning behind 
this is as follows: why in X should one gamble a sure fortune 
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against a chance (however remote) of getting nothing, 
whereas in Ya probability of . 11 is not much more than 
. 10, so choose the much larger payoff. Such a pattern of 
preferences, however, represents a violation of the sure- 
thing-principle. This-becomes clear if we restructure 
the problem as follows: 
Situation X Probability To win 
Gamble 1 . 11 £1,000,000 
. 89 £1,000,000 @ Gamble 2 . 89 £1,000,000 @ 
.1 £5,000,000 
. 01 £0 
Situation Y Probability To win 
Gamble 3 . 11 £1,000,000 
. 89 £0 Gamble 4 . 89 £0 
.1 £5,000,000 
. 01 - £0 
Since the outcomes marked @ are equivalent, and common to 
both Gambles 1 and 2, they should not influence preference 
between these gambles. Similarly the. outcomes marked @@ 
are common to Gambles 3 and 4. Neglecting these common 
outcomes, the choice between both 1 and 2 and 3 and 4 reduces 
to an equivalent pair: i. e. . 11 to win £1,000,000, against 
.1 to win £5,000,000 or . 01 to win £0. Thus, for an individual's preferences to be consistent with the sure-thing- 
principle he or she should prefer 1 and 3, or 2 and 4. 
The individual who prefers 1 and 4 (or 2 and 3) is held to 
violate the sure-thing-principle on the grounds that the 
addition of the common outcomes @ and @@ appears to have 
influenced the preference order. Such behaviour is 
typically termed a 'preference reversal'. 
11. Within some-descriptive theories of choice the strict 
transitivity axiom is commonly relaxed in order to compensate 
for random fluctuations in preference order. The weakest 
form of this axiom is known as weak stochastic transitivity 
(Davidson and Marschak, 1959). . Here preference 
is held 
to be transitive if the following holds: 
P(x, y, ) a/ and P(y, z, ) > /, implies that P(x, z) a/ 
where P(x, y) is the proportion of times, or 
probability, that x is preferred to y. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE HEURISTICS, BIASES, AND BOUNDED 
RATIONALITY MODEL 
Introduction and Summary 
In the previous Chapter we have reviewed early research on 
decisbn-making under risk covering a period broadly from the 
publication of Ward Edwards' seminal(1954a) article to the late 
1960s. Psychological experimentation and theory within this 
tradition focuses primarily upon the attempt to describe individual 
decision-making under risk in terms of variants of the normative 
expectation model inherited from statistics and economics (Chapter 
1, this volume). Two, somewhat contradictory conclusions arise 
from this research: firstly, that under fairly general task 
conditions (e. g. factorially generated sets of gambles), expectation 
principles such as SEU, or moment oriented models, approximate 
individuals' choice patterns well. However, such interpretations 
are subject to a number of methodological problems, in addition to 
the theoretical charge, in the case of the SEU model at least, of 
unfalsifiabiity. Furthermore, these findings can be contrasted 
with a second, smaller group of studies, ty. pically employing highly 
specific choice stimuli (e. g. duplex gambles, paradoxes). Such 
studies would appear to indicate that the normative principles 
inherited from economics and statistics are an inadequate basis 
for a truly psychological level of explanation of risky choice. 
As a result a number of studies at the end of this period (Payne 
and Braunstein, 1971; Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1968a, 1968b; 
Tversky, 1969) point to the possibility of achieving a more 
psychological theoretical framework within Behavioral Decision 
Theory by the adoption of an explicitly cognitive, information- 
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processing approach to judgement and choice. In the current 
Chapter we move on from the traditional subject area of Behavioral 
Decision Theory, that of decision-making under risk, to consider the 
development, in the 1970s, of such an information-processing approach - 
specifically, the heuristics, biases, and bounded rationality model. 
This model, initially developed in the context of judgement under 
uncertainty, but more recently interpreted as a generalised model of 
both judgement and decision1, has provided the dominant paradigm 
within Behavioral Decision Theory for the last ten years. We 
consider in the first section the conceptual underpinnings of this 
model, as reflected in the seminal work of Herbert Simon and Jerome 
Bruner in the mid-1950s. This is followed by an examination of 
the empirical precursors of the model, specifically the work, firstly 
comparing clinical judges to statistical prediction rules, and 
secondly exploring the Bayesian conservatism phenomenon. Of 
particular interest here will be the genesis of the notion of 
bias in these studies, together with the evidence that they 
provide to support the argument, proposed initially in the context 
of risky choice, for the radical theoretical and empirical 
reorientation of research within Behavioral Decision Theory. 
The third section details the theoretical and methodological 
aspects of this reorientation, as expressed in the heuristics, 
biases, and bounded rationality paradigm. This is followed by 
a general outline of some of the important empirical results that 
have arisen within this paradigm. It is also argued, in the fifth 
section, that the resultant growth of empirical findings of inferential 
and decision-making biases has been accompanied by a generalisation 
of the notion of error or bias that has radically altered the original 
implications of the model. In a final section, brief conclusions 
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are drawn. It is not the intention to discuss here criticisms 
of the heuristics, biases, and bounded rationality model, or the 
specific issue that will be of central relevance to the empirical 
studies to be reported in subsequent Chapters; that of heuristic 
efficiency (Thorngate, 1980). These issues will be comprehensively 
discussed in the following Chapter (Chapter 4). 
I. Conceptual Foundations: Bounded Rationality and Cognitive Strain 
'Because of the psychological limits of the organism 
(particularly with respect to computational and 
predictive ability) actual human rationality striving 
can at best be an extremely crude and simplified 
approximation to the kind of global rationality 
which is implied, for example, by game theoretic 
models' (Simon, 1955, p. 102). 
The seminal restaTch by Tversky and Kahneman (1971,1973,1974; 
Kahneman and Tversky, 1972,1973) on the role of cognitive heuristics 
in judgement under uncertainty derives its primary theoretical 
orientation from the early work of Herbert Simon on models of 
rationality. Simon's own theoretical position is typified in 
the conjecture quoted above. Like Edwards (1954a), Simon (1955) 
notes the research potential, with respect to the issue of rational 
behaviour, at the interface of economic and psychological theory. 
Edwards concludes his seminal review article by noting that the then 
new mathematical models of choice offer '... a new and rich field for 
psychologists, in which a theoretical structure has already been 
elaborately worked out and in which many experiments need to be 
performed' (1954a, p. 411). Simon, however, questions. the prescriptive 
and descriptive validity of such models in the domain of behavioural 
choice. He argues that the intrinsic calculational complexity 
demanded by economic models of rational choice is incompatible, under 
all but the most trivial of circumstances, with the limited cognitive 
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resources of the individual. Empirical confirmation of Simon's 
latter suggestion was at the time evident in the work of Miller 
(1956), on the limited capacity of short term memory. Simon 
rejects as a practical descriptive proposition the theory of economic 
man, who is always rational in the sense that he or she maximises 
Expected Utility. As an alternative Simon (1957) suggests that 
actual choice behaviour can be more parsimoniously described in 
terms of the principle of bounded rationality. By this Simon 
means that the individual, in order to cope with the complexities 
of the choice environment, constructs a simplified cognitive 
representation of the world that facilitates, via the mediation of 
simple choice rules, functional decisions within the context of 
that environment. One such decision rule suggested by Simon 
(1955) is that of satisficing; rather than seeking to maximise 
Expected Utility, a choice will be made of the first option that is 
found to be above a fixed aspiration level (i. e. is satisfactory) 
on all relevant outcome dimensions2. 
The general notion underlying Simon's position is that a 
realistic model of rational behaviour must be sensitive to the 
constraints arising from the interrelation between the individual's 
cognitive resources and the demands placed upon him or her by the 
complexities of the environment, and that '... the problem can be 
approached initially either by inquiring into the properties of 
the choosing organism or by inquiring into the environment of choice' 
(1955, p. 99). Both descriptive and prescriptive aspects are to be 
sought in the relation between, on the one hand, cognitive processes 
and on the other the structure of the environment. 
Simon (1955) rightly suggests that, when compared to economic 
models, the principle of bounded rationality is clearly the more 
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parsimonious descriptive construct. However, his position 
with respect to its prescriptive implications is less clear, with two 
interpretations possible. One is (as a subjective probability or 
utility theorist would undoubtedly claim) that the boundedly rational 
decision-maker is acting 'sub-optimally' or 'irrationally', in the 
sense that he or she can be demonstrated to be acting in an incoherent 
or inconsistent manner. The competing interpretation is that the 
boundedly rational decision-maker is, given the environmental and 
behavioural constraints to decision, acting as rationally as possible. 
Hence the principle offers an alternative conceptualisation of 
rationality; i. e. defined with respect to achievement within a 
given decision environment. Our own view is that Simon, originally 
at least, is committed to the latter interpretation. For example, 
in an early paper (1956) he demonstrates mathematically that an 
organism in a simulated environment (similar in some respect to 
Walter's, 1953, Machina Spectulatrix) can exhibit functional behaviour 
upon the basis of. a limited number of simple choice rules. And as 
March (1978) comments: 
'Because subsequent developments were extensive, it 
is well to recall that the original argument of 
Simon was a narrow one. It started from the 
proposition that all intendedly rational behavior 
is behavior within constraints. Simon added the' 
idea that the list of technical constraints on 
choice should include some properties of. human 
beings as processors of information and problem- 
solvers ... He suggested that human beings 
develop decision procedures, 
_that 
are. sensible, given 
the constraints, even if they might not be sensible 
if the constraints were removed'-(March, 1978, p. 590). 
Readers of recent interpretations of the principle, of bounded 
rationality might be forgiven for assuming-that he was himself more 
concerned with the 'sub-optimal' interpretation of the principle. 
At the time Simon's bounded rationality thesis was purely conjectural, 
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and lacked direct empirical support from within the then embryonic 
field of Behavioral Decision Theory. Although the attribution of 
causes to scientific progress is at best a problematic business, it 
could be argued here that it was this initial lack of direct empirical 
support, in addition to the initial belief of psychologists that 
subjective probability and utility theory provided a new and 
appropriate framework within which to study -judgement and choice, 
that resulted in the almost universal neglect of Simon's early work 
for almost fifteen years. This, in hindsight, had a number of 
important implications for the field, since, as our review of the 
early Behavioral Decision Theory literature has illustrated, the 
subsequent reliance upon economic models resulted in equivocal findings, 
serious theoretical and methodological difficulties, and perhaps 
most significantly a lack of theory with adequate psychological 
content. 
Given the emphasis laid by Simon upon the problem-solving 
abilities of the organism, it is perhaps not at all surprising to 
find related research being conducted at the same time within the 
emerging field of cognitive psychology: specifically, the classic 
work of Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin (1956) on thinking (cf. 
Lockhead, 1980). Bruner et al. discuss the important role played 
by cognitive strain (the demands placed on memory and inference by 
task and strategy complexity) in the mediation of problem-solving 
activity. They argue that the cognitive strain on an individual 
decision-maker is a function of both the complexity of the strategy 
adopted, and the local demands of the task environment with which 
the individual is in interaction. In experiments on concept 
attainment they demonstrate that individuals will tend to shift 
towards the use of simple, less strainful strategies, at the risk of 
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an overall decrement in problem-solving efficiency3, as the cognitive 
strain imposed by the task is increased (as manipulated, for example, 
by the provision of randomly structured as opposed to orderly visual 
aids to guide the subject's problem solving). 
The importance of the work of Bruner et al. lies"in the fact that 
they provide an independent demonstration (albeit in a task domain 
strictly unrelated to Behavioral Decision Theory) of the general 
processes hypothesised by Simon in the principle of bounded rationality. 
Furthermore, the notion of cognitive strain is an explicit psychological 
construct that suggests the possibility of (a) treatment of the 
cognitive demands imposed both by the decision-maker's limited 
information-processing abilities and those of the task under a single 
conceptual framework, and (b) consequent generation of specific 
predictions relating achievement to both cognition and task, in 
the manner implicit in Simon's model. Interestingly, and like 
Simon, Bruner et al. do not relate the adequacy of achievement merely 
to efficiency per se. They indicate that efficiency can only be 
adequately understood in relation to the demands imposed by the task. 
Hence, while a decrease in efficiency might be regarded at a global 
level as sub-achievement, they suggest that a more subtle issue 
concerns the fact that 'aside from this generalised efficiency, one 
must consider the extent to which a given mode of approach meets 
the requirements of a task with which a person must deal here and 
now' (1956, p. 113, emphasis added). In effect they adopt a similar 
position to Simon with respect to the issue of rational behaviour; 
that is, that it should be conceptualised as a function of 
characteristics of both the organism and task4. 
We conclude this section by noting that the general relevance 
of the work of the work of Simon, and of Bruner, GoodnDw and Austin 
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to the field of Behavioral Decision Theory was to emerge only 
fifteen years later, in the development of the heuristics, biases, 
and bounded rationality model. Before describing this development, 
we review some influential empirical studies from this fifteen 
year period. 
II. Empirical Precursors: Linear Models and' Conservative Bayesians 
The issue of rational judgement was raised, sometimes in quite 
heated debate, within the field of clinical psychology following the 
publication of Meehl's classic (1954) monograph, Clinical vs. 
Statistical Prediction. Meehl, following Sarbin's (1941,1944) 
critique from an actuarial perspective of the logic of clinical 
prediction, presents the first comprehensive review of the relative 
merits of these two important methodologies. The term actuarial 
refers to the statistical prediction of clinical outcomes on the 
basis of pre-determined diagnostic cues. Such cues are selected 
such that they correlate, in sets of prior case history data, 
with meaningful behavioural outcome categories. Typically simple 
linear models are utilised to aggregate into an overall prediction 
the information provided by a set of relevant cues. For example, 
crude numerical values can be assigned to the presence or absence 
(possibly taking some account also of degree of strength) of 
each separate cue variable, and combined linearly to produce an 
overall predictive index. Such an index can, most simply, be 
interpreted with respect to some form of predetermined cut-off 
score. By clinical prediction is meant the intuitive judgement 
processes employed by the trained expert, such as the clinical 
psychologist or interviewer, when arriving at diagnoses and 
predictions. 
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Meehl (1954, Chapter 6) rejects Sarbin's extreme conclusion 
that all clinical activity can be reduced in essence to actuarial 
formulae, arguing that the clinician's potential superiority lies 
in his or her ability to generate hypothesis about the case in 
hand. While actuarial data might be necessary for the testing of 
such hypotheses, whether by classical induction or the more recent 
methods of falsificationism, it cannot be employed to generate them5. 
Furthermore, Meehl argues, the clinical expert would be likely to 
be sensitive to configural properties of sub-sets of cues that might 
be relatively intractible from an actuarial perspective. 
However, Meehl is unable to cite clear evidence, from his 
review of the few empirical studies available to him at the time, 
many of which he admits are methodologically unsound, of the 
superiority in predictive accuracy of the clinical method over the 
actuarial. This is despite the clinicians' sincerely held belief 
that they would, almost axiomatically, perform more efficiently. 
At the time this controversial claim prompted a plethora of more 
rigorous studies. This subsequent evidence indicates that statistical 
methods, and in particular the simple linear model, can be as good 
as, and often outperform, the expert clinician (e. g. Goldberg, 1968; 
Meehl, 1965; Sawyer, 1966). As Dawes and Corrigan (1974), in 
a comprehensive review of the subject, succinctly comment: 
'The statistical analysis was thought to provide a 
floor to which the judgement of the experienced 
clinician could be compared ... The floor turned 
out to be a ceiling' (Dawes and Corrigan, 1974, 
p. 97). 
The most significant applied outcome of these studies has been 
the development of policy capturing linear regression techniques. 
By such methods accurate linear regression models of the input-output 
relationship expressed in the expert's overt predictions can be 
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formulated (Hammond, Hursch, and Todd, 1964; Hoffman, 1960; 
Naylor and Wherry, 1965). The obtained proper linear model 
(Dawes, 1979) can then be utilised to bootstrap the expert; i. e. 
under certain task conditions (cf. Camerer, 1981) improve on his or 
her overall predictive ability and even possibly, in the spirit of 
Meehl's (1954) hypothetical trained actuary, replace the expert 
entirely (Dudycha and Naylor, 1966; Goldberg, 1970). 
Three complementary hypotheses have been advanced in an attempt 
to explain the apparent power of the linear model to mimic, and even 
improve upon, the predictions of the expert. Firstly, by capturing 
the expert's policy, which is assumed to rely upon valid predictor 
variables in substance, if not always consistently in application, 
a proper linear model eliminates the inherent variability in the 
expert's strategy that arises as a result of such factors as fatigue, 
or the inconsistent attention to distracting and invalid cues. In 
sum, the linear model never has an off day (Dudycha and Naylor, 1966; 
Goldberg, 1970; Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1971). Secondly, under 
the fairly mild assumption that predictor variables are monotonically 
related to the criterion variable, the linear model can account for 
the majority of the predictable variance associated with non-linear, 
or configural, strategies (Yntema and Torgerson, 1961). Thus, even 
the highly configural judge, who employs highly non-linear prediction 
strategies, can often be highly accurately simulated in an input- 
output sense. Note that this observation removes one particular 
advantage that Meehl (1954,1959) suggests that the clinician would 
have over the statistical method. Thirdly, the linear model is 
generally robust in the event of mis-specification of predictor 
variable weights (Dawes and Corrigan, 1974). Wilks (1938; see 
also Stalnaker, 1938) analytically demonstrates that as a consequence 
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of the statistical Law of Large Numbers different sets of predictor 
weights will tend to result in equivalent predictions as the number 
of predictor variables incorporated in a linear model increases 
towards infinity6. Also Von Winterfeld and Edwards (1973) show 
that the problem of specifying optimal weights for mul'tiattribute 
decision-models, of which linear regression models are one particular 
sub-type, typically has a solution with what they term is a 'flat 
maxima'. That is, if weights are mis-specified, but approximately 
in the region of the optimal weighting scheme, then the resulting 
departure from the theoretically optimal decision may be small. 
They also suggest that this region may be relatively large7 in the 
context of the total interval over which weights can maximally vary. 
Dawes and Corrigan (1974; also Einhorn and Hogarth, 1975) illustrate 
the implications for clinical prediction-of these two results by 
demonstrating that under fairly general constraints, liable to be 
satisfied in many prediction contexts, simple unit or even randomly 
weighted linear models may serve to outpredict the expert judge. 
Specifically, mis-specified linear models are likely to excel when 
the relationship between the criterion and predictor variables is 
conditionally monotone and measurement error is associated with 
both predictor and criterion variables. The important implication 
of this result is that, while the expert's knowledge is necessarily 
critical information in order to be able first to identify the 
appropriate variables upon which to base a iinear"model; the robustness 
property will often ensure, as Dawes and Corrigan comment, that all 
that is required for subsequent accurate prediction is 'to know 
how to add' (1974, p. 105). 
While the empirical evidence and theoretical arguments indicate 
when and why the linear model can mimic the expert's output, it has 
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generally been accepted that such models do not represent an 
accurate reflection of the actual strategies employed by the human 
judge. Hoffman (1960), utilising a term from minerology, describes 
the relationship between the judge's actual strategies and the 
linear model as being paramorphic. In the same way that a chemical 
formula facilitates general understanding of a substance's properties 
without providing a full account of the actual structure, a paramorphic 
model 'explains' the general outcome of the underlying process at a 
level sufficient for accurate prediction, but without necessarily 
accurately describing the actual cognitions of the individual. 
In this way, for example, an appropriate linear model may accurately 
mimic the predictions of a truly configural judge (Yntema and 
Torgerson, 1961). 
Perhaps the most important implication, for our own purposes, 
that arises from the clinical-statistical debate is the imputation 
of a general level of fallibility on the part of supposedly highly 
trained experts, and the message that this holds with respect to the 
issue of the competence of intuitive judgement. If experts can be 
easily replaced by mechanistic processes, what hope the rest? 
As we shall see, the question of the competence of intuitive judgement 
is central to the heuristics, biases, and bounded rationality model. 
The second critical group of empirical studies that we review 
here derive from the work of Ward Edwards and colleagues on the 
revision of subjective probabilities in multi-stage inference tasks 
(Edwards, 1968; Phillips and Edwards, 1966; Phillips, Hays and Edwards, 
1966). Following Edwards, Lindman., and Savage (1963), this research 
group was the first to introduce to psychology Bayes' Theorem as a 
normative, and potentially descriptive, principle of inference. 
Bayes' Theorem arises primarily in the context of subjective 
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probability theory. The coherent/consistent individual, when 
presented with information that is diagnostic with respect to two 
or more mutually exclusive hypotheses, should revise his or her opinion 
in accordance with the prescriptive Bayesian rule. The typical 
methodology devised to compare the performance of experimental subjects 
with the prescriptions of Bayes' Theorem is the now classic 'bookbag 
and pokerchip task'. Subjects are initially shown two or more 
bookbags containing a number of pokerchips of a specified colour 
composition (e. g. 70 red, 30 white and 30 red, 70 white). The 
experimenter then selects one bag at random without showing the 
subject which. At this point it is assumed that a typical subject 
will have a subjective probability of 0.5 for each of the mutually 
exclusive hypotheses H1 (bag selected is a majority red) and H2 
(bag selected is a majority white). Successive draws of chips 
are made from the selected bag with or without replacement. Subjects 
are required to provide their posterior etimates, with respect to 
the probabilities of the competing hypotheses , on the basis of the 
information provided by the colour of each sampled chip.. The 
typical finding, an effect labelled by Edwards as conservatism, is that 
subjects' estimates on each successive draw will be less extreme 
(although in the correct direction) than the normative probability 
value provided by Bayes' Theorem8. This effect is remarkably 
resilient to experimental eradication, with variations such as changes 
in composition of the chips in the bag, the number of draws, or the 
response mode (e. g. eliciting probability or odds estimates from 
subjects) failing to alter the fundamental pattern of results. 
What appears to have surprised Edwards and colleagues at the time 
was that they had been able to produce such a reliable effect with 
so simple a task; they had originally assumed that subjects would 
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generally be quite good Bayesians, in line with the normative theory 
(Phillips, Hays', and Edwards, 1966). 
The original conservatism studies prompted a plethora of further 
empirical research, seeking to vary every and all parameters 
associated with the basic bookbag and pokerchip task. 
' We shall 
not attempt to review these studies here (see Slovic and Lichtenstein, 
1971, for a comprehensive discussion). However, three competing 
theoretical explanations for the effect can be noted: firstly, 
that conservatism is an artifact arising as a result of response 
bias against extreme probability judgements (DuCharme, 1970); 
secondly, that it is the result of mis-perception of the diagnostic 
impact of the sample data (Beach, 1968; Peterson, DuCharme, and 
Edwards, 1968; Pitt and Downing, 1967); finally, that conservatism 
arises as a result of mis-aggregation of essentially 'accurate' 
estimates of diagnosticity by some rule other than Bayes' Theorem 
(Edwards, Phillips, Hays, and Goodman, 1968; Navon, 1975). Although 
all three explanations receive some empirical support, the most 
critical observation that can be made here is that they all seek to 
locate the deviation from the prescription of Bayes' Theorem in 
some form of semi-psychological bias on the part of the experimental 
subjects. The implication is that if only a subject could be taught 
to respond, perceive, or aggregate in the 'correct' manner then he 
or she would quite naturally become an optimal Bayesian. Clearly, 
such a meta-theoretical perspective, unifying all three explanations 
for the effect, is quite compatible with much contemporary work 
within the field of mainstream cognition, stressing the fallible 
nature of, for example, memory or perception. However, it is 
nevertheless critically dependent upon the assumption that Bayesian 
behaviour is indeed optimal for such contexts as are studied. The 
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view that conservatism was somehow something to be avoided, and 
a pervasive and erroneous response, appears to have been fairly 
uncritically accepted by the researchers. It has only been much 
later, when the entire question of conservatism has become almost 
extinct as an empirical issue, that the suggestion has been made that 
under the general conditions that diäg nostic data is found in the 
world outside the laboratory conservative processing of sequential 
data might be an entirely reasonable mode of inference for the 
intelligent judge (Navon, 1978; 1981). 9 
The comprehensive review by Slovic and Lichtenstein (1971) 
marks the culmination and, in retrospect, subsequent rapid demise of 
the empirical tradition of bookbag and pokerchip experiments. 
Slovic and Lichtenstein note that the dominant emphasis within this 
tradition had been the investigation of inferred judgemental bias 
on the evidence of performance comparisons. That is, the conservative 
Bayesian can be seen as almost by definition behaving sub-optimally, 
irrespective of the possible rationale underlying the rule(s) that 
he or she employs. However, they fail to take this point further, 
and do not challenge the fundamental assumption that Bayes' Theorem 
is indeed the best prescriptive rule under such circumstances. 
What is clear, as Slovic and Lichtenstein rightly note, is that the 
three explanatory hypotheses, representing the sum total of the 
effort of a large number of researchers, lack somewhat in true 
psychological content: 
... the Bayesians have been 
least concerned with 
developing descriptive models of subjective 
composition rules, concentrating instead on 
comparing subjects' performances with that of 
an optimal model' (Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1971, 
p. 725). 
Slovic and Lichtenstein rightly conclude that the accumulated 
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evidence indicates that individuals may be processing information 
in ways fundamentally different from that of the Bayesian model, 
and that new models of a truly descriptive and psychological nature 
are required. It was perhaps this suggestion that, more than 
anything, extinguished the bookbag and pokerchip paradigm as a major 
research tradition within Behavioral Decision Theory. Significantly, 
they also conclude that the necessary theoretical and empirical 
re-orientation of research might well take the form of a closer 
integration of the concepts and methods of Behavioral Decision 
Theory with those of mainstream cognitive psychology, particulärly 
as represented by the work of Simon and Bruner. Thus the suggestion 
of a process oriented approach to judgement and choice had been made (cf. 
Wallsten, 1980). 
To summarise the research that has been discussed in this 
section, two decades of research both within the Bayesian and 
Clinical-Statistical tradition produced an abundance of empirical 
data of varying quality, but a paucity of theory of substantive' 
cognitive content. The primary conclusions that can be drawn 
with respect to both traditions are as follows: firstly, that 
individuals when required to make judgements about the probability 
of predetermined hypotheses (whether clinical outcome categories, or 
bag compositions) upon the basis of potentially diagnostic information, 
are prone to reliable deviation from optimality, where optimality 
is defined with respect to prescribed performance criteria10; 
secondly, that such results might best be explained in terms of the 
operation of cognitive processes fundamentally different from the 
principles underlying the assumed optimal models. These conclusions 
mirror. those that we have noted in the previous Chapter (Chapter 2) 
with respect to the culmination of early research into the issue of 
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decision-making under risk, although the emphasis upon sub-optimality 
per se is probably less pronounced in the latter research tradition. 
Hence, although prediction, judgement, and decision-making under risk 
are conceptually distinct in many ways, the basic thesis to arise 
from all three domains of inquiry, as it was to influe"nce the 
subsequent development of the heuristics, biases, and bounded 
rationality model in Behavioral Decision Theory, is remarkably 
uniform and unequivocal. 
III. Theoretical and Methodological Aspects of the Model 
The fundamental theoretical insight that promoted the reorientation 
of the field of Behavioral Decision Theory was that of the inadequacy 
of normative models of judgement and choice as truly descriptive 
principles, even when appropriately modified to account for 
behavioural factors. As Tversky and Kahneman have succinctly 
commented: 'Man is apparently not a conservative Bayesian; he 
is not Bayesian at all' (1974, p. 450). This observation has two 
fundamental implications: firstly, the need for a completely new 
conceptual framework, no longer grounded in the formalism of normative 
rationality, and offering purely paramorphic representations of 
human inference and decision processes; secondly, that at an 
empirical level theoretically sterile baseline comparisons with 
normative performance criteria should be rejected in favour of 
methods more suited to the investigation of the specific cognitive 
processes underlying judgement and choice. In response to the former 
problem Tversky and Kahneman, following Slovic and Lichtenstein 
(1971), suggest the adoption of a conceptual framework derived in 
the main from the work of Simon and Bruner. They propose that the 
individual, because of his or her modest computational abilities, 
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and faced with the typical complexities of all but the simplest of 
decision tasks, will employ a range of simplifying judgemental 
strategies (heuristics) in order to reduce, or limit, cognitive 
strain. Tversky and Kahneman suggest that the use of such 
simplifying strategies will often lead to efficient and optimal 
responses, but under some circumstances will result in severe and 
systematic error, or bias. Thus the individual is no longer the 
rational calculating being assumed by Peterson and Beach (1967), 
but is conceptualised as a strictly flawed creature, of bounded 
rationality, sometimes succeeding, and sometimes failing to cope 
adequately with the complex tasks with which he or she is faced 
(see also Slovic, 1972). By implication, bounded rationality 
is taken here to mean no more or less than strict non-optimality. 
This is the first, prescriptive, sense of the term that we have 
previously noted in our discussion of Simon's (1957) original 
proposition. As we have also noted, such usage is somewhat 
different from Simon's original meaning. 
The empirical approach adopted by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) 
follows as a consequence of the conceptual position that they adopt. 
Specifically, experiments should be designed to ascertain the precise 
forms of cognitive simplifying strategies adopted by individuals under 
conditions of cognitive strain, and the important factors such as task 
individual differences11 determining the variables, motivation, and 
use or neglect of any specific strategy. Clearly, as a general 
programmatic statement there is little to criticise in this empirical 
orientation adopted by Tversky and Kahneman. And indeed its 
emergence as a research tradition has ensured that Behavioral 
Decision Theory has at a minimum evolved a psychological, specifically 
cognitive, level of explanation that was formerly conspicuous by its 
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absence! Nevertheless, within the bounds of their general empirical 
strategy, Tversky and Kahneman adopt a far more specific tactical 
approach to experimentation. Specifically, they devise studies 
that seek to demonstrate : reliable departures by subjects from 
predetermined normative principles. These departures are then 
accorded the status of biases. On the basis of such departures 
from a normative rule (i. e. the Y bias or 'fallacy') an attempt is 
made to infer, in hindsight, the underlying cognitive mechanism 
governing the subjects' responses (which is then accorded the status 
of the X heuristic). Generally the studies are carefully constructed 
within the 'conversational paradigm' (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982a); 
that is, utilising simple question and answer tasks, and a problem 
structuring. that is assumed to be common to both experimenter and 
subject (Berkeley and Humphreys, 1982). 
Kahneman and Tversky note three interrelated reasons for 
studying systematic judgemental errors: 
'First, they expose some of our intellectual limitations 
and suggest ways of improving the quality of our thinking. 
Second, errors and biases often reveal the psychologial 
processes and the heuristic procedures that govern 
judgement and inference. Third, mistakes and fallacies 
help the mapping of human intuitions by indicating 
which principles of statistics or logic are non- 
intuitive or counter-intuitive' (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1982a, p. 124). 
Of these three reasons, the first can be questioned since it 
rests upon the implicit assumption that responses counter to the 
normative principles of mathematics and statistics are necessarily 
behaviourally limiting. Of course, we have to accept here that it 
would be inappropriate to attribute hidden method to all forms of 
madness (Fischhoff and Beyth-Marom, 1983). However, as we shall 
argue in the next Chapter (Chapter 4), normative models may not 
necessarily always be adequate guides to intelligent behaviour, and 
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hence their neglect under specific circumstances might be entirely 
reasonable (cf. March, 1978). On similar grounds the third reason 
can be questioned, since it implicitly assumes that non-normative 
responses can be unambiguously classified as mistakes. Tversky's 
and Kahneman's second stated reason is, however, a strong justification 
for the methodological approach that they adopt, and we can trace 
this approach to Tversky's statement with respect to intransitivity 
(1969); that the main interest in such experiments lies in the 
information that they provide about the mechanism of choice. 
Tversky and Kahneman also draw a parallel between their research 
strategy and the study of visual illusions within perception, as 
follows: 
'The emphasis on the study of errors is characteristic 
of research in human judgement, but it is not unique 
in this domain. We use illusions to understand the 
principles of normal perception and we learn about 
memory by studying forgetting' (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1982a, p. 123). 
At a basic methodological level the 'visual illusion' analogy 
is unobjectionable. Empirical studies within the conversational 
paradigm that merely seek to demonstrate the conditions under which 
a judge will conform to the prescriptions of an optimal model may 
lead to conflicting explanations. That is, the question of whether 
the subjects are employing some (unstated) heuristic strategy, which 
under the specific task conditions had resulted in a paramorphic 
response, or are actually employing the normative strategy, is 
unresolved. Without a more sophisticated inquiry at a cognitive 
level than can typically be provided within a conversational paradigm 
type study (e. g. by utilising verbal protocols) it is unlikely 
that such competing explanations can be resolved. Conversely, 
by identifying departures from normative models, the 'optimal 
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processing' explanation can, in theory at least, be eliminated, 
although in practical terms this may be difficult to achieve 
unequivocally. For example, the interpretation of input-output 
studies within the conversational paradigm' will be critically 
dependent upon the validity of the assumption that subject and 
experimenter share a common understanding of the problem structure. 
As we shall discuss in the following Chapter (Chapter 4), this 
assumption has been recently challenged (Berkeley and Humphreys, 
1982; Humphreys and Berkeley, 1983; Phillips, 1983). 
However, it is clear, as the first quotation above from Kahneman 
and Tversky (1982a) illustrates, that the emphasis that is generally 
placed upon the notions of bias and error within the literature 
extends these terms beyond their original restricted methodological 
meaning. The reason for this, as Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 
(1982) in the introduction to their recent retrospective review 
volume of the field admit, is related in part to the early notions 
of judgemental and predictive fallibility arising from the work 
with respect to clinical and statistical prediction, and to a lesser 
exftent Bayesian conservatism. That is, biases and errors have 
become interpreted solely as undesirable responses, and thus as 
suitable candidates for eradication by whatever means the psychologist 
or decision analyst can devise. Hence the term debiasing (Fischhoff, 
1982; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979b). 
IV. Empirical Studies within the Paradigm 
In a series of articles Tversky and Kahneman (1971,1973,1974; 
Kahneman and Tversky, 1972,1973) present the results of a large 
number of experimental studies within the conversational paradigm. 
These studies purport to illustrate a number of intuitive judgement 
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responses, common to both laymen and statisticians alike, and held 
to be demonstrations of significant and systematic departures from 
normative rationality. The findings are explained with respect 
to the three basic judgement strategies of anchoring and adjustment, 
representativeness, and availability. Examples of the inferential 
errors that Tversky and Kahneman document include failure to incorporate 
population base-rates as relevant data in Bayesian prediction tasks 
(the 'base-rate fallacy'; Bar-Hillel, 1980), overconfidence in 
judgements based upon redundant data, failure to appreciate the 
inverse relationship between sampling error and sample size, and 
erroneous conceptions of the likely nature of random processes. 
Of the three original heuristics proposed by Tversky and Kahneman, 
two are not new to psychology, anchoring and adjustment having its 
origins in psychophysics (Nelson, 1964; Poulton, 1968; Tresselt, 
1948), and availability in mainstream cognitive psychology (e. g. 
Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin, 1956). The third heuristic, that of 
representativeness, is new to experimental psychology but not to 
philosophy12. We consider each of these three processes separately. 
(i) Anchoring and adjustment 
Of the three original heuristic strategies, anchoring and 
adjustment has had perhaps the least impact within Behavioral Decision 
Theory. Specifically, this strategy involves an individual making 
an initial estimate of the parameter to be judged, and then adjusting 
this to produce a final judgement. The initial estimate may be 
based upon a salient anchor, suggested either by task characteristics 
or partial computation. Subsequent adjustments, according to 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974), are liable to be typically insufficient, 
and hence the final judgement will be biased in the direction of the 
initial anchor. For example, groups of subjects requested to 
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estimate rapidly, without pencil and paper aids, the computation 
1x2x3x... x7x8 (eight factorial) produce median estimates 
well below that of those presented with the calculation in the 
reverse format of 8x7x... 3x2x1. While both results are 
well below the actual answer13, it can be inferred from this that 
the order manipulation has had a significant influence upon responses. 
It is argued that the typical subject will work out such a problem 
from left to right, and extrapolate a final judgement from an achor 
based upon partial computation of the first few terms. The anchor 
is likely to have a higher value in the latter presentation format. 
It has been proposed that anchoring and adjustment is an influential 
mechanism with respect to distorted estimates of frequencies of 
death from risks (Lichtenstein, Slovic, Fischhoff,. Layman, and 
Coombs, 1978), and biases in the evaluation of conjunctive and 
disjunctive probabilities (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). 
(ii) Representativeness 
Hammond, McClelland, and Mumpower suggest that representativeness 
is an 'organism centered definition of an object-attribute' (1980, 
p. 70). Tversky and Kahneman offer their original definition of the 
representativeness heuristic as follows: 
'An event A will be judged a member of a category B 
(or a sample seen as typical of its parent population) 
to the extent that it is representative of that 
category or population; i. e. (a) similar in essential 
properties to its parent population, and (b) reflects 
the salient features of the process by which it is 
generated' (Kahneman and Tversky, 1973, p. 431). 
Of the three original heuristics, representativeness has 
probably prompted the greatest amount of debate and empirical 
research, particularly with respect to its hypothesised role in 
the neglect of base-rate information (Kahneman and Tversky, 1973; 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; see also Meehl and Rosen, 1955, for 
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an early discussion of base-rates). The original experiments of 
Tversky and Kahneman with respect to this particular bias suggest 
a neglect by subjects of 'axiomatically safe' outcome frequencies 
in favour of a reliance on 'psychologically safe' (Hammond et al., 
1980, p. 88) individuating diagnostic information when judging 
category membership. This effect is in contravention of the 
prescription of the Bayesian model, and held to result from an 
over-reliance upon the representativeness heuristic; judgement 
being primarily based upon the goodness-of-fit (representativeness, 
or proto-typicality) between the target description and the subject's 
own stereotypes of the outcome categories being judged. 
Although the original base-rate results appearto be relatively 
unequivocal, subsequent attempts to replicate the phenomenon under 
a variety of task conditions have met with mixed success. This 
suggests that the effect, unlike (for example) conservatism, is 
relatively un-systematic (e. g. see Bar-Hillel, 1980; Bar-Hillel 
and Fischhoff, 1981; Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein, 1979; 
Ginosar and Trope, 1980; Lyon and Slovic, 1976; Manis, Dovalina, 
Avis, and Cardoze, 1980; Wells and Harvey, 1978). Indeed, the 
recognition that under particular task conditions base-rates will 
in fact reliably influence predictions in a normative fashion has 
resulted in the proposal that under some circumstances a fourth, 
entirely separate causality heuristic might be operating (Ajzen, 
1977; Tversky and Kahneman, 1980). Latterly Bar-Hillel (1983), 
in a retrospective evaluation of the state-of-the-art with respect 
to base-rate studies, suggests (as do Tversky and Kahneman, 1982a) 
that representativeness is only one factor, although possibly the 
most dominant one, mediating the use or neglect of base-rate 
information. 
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(iii) Availability 
Described by Hammond et al. (op. cit., p. 70) as an 'organismic 
process', the availability heuristic is defined as follows. A 
decision-maker will judge the likelihood or frequency of an event 
A in part as a function of the ease of recall, or availability 
of similar instances from memory. Often such a strategy will 
provide relatively accurate subjective probability estimates, but the 
ease of recall may also depend upon factors other than statistical 
frequency: for example, recency of coding, vividness, and 
imaginability (Nisbett and Ross, 1980; Tversky and Kahneman, 1972; 
Wyer and Carlston, 1979). Reliance upon the availability heuristic 
for such judgements is held to account for a number of biases if 
non-frequentist factors intervene 
14. 
Tversky and Kahneman present 
the following example of the operation of the availability heuristic. 
They ask subjects whether a word sampled at random from an English 
dictionary is more likely to start with a kor have k as its third 
letter.. They report that a significant majority of subjects 
respond that the former is the case, while the statistical likelihood 
favours the latter. It is suggested that this effect is the result 
of subjects' attempts to make frequency estimates by first generating 
as many words as possible from memory, both starting with the 
letter k, and with k in the third position. Since it is easier, 
Tversky and Kahneman argue, to think of the former type of word 
more instances will be available. The availability heuristic has 
been suggested as one mechanism mediating the public's perceptions 
of risk (e. g. Fischhoff, Lichtenstein, Slovic, Derby, and Keeney, 
1981)15. Tversky and Kahneman suggest that availability, when 
mediated by associative distance between variables, can account for 
the illusory correlation effect (Chapman and Chapman, 1967,1969; 
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Chapman, 1967). More recently, Kruglanski and Ajzen (1983) have 
suggested that availability can be considered to be a meta-heuristic, 
arguing that anchoring and adjustment and representativeness are 
merely variants of the more general phenomenon of availability. 
V. The Proliferation of the Bias Concept 
As a stimulant to research within the field of Behavioral 
Decision Theory, the work of Tversky and Kahneman has had enormous 
impact. And there is no doubt that by the early 1980s the heuristics, 
biases, and bounded rationality model had gained almost zeitgeist 
status within cognitive psychology. It is beyond the scope of 
this review to survey the detailed developments that have accompanied 
this process, since this would require not only coverage of the 
parent field but also that of social cognition (see Nisbett and Ross, 
1980; Fiske and Taylor, 1984; Wyer and Carlston, 1979). However, 
Sage (1981), in an excellent recent review paper, notes the following 
cognitive biases that have been investigated in the literature: 
1. Adjustment and Anchoring 
2. Availability 
3. Base Rate 
4. Conservatism 
5. Data Presentation Context 
6. Data Saturation 
7. Desire for Self-Fulfilling Prophecies 
8. Ease of Recall 
9. Expectations 
10. Fact-Value Confusion 
11. Fundamental Attribution Error (Success/Failure Error) 
12. Gambler's Fallacy 
13. Habit 
14. Hindsight 
15. Illusion of Control 
16. Illusion of Correlation 
17. Law of Small Numbers 
18. Order Effects 
19. Outcome Irrelevant Learning System 
20. Overconfidence 
21. Redundancy 
22. Reference Effect 
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23. Regression Effects 
24. Representativeness 
25. Selective Perceptions 
26. Spurious Cues 
27. Wishful Thinking (from Sage, 1981, pp. 647-648). 
This list must be considered as illustrative rather than definitive. 
However, it is representative of the field, and in particular reflects 
the inhomogeneity of much of the research. For example, the list 
groups empirical effects (e. g. Gambler's Fallacy) with the actual 
heuristic processes that are held to mediate such effects (Availability), 
as well as far less well documented and researched hypotheses (Habit). 
Also, no distinction is made in terms of the theoretical status of 
these principles and effects. Hence, the semi-psychological 
conservatism effect can be contrasted with the hot-cognitive 
motivational bias of wishful thinking, and the cold-cognitive 
information-processing bias of hindsight (see Footnote 11, this 
Chapter). Furthermore, the normative models upon which each of the 
listed biases is dependent are of a diverse nature: for example, 
Bayes' Theorem with respect to conservatism, frequency statistics 
for illusory correlation, and Mill's method of difference for 
attribution errors. We shall argue at a later point in this 
dissertation that the relative nature of such models is a critical 
issue with respect to the interpretation of meaning of the term 
bias within the heuristics, biases, and bounded rationality paradigm. 
The very grouping together by Sage of such relatively disparate 
examples would appear to indicate the occurrence of a generalisation 
of the bias concept. As we have previously noted, the identification 
of bias was originally construed primarily as a methodological question, 
that did not necessarily bear upon the issue of general human 
rationality. In contrast, Kahneman and Tversky, in a more recent 
paper, suggest the following: 
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'Although errors of judgement are but a method by 
which some cognitive processes are studied, the 
method has become a significant part of the message' 
(Kahneman=and Tversky, 1982a, p. 124). 
This quotation summarises the generalised meaning that the 
concept of bias has taken on in the latter stages of 
& model's 
development. Perhaps the most controversial effect of this has been 
the implication of a general cognitive fallibility on the part of 
the intuitive judge and decision-maker. , This, as Hogarth rightly 
suggests, 'paints a depressing picture of human judgemental ability' 
(1981, p. 197). Following the widespread use by researchers during 
the 1970s of the research methods introduced-within the heuristics 
and biases paradigm, the primary emphasis in much current literature 
is laid upon the dysfunctional, as opposed to functional, aspects of 
heuristic use. Investigation of biases per se, rather than the 
cognitive processes that mediate such responses, appears to have 
become a primary research goal within both Behavioral Decision Theory 
and other related areas of psychology (Wallsten, 1983). 
The frequent invocation of the bias argument by researchers from 
diverse fields of psychology has been described reflexively by 
Berkeley and Humphreys (1982), not without considerable irony, as the 
'Bias Heuristic'. They give circumstantial, but nevertheless 
suggestive evidence of the generalised meaning of the term bias as 
currently utilised by researchers. Benc. eley and Humphreys survey 
the Social Sciences Citation Index for articles that reference the 
seminal Science paper of Tversky and Kahneman (1974) between the 
period 1975-1980 inclusive. Of the 227 papers listed, published in 
125 different journals, they are able to access a total of 172 of 
these. They note, as a result of a general content-analysis, that 
generalisation of Tversky's and Kahneman's original results often occur: 
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and often without discussion of the representativeness (in the - 
sense implied by methodological theory) of the findings. Berkeley 
and Humphreys also suggest that: 
'It is interesting to note the terms used to describe 
these results in the literature ... For instance, 
the "evidence" has been suggested as "considerable" 
(March and March, 1978), "convincing" (Horst et al., 
1980; Szolovits and Pauker, 1978), "abundant" (Pitz 
et al., 1980) and that it is "well known" (Diaconis, 
1978; Kochen, 1980) or that it has been "amply 
demonstrated" (Read and LeBlanc, 1978) that man's 
ability to make correct decisions is limited' 
(Berkeley and Humphreys, 1982, p. 240). 
It is perhaps not surprising therefore that, of the 32 papers which 
Berkeley and Humphreys are able to access having their substantial 
emphasis outside psychology, all 'treated Tversky's and Kahneman's 
(1974) discussion of heuristics as representative facts, without 
qualification' (1982, p. 247). 
VI. Conclusion 
The current Chapter has reviewed the development, in the 1970s, 
of the heuristics, biases, and bounded rationality model. It is 
unquestionably the case that, as a stimulant to truly psychological 
research within Behavioral Decision Theory, the impact of this 
research tradition has been unprecedented. The behaviourally 
sterile models that were inherited from economics and statistics 
(Chapters 1 and 2, this volume) have been largely superseded today, 
in favour of a more cognitively oriented approach to both judgement 
under uncertainty, and decision-making in general (e. g. Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1979a). In our final section, however, we have argued 
that the notion of bias, originally a primarily methodological construct, 
has latterly obtained a more generalised meaning. Of course, it would 
be bad practice to criticise psychological research merely on the 
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grounds that non-psychologists (or non-cognitive psychologists, 
for that matter) might have misunderstood the research tradition's 
findings. However, it is also clear that it is not only non- 
specialists who perceive a subtle evolution of the bias concept in 
the direction of the generalised meaning (e. g. see Christensen- 
Szalanski and Beach, 1984). The method has indeed become the 
message! 
The following Chapter (Chapter 4) will present a detailed 
critique of the heuristics and biases research. In particular 
we shall focus upon a number of arguments suggesting that the 
generalisation of the bias concept is at best premature, and will 
argue, following Thorngate (1980), for the need to stress the 
functional as well as the dysfunctional aspects of heuristic use. 
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NOTES 
1. The distinction between judgement (or more generally inference) 
and decision is 
'a 
problematic one (cf. Einhorn and Hogarth, 
1981), and many different specific definitions appear in 
the literature. We adopt here the basic distinction that 
judgement is an intuitive inference describing the state 
of an assumed world, which may or may not hold consequences 
for action. Decision is a function of both inference and 
action (or intention to act). - As Barnett suggests, with 
respect to the technical literature within statistics: 
'The distinction between these two modes of 
interest in a'statistical study, the 
descriptive and the action guidance functions, 
arises again and again ... Any statistical 
procedure which utilises information to obtain 
a description of the practical situation (through 
a probability model) is an inferential procedure 
... a procedure with the wider aim of suggesting 
action to be taken in the practical situation, 
by prodessing införmaton' relevant to''that'- 
situation, is a decision-making procedure' 
. 
(Barnett, 1973, p. 13). 
In general a decision-making procedure will be distinguishable 
from an inferential one by its explicit reference to the 
consequences of alternative courses of action, and hence is a 
more generalised operation. In the context of the present 
thesis, probability (or degree of belief) estimation is clearly 
an inferential process, whereas evaluation of alternative 
gambles is decision-making. 
2. Simon (1955) formally defines satisficing in the following 
manner: 
Given a set of perceived choice alternatives A, 
and an associated set of outcomes S of varying 
value to the decision-maker, an organism 
satisfices if it: 
1. searches for a set of possible outcomes 
(a subset S' of S) such that the payoff 
is satisfactory (defined with respect to 
some pre-determined aspiration level) for 
all these possible outcomes (all s in S'); 
and 
2. searches for a behavioural alternative (a 
in A) for whose possible outcomes are all 
in S' (such that a maps on 9: ScS'). 
He notes, however, that, while such a procedure is likely to 
be computationally efficient, it-does not guarantee the 
existence or uniqueness of a solution with the desired 
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properties. Nevertheless, the course open to the organism 
in the case where a satisfactory alternative does not 
initially appear to exist is clearly to make some adjustment 
to the relative aspiration levels. 
3. Efficiency here being measured by some form of overall index 
of success at achieving the correct solution to the task at 
hand; e. g. number of trials to success. 
i 
4. This suggestion, that rationality must be related to local 
achievement within a specified task domain, can be further 
paralleled to Mannheim's (1940) notion of substantive 
rationality. 
5. The distinction between the hypothesis generation and testing 
stages of the scientific method (the contexts of discovery on 
the one hand and verification, or latterly criticism, on the 
other) is, as Meehl rightly notes (1954, pp. 65-66), one 
that continually arises within the field of philosophy of 
science. However, the majority of_philoscphers have'tended, 
while maintaining that the distinctiQn is a valid one, to 
pass over the implications of the former issue, on the grounds 
that the context of discovery in science is a matter for 
psychology rather than logic! For example, Popper (1935, 
1959) would not be untypical with respect to this. For 
exceptions the reader is referred to the discussions of 
'tacit' and 'craft' knowledge by Polanyi (1958) and Ravetz 
(1971), or, for a truly radical viewpoint, questioning 
whether this distinction actually exists in the context of 
practical scientific inquiry, as opposed toin the minds of 
philosophers of science, see Feyerabend (1975). In common 
with the_ philosophers, Behavioral Decision Theorists have 
generally ignored the role of the hypothesis generation process, 
although its centrality to the judgement process cannot be 
doubted (e. g. see Hogarth, 1980, Chapter 7). 
6. This result holds if the correlations between predictor 
variables are generally positive, and there are of the order 
of n2 non-zero (i. e. positive) correlations for any n 
variables (Wilks, 1938). 
7. Although the practical implication of this result in any 
specific context may be problematic. As Von Winterfeld 
and Edwards note, their analysis leaves open. the important 
question of 'how flat is flat' (1982, p. 619). 
8. The following illustrative example is given by Edwards (1968). 
Suppose that we have two bags, each containing 1,000 chips 
of composition 700 red/300 blue and 300 red/700 blue 
respectively. If we sample chips one at a time, and with 
replacement, from the selected bag, and after twelve draws 
have observed eight red chips and four blue the typical 
subject's response for P(H1: Bag is majority red) will 
be between 0.7 and 0.8, whereas the Bayesian inference 
would be 0.97. 
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9. Navon (1978,1981) suggests that the conditional independence 
constraint, required o. f separate datum if Bayes' Theorem 
is to be applied optimally, is rarely, if ever, achieved in 
everyday inference tasks. Since much real world data is 
in fact liable to be conditionally non-independent a judge 
who treats it as such (i. e. makes a conservative estimate) 
is likely to make a better estimate than one who applies 
Bayes' Theorem. Hence, conservatism may be a response 
that can indeed be argued to be dysfunctional under artificial 
laboratory conditions, but'which is entirely functional in 
everyday contexts. If we accept this argument it becomes 
clear that the conservatism phenomenon is a classic example 
of the need to ensure the representativeness of experimental 
designs (see Brunswik, 1955,1956; also Hammond, 1966,1978). 
10. We make the fairly mild assumption here that the linear model 
is in some sense optimal in the context of the clinical 
prediction. While this clearly does not represent the same 
form of optimality as that underlying Bayes' Theorem (i. e. 
coherence/consistency), the empirical and analytical demonstration 
of such a model's robustness properties is interpreted here 
as conferring some sense of optimality 'albeit weakly, 
given that the truly configural judge ought in theory to be 
able to outperform a linear model. 
11. Interestingly, the relevant factors most comprehensively 
studied within the field of Behavioral Decision Theory have 
primarily been of the task variable types; e. g. data 
presentation format, semantic content of information, etc. 
The issues of motivational variables, or individual differences, 
which might both be relevant to heuristic use, are rarely 
discussed. This emphasis has resulted in a specifically 
cold-cognitive, information-processing, approach to inference 
and decision. This can be contrasted to the hot-cognitive 
(Abelson, 1968) approach of, for example, Janis and Mann 
(1977; also Janis, 1972). This is illustrated in the 
diagram below (Figure 3.1): 
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Figure 3.1 
Cold- vs. hot-cognitive approaches to the study 
of inference and decision-making 
HOT-COGNITIVE 
APPROACH 
Domain of empirical 
inquiry: Decision 
and judgement under 
conditions of 
motivational extremes 




choices, etc. ) 
Assumed to be _ 
generalisable model 
of typical real-life 
decision and inference 
(e. g. choosing cars, 








Assumed to be 
generalisable model 
of typical real- 
life inference and 
decision (e. g. risk 
perceptions, choices 
with real consequences) 
Domain of empirical 
inquiry: Judgement 
and decision in 
mundane 'conversational 
paradigm' experiments 
(e. g. hypothetical 
probability judgements, 
choice amongst gambles, 
etc. ) 
12. Nisbett and Ross (1980, p. 115) point out the similarity of 
the representativeness concept to Mill's (1843/1974) 
resemblance criterion: i. e. the belief that the condition 
of a phenomenon resembles the phenomenon itself. 
13. For the product 1x2x3x... x7x8 Tversky and Kahneman 
(1974) report a median judgement for their subjects of 521, 
and for the reverse order they report 2,250. In reality 
eight factorial is 40,320. 
14. Note that this reasoning, and in particular the assertion that 
the effect of reliance upon the availability heuristic can 
legitimately be termed a biased response under some 
circumstances, rests upon the assumption that an individual's 
subjective probability of the occurrence of an event 
should be equal to the stated objective statistical probability 
of that event, if such a statistical estimate exists. As our 
discussion of the foundations of subjective probability theory 
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has illustrated (Chapter 1), this is a controversial assumption 
to make, and would generally be regarded to be contrary to 
the spirit of subjective probability theory, since any coherent/ 
consistent degree of belief is admissible! 
15. While the psychometric approach of Fischhoff et al. (op. cit. ) 
to the issue of risk-perception (see also Vleck and Stallen, 
1981) and the public acceptance of hazardous technologies 
gives'a more parsimonious behavioural account than that of the 
positivist technologists (e. g. the public is misinformed of the 
'true' risks; Rothschild, 1978), it has itself come under 
recent criticism for its neglect of the wider social and 
political context within which social risk decisions are made 
(e. g. see Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982; Otway and Thomas, 
1982). 
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CHAPTER 4 
HEURISTICS AND BIASES -A CRITIQUE 
Introduction and Summary 
In the previous Chapter we have reviewed the development, during 
the 1970s, of the heuristics,, biases, and bounded rationality model. 
The conceptual roots of this research tradition have been traced to 
the seminal work, in the mid-1950s, of Herbert Simon on models of 
rationality, and that of Jerome Bruner and colleagues on cognitive 
strain. Its empirical precursors are to be found in the clinical 
vs. statistical prediction debate of the 1950s and 1960s, and in the 
work started by Edwards and colleagues on the conservatism effect. 
Underlying the heuristics, biases, and bounded rationality model 
is the suggestion that the individual, equipped with only modest 
computational capacity, and faced with the complexities of many 
real world decision tasks, will employ a range of simplifying 
judgemental strategies (heuristics) in order to reduce, or limit, 
cognitive strain. Use of such strategies is held to be generally 
efficient and optimal, and hence their use, but under some 
circumstances to result in severe and systematic errors (Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1974). A number of proposed heuristic strategies, 
and 'fallacies', have subsequently' been identified by researchers 
working within this tradition. We have noted the positive aspects 
of research into heuristics and biases. Firstly, the method of 
investigating cognitive processes by means of comparisons with the 
prescriptions of normative models appears unobjectionable, and can 
lead to fruitful,. if somewhat circumscribed, theoretical and empirical 
findings. With respect to this, we would concur with Kahneman's 
and Tversky's (1982a) 'visual illusion' analogy describing this 
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research. Secondly, as Fischhoff (1983) suggests, the explicit 
cognitive orientation of the approach has 'succeeded in rescuing 
the study of judgement from the mechanistic models of behaviour 
inherited from economics' (p. 521), and has stimulated the subsequent 
1 
construction of more 'phenomenologically' based descriptive models. 
However, we concluded the previous Chapter with the suggestion that 
the notion of judgemental bias has obtained a generalised meaning 
which transcends its original empirical origins. The reason for 
this, being we suspect primarily of an ideological nature, need not 
concern us here. One function of the current Chapter, which 
concludes the major review section of this dissertation, is to 
outline a number of recent critiques of the heuristics, biases, and 
bounded rationality model. On the basis of this it will be argued 
that the generalisation of the bias concept is untenable. The 
focus here will be primarily upon a number of general issues. 
In consequence we do not discuss the details of the recent (and 
often lively) interpretive debates that have been conducted in 
the technical literature, save to note their very existence as being 
diagnostic of a scientific discipline in healthy 'Kuhnian' crisis2. 
Review articles covering some of the primary arguments to be presented 
in this Chapter have been written by Einhorn and Hogarth (1981), 
Jungermann (1983), and Pitz and Sachs'(1984). 
The current Chapter is organised in five principal sections. 
Firstly, a number of arguments are presented questioning the use of 
normative models as standards against which to judge human rationality. 
In a second section the familiar methodological issues of internal 
and external validity are discussed in the context of heuristics 
and biases research. -Thirdly, two general functionalist critiques 
of the 'cognitive cripple' hypothesis are developed. The fourth 
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section will focus upon the argument that judgement and decision 
research ought to focus more centrally, in contrast to typical 
heuristics and biases investigations, upon the functional, as 
opposed to merely dysfunctional aspects of heuristic use. It is 
this' suggestion, and in particular the simulation study by Thorngate 
(1980), that will provide the initial focus for the empirical work 
to be reported in later Chapters of this dissertation. Finally, 
general conclusions arising from our critique are noted. 
I. Normative Issues 
'why-are. normative theories so prevalent in the study 
of judgement and choice, yet virtually absent in 
other branches of science? For example, Imagine 
that atoms and molecules failed to follow the laws 
supposed to describe their behavior. Few would call 
such behavior irrational or suboptimal. However, if 
people violate expected utility axioms or do not 
revise probabilities in accord with Bayes' theorem, 
such behavior is considered suboptimal and perhaps 
irrational' (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1981, p. 53). 
As Einhorn and Hogarth suggest in the above quotation, compared 
to other scientific disciplines (and, we might add, much of 
contemporary psychology)3, the study of judgement and decision- 
making is indeed extensively influenced by normative considerations. 
The historical antecedents to this situation have been. reviewed 
earlier (Chapters 1 and 2, this volume). It is in recognition of 
the almost unique status of normative modelswithin Behavioral Decision 
Theory that a separate section is deemed necessary in which to discuss 
a number of relevant issues. In effect, this leads us, albeit 
briefly, to inquire into the meaning of the term rationality as 
currently utilised within the field, and its relationship to a number 
of philosophical issues (although extensive. epistemological comment 
is beyond the scope of this review, and the competence of its author). 
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We shall defer, for the present at least, the issue of what might be 
meant by the term intelligent behaviour, and its relationship to 
normative modes of judgement and choice. 
Trivially, and in somewhat circular fashion, we might define 
rational, optimal, normative behaviour as those responses that conform, 
conditional upon context, to some rational, optimal, normative rule(s). 
Some technical differences do exist between the terms rational, 
optimal and normative. For example, the scientific meaning of 
. optimality 
(cf. Bordley, 1983; Schoemaker, 1981)-is probably more 
circumscribed than that of rationality. For the present purposes, 
however, these will be treated as equivalent terms. Also, this 
definition adopts a process (goodness of means) rather than outcome 
(goodness of goals) orientation. That the latter aspect, which 
we shall not address here, is a non-trivial issue, and not merely 
the province of moral philosophers, is illustrated by debates within 
Behavioral Decision Theory with respect to the question of the 
definition of a 'good' decision (e. g. see the recent discussion by 
Edwards, Kiss, Majone, and Toda, 1984). It is sufficient here, 
however, to note that the conceptual framework of the heuristics and 
biases research depends upon an uncritical acceptance of the assumption, 
underlying this definition; that the prescriptive status of-normative 
models can be unequivocally defended a priori. 
The issue of the a priori status of normative models is rarely 
raised within Behavioral Decision Theory. However, recent critiques 
have questioned whether any singular concept of rationality can 
indeed be unequivocally defended as providing superior guidance to 
a judge or decision-maker. In the clearest statement of this 
position, Kruglanski and Ajzen (1983) indicate its relation to the 
'new wave' of post-positivistic, non-justificationist philosophies 
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of science. The development of this tradition can be traced in 
the work of Popper (1935,1959), Kuhn (1962), Lakatos (1968,1970) 
and Feyerabend (1975,1978). The non-justificationist thesis, 
expressed most clearly in the scientific anarchism of Paul Feyerabend4, 
stresses the contextual, conjectural nature of all knowledge, _ 
particularly scientific knowledge. According to this view, philosophy's 
traditional rationalist thesis - that secure and objective a priori 
criteria for the appraisal of rival knowledge can be unambiguously 
specified - is refuted. This suggestion is supported by historical 
evidence, pointing to the merely relative and transitory, as viewed 
in hindsight, nature of once secure 'objective' scientific facts 
(e. g. Aristotelian Cosmology; Newton's Laws of Motion, etc. ). 
The implications of the non-justificationist philosophy for 
the interpretation of heuristics and biases research are outlined 
by Kruglanski and Ajzen (1983). They note the three general 
criteria of valid inference that are commonly utilised as yardsticks 
for the investigation, and definition of biases; (a) normative 
models (e. g. Bayes' Theorem), (b) direct veridical verification 
(from an 'obvious' state of the world, such as a direct quantitative 
estimate of a stimulus' properties), and (c) the experimenter's 
perspective 
5 
as regards the most appropriate judgement (e. g. many 
attributional phenomena, in the absence of well formulated criteria 
of valid inference for such judgements, are interpreted to be 
biasing on these grounds; see Fischhoff, 1976; Nisbett and Ross, 
1980). Kruglanski and Ajzen argue, following the non-justificationist 
school, that'in reality no secure criteria of valid inference exist, 
or can exist. Hence, the interpretation of any specific judgement 
as unequivocally in error6 will be philosophically problematic, and 
at best merely conditional upon the particular assumptions, or axioms, 
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underlying the standard adopted. So, for example, as our discussion 
in Chapter 1 of the normative foundations of probability and utility 
theory suggests, much of what is held to be rational within Behavioral 
Decision Theory is conditional upon our acceptance of the standard 
coherence/consistency axioms. As Einhorn and Hogarth' comment: 
... the optimal-intuitive comparison presents the 
following paradox: Optimal models have been 
suggested to overcome intuitive shortcomings. 
However, in the final analysis the outputs of 
optimal models are evaluated by judgment, i. e. 
do we like the outcomes, do we believe the 
axioms to be reasonable, and should we be 
coherent? ' (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1981, pp. 59-60). 
The validity of Kruglanski's and Ajzen'. s general epistemological 
argument is supported by a number of recent examples in the literature, 
where disagreement with respect to the applicability of a number of 
normative models can be traced to differences with respect to axiomatic 
preference. The most prominent critic with respect to'this has been 
the oxford philosopher Jonathan Cohen, who has engaged in a number 
of (often animated) debates with Tversky and Kahneman (Cohen, 1979, 
1980c; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979c; Cohen and commentaries, 1981). 
Echoing Kruglanski and Ajzen (1983), Cohen remarks upon the 
epistemological status of all normative models as follows: 
'Normative criteria cannot be taken, as some have suggested, to 
constitute part of natural science, nor can they be established 
by meta-mathematical proof' (1981, p. 317). Rather, following 
Goodman (1954), he argues that normative criteria can be acceptable 
as standards of judgement only in so far as they are intuitively 
reasonable at 'crucial points'. The relativist-character of such 
debates is clearly. illustrated here, and hinges upon our definition 
of what constitutes a 'critical point'. Cohen does*not"provide a 
resolution, and, as our discussion in Chapter 1 of the foundations of 
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the normative models of decision theory would suggest, a Bayesian 
might readily defend his art on the grounds that the Savage (1954) 
axioms do indeed provide intuitive appeal at 'crucial points'. 
In a series of articles, some of which he points out are prior 
to the early work of Tversky and Kahneman, Cohen develops an-alternative 
framework for an uncertainty calculus (1970,1977,1980a, 1980b). 
He bases this upon Baconian, rather than the traditional Pascalian 
notions of probability. From this, perspective Cohen argues the 
case for the validity or 'reasonableness', of several modes of 
inference that had previously been labelled as biases by Tversky and 
Kahneman (e. g. Cohen, 1977,1979). Particularly relevant to our 
present discussion is Cohen's (1981) suggestion that researchers within 
Behavioral Decision Theory have either misapplied appropriate normative 
theory, or sometimes applied inappropriate normative theory7. Cohen 
draws several examples from legal practice (see also Shafer's, 
1976, theory of evidence) which, he argues, are incompatible with 
the standard probability system, but entirely compatible with his 
own Baconian framework. For example, in discussing the base-rate 
phenomenbn Cohen (1979) provides the following illustration. Imagine 
that 1,000 people are at a public event, and that 400 are known to 
have paid for admission. During the course of this. event a hole is 
discovered in the surrounding fence. A man, John Smith, is selected 
at random from the crowd, and the management company sue him for 
the entry fee. Cohen argues that from a standard Bayesian position, 
and that of Tversky and Kahneman, the company should win their case 
in civil law8. However, According to Cohen, such a situation is 
intuitively unjust, and that no jury would find for the plaintiffs 
without also having individuating (e. g. 'representativeness') 
information about John Smith, such as evidence of threads of his 
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clothing found snagged to the wire adjacent to the hole. In 
effect, Cohen is suggesting that the neglect of base-rate information, 
far from being a source of bias, is a reasonable course in certain 
contexts. That such a behaviour is interpreted as a bias is a 
direct result of structuring the problem in terms of Pascalian 
rather than Baconian probability. Kahneman and Tversky (1979c; 
see also Cohen, 1980c) reply to this, and several other examples 
provided by Cohen, by arguing that Baconian probability does not 
have normative status. Clearly, from the non-justificationist 
perspective, such a debate is something of a pseudo-issue, and is 
therefore not one that we shall develop here. 
Other examples of the relative nature of normative frameworks 
exist. Within statistics the universal applicability of Bayes' 
theorem has been challenged: for example, see Barnett (1973) or 
discussions of 'Lindley's Paradox'9. And Gaines (1978) has 
demonstrated the primary axiomatic differences between probabilistic 
and fuzzy (Zadeh, 1965,1976,1978) approaches to the treatment of 
uncertainty. And we have noted in Chapter 1 of this volume the 
diverse foundations (i. e. logical, empirical, and coherence/consistency) 
of the theories of probability. 
Criticisms have also been recently raised with respect to 
the applicability of classical statistical constructs as standards 
against which laboratory performance is to be measured. Lopes 
(1980) argues that it is a misconception to assume (cf. Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1972) that well defined criteria of randomness exist. 
More recently Wright and Murphy (1984), in an insightful paper, have 
pointed out that empirical demonstrations of so-called 'theory driven' 
biases such as the illusory correlation effect (e. g. Chapman, 1967; 
Chapman and Chapman, 1967,1969; Hamilton, 1981; Hamilton and Rose, 
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1980; Jennings, Amabile, and Ross, 1982) are critically dependent 
upon the statistical measure of correlation adopted by the researchers; 
typically classical Pearsons-R. They quite rightly note that several 
estimates of correlation are available, the applicability of each 
depending upon the assumptions introduced with respect to the form 
of the data. In a series of empirical studies they demonstrate 
that subjects who might be interpreted as performing 'poorly' with 
respect to the classical statistical measure are performing competently 
when compared to more modern robust measures of correlation (they 
utilise the weighted local linear least squares; Cleveland, 1979). 
Their comments with respect to the normative standards debate, 
which, we might add, could equally apply to any of the examples 
so far discussed in this section, are given below: 
'Our findings 'demonstrate that it is inappropriate 
to single out a particular standard - no matter how conventional - for the purposes of evaluating 
people's performances. Certain scientifically 
useful measures perform well under particular 
conditions; under conditions where they were 
not meant to be applied they perform poorly. 
Since any particular measure captures some 
aspects of the data and ignores others, the choice 
of a measure must depend on the task at hand and 
the goals of its user' (Wright and Murphy,. 1984, 
p. 317). 
By their rejection of prescriptive imperialism, Wright and Murphy 
point to the essentially conditional. nature of all normative standards, 
however consensual they might be within a particular scientific 
discipline. The inference that can be drawn with respect to this 
is that biases and errors may exist. as much in the heads of 
experimenters, as a consequence of a priori preference for a 
particular normative framework, as in the heads of subjects (cf. 
also Ebbesen and Konecni, 1980). 
The notion of the conditionality of normative models leads 
- 86 - 
directly to the question of the constraints imposed upon the 
decision-maker by the use of such standards. Berkeley and 
Humphreys (1982) catalogue seven types of uncertainty associated 
with the pre-decisional act of structuring. They suggest that 
three of these-. procedural uncertainty (see Hogarth, Michaud, and 
Mery, 1980), uncertainty about changing goals, and uncertainty with 
respect to potential agency with which to influence events- cannot 
be treated within the framework provided by traditional decision 
analytic techniques. Similarly, Schoemaker (1982) suggests that 
the concept of rationality embodied in the Expected Utility model 
is only well defined for decisions under certainty and risk. 
The cases of decision-making under uncertainty, conflict, and group 
choice are associated with different decision-making principles in 
the literature (see also Collingridge's comments upon decision-making 
under ignorance; 1980). 
In an influential article, March (1978) also addresses the 
problem posed by the potential for changing goals. His argument 
is founded on the observation that in many organisational contexts 
long-term goals will often be highly ambiguous and hence problematic 
to specify in advance (March and Olsen, 1976). A similar 
observation applies for the individual decision-maker. However, 
the traditional, normative theories of choice make the assumption 
that goal preferences, or tastes, are well specified. Therefore, 
the Expected Utility maximiser, in order to act in such a way, must 
make possibly unrealistic guesses about his or her future preferences. 
The position adopted by March is important because it represents a 
direct challenge to the intuitive axiomatic foundations of normative 
decision theory; i. e. the assumptions with respect to the stability, 
coherence, and consistency of preferences as expressedin the Von 
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Neumann-Morgenstern (1947) and Savage (1954) axiom systems. As 
March suggests, these axioms introduce unrealistic constraints if 
and when the individual's preferences are-ambiguous. For example, 
the axioms make the assumption that tastes will be absolute (a form 
of moral relativism), relevant, stable over time, and precise (by 
eliminating ambiguity with respect to which outcomes will satisfy 
which tastes). In contrast to this, each of these criteria can 
and are violated by individuals who are patently acting intelligently. 
For example, people often expect their preferences to change over 
time (i. e. be unstable), and consequently accommodate by selecting 
options that preserve the potential for subsequent action in the 
light of such change (see also Lopes, 1983). The normative theory 
of choice, however, depends upon the assumption that preferences 
are 'frozen' at the point of elicitation. 
March also suggests that the dominant calculated rationality 
of economics can be contrasted with notions of systemic rationality. 
The latter operates without the grounds for its justification ever 
being fully comprehended by the decision-maker. Typically systemic 
rationality will be marked by tacit knowledge (Polanyi, 1958), embedded 
in a set of schema, decision heuristics (e. g. habits), or, in the 
organisational context, Standard Operating Procedures (e. g. see 
Allison, 1971). Such knowledge is built up over time 'without 
complete current consciousness of its history' (March, 1978, p. 592). 
The arguments that have been presented in this section present 
a clear conclusion with respect to the rationality debate within 
Behavioral Decision Theory, whether framed in terms of the issue of 
the interpretation of any specific behaviour as biased, or that of 
the general competence of the intuitive 
judge and decision-maker. 
The prescriptive status of-any standard will at worst 
be indeterminate, 
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and at best merely conditional upon the simplifying assumptions 
introduced in order to model the task. It follows, therefore, that 
the notion of error or bias as currently utilised within Behavioral 
Decision Theory is at best similarly conditional. We have 
illustrated the nature of this conditionality by discussing some 
of the constraints imposed by current normative standards, and noting 
March's (1978) suggestion that under some circumstances such 
constraints may be unacceptableto the decision-maker. Of course, 
this is not to deny that the decision-maker might indeed want to adhere 
to the prescriptions of normative standards under many circumstances, 
but to suggest that an awareness is always required that alternative 
modes of inference and decision will exist10, and that therefore the 
labelling of any response as erroneous is a non-trivial issue. 
II. Methodological Issues: Internal and External Validity 
The first major methodological critique of the heuristics, 
biases, and bounded rationality model that we shall consider here 
is labelled by Jungermann (1983) the structure argument. This 
derives from a theoretical paper by Berkeley and Humphreys (1982), 
who question an important aspect of the internal validity of the 
empirical 'conversational paradigm' (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982a) 
typically associated with heuristics and biases research. Problems 
of internal validity are, of course, not new to experimental psychology 
(cf. Campbell, 1957). However, Berkeley and Humphreys highlight 
the ways in which the interpretation of responses as biases can 
be critically dependent upon the assumptions introduced by the 
experimenter with respect to the subjects' pre-decisional problem 
structuring11. In suggesting thisthey. point out, congruent with 
our earlier arguments, that they do not seek to 
imply that any 
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singular cognitive representation of a decision task can be 
precisely categorised as being necessarily correct or incorrect. 
However, they do argue that the labelling of any specific response 
as biased or erroneous depends upon an assumption upon the part of the 
experimenter that a 'common understanding' has been reached with the 
subjects, at least temporarily in the laboratory, with respect to the 
appropriate structure for the particular experimental task. This 
suggestion, as a general methodological critique of the use of 
standard experimental techniques in Social Science, is not new (for 
example, see Cicourel's discussion of the problem of social meaning 
in the laboratory situation, 1964, Chapter 7). In the context of 
the heuristics and biases research it implies that, if subjects 
structure the tasks in different ways from that assumed by the 
experimenter, then any interpretation of findings in terms of bias 
can be questioned. In most cases the conversational -paradigm 
experiments do not incorporate techniques, such as process 
tracing, that would indicate the actual structures adopted by the 
experimental subjects. Rather, reliance is placed upon the subjects 
adopting the 'correct' (as defined by the experimenter) representation 
of the problem, as a result of being given appropriate experimental 
instructions. In a subsequent article Humphreys and Berkeley (1983) 
note that this is not to imply that 'experimenters should try to write 
better instructions for their subjects' (1983, p. 124). The more 
serious implication of their observation, given that the issue of 
how to structure any given problem is equivocal (cf. our comments 
earlier with respect to the conditionality. of normative models; see 
also Phillips', 1983, discussion of the role of problem structuring), 
is that in general it is almost impossible to write descriptions of 
"real life" decision making situations which guarantee that. all subjects 
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will locate the problem within the same small world' (Berkeley and 
Humphreys, 1982, pp. 225-227). Of course, as Fischhoff (1983) 
rightly notes, such conjectures do not prove that subjects have 
structured such problems'in different ways. As with all such 
arguments resolution of the issue will ultimately be an empirical 
matter. For our current purposes, it is sufficient to conclude 
here that the unresolved problem of the internal validity of 
'conversational paradigm' experiments would appear to indicate 
that the interpretation of the results of such studies should be 
carefully circumscribed. 
The issue of the interpretation of findings is related not only 
to internal validity, but also to the external validity of the 
heuristics and biases research. Wright and Murphy (1984) suggest 
that in the judgement and decision literature it is commonplace to 
find the assumption that people will do worse in the world outside 
the laboratory than in the experimental situation. However, such 
a position, intuitively plausible as it is, is simplistic; e. g. 
in its assumptions with respect to the relationship between 
performance and task complexity. One specific methodological 
issue of relevance here is the representativeness, in terms of 
tasks and subjects studied, of much of the laboratory based judgement 
and decision research. At a general level of analysis Edwards (1983) 
presents a personal, but nevertheless illuminating, illustration of 
the unrepresentative nature of much of the research within Behavioral 
Decision Theory... He develops a taxonomy of task (e. g. easy vs. difficult; 
with time pressure vs. with none) and 'performer' (e. g. non-expert vs. 
expert; individual vs. group) dimensions which might plausibly be 
relevant to human intellectual competence in applied contexts. 
Edwards suggests that few of the several thousand sub-classifications 
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generated factorially from his basic taxonomy have been studied 
intensively by psychologists, primarily because of the difficulties 
associated with gaining research access in many real life contexts12. 
The implication here is that at best we hardly have a rudimentary 
empirical grasp of the processes of judgement and decision-making 
in applied contexts. Particularly important according to Edwards 
(see also Ebbesen and Konecni, 1980) is the role commonly played by 
decision aids in support of our everyday intellectual functioning. 
These might range from such simple decision support systems as the 
pencil and paper, to the more sophisticated appeal to expertise. 
Almost all decision-makers rely upon some form of external aid, 
and yet such 'contaminating' influences are typically prohibited 
in the experimental laboratory. The conclusion that might be drawn 
here is that the judgement and decision-making literature paints 
not a depressing but a misleading picture of human potential, although 
such a view does rest upon the assumption that the decision-maker 
is capable of appropriately utilising the appropriate aid. 
Ultimately this is an empirical matter. 
It has recently been suggested that experimenters have neglected 
the important implications of the essentially dynamic nature of many 
decision-making environments. Thus, according to Hogarth (1981), 
the static lottery, along with other traditional normative constructs, 
introduces unrealistic simplifying assumptions about the nature of 
the decision-making environment, suggesting the possibility that it 
is an inappropriate paradigm for experimentation (cf. also March, 
1978). Hogarth's continuity hypothesis suggests that behaviour 
which might-be readily labelled dysfunctional in the context of a 
static environment might be seen as quite sensible. if viewed in 
relation to dynamic environments, where, for example, variables 
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such as outcome feedback, and consequently learning, play 
prominent roles. An interesting parallel, and one that potentially 
raises a number of significant empirical questions, is the notion 
that the inconsistent utilisation of information, expressed as 
judgemental variability (and typically treated as noise in the 
psychological laboratory)might be entirely functional in environments 
where varying informational dependability and redundancy exist 
(Hogarth, 1982; also Beer's, 1966, 'law of requisite variety'). 
In a similar vein Lopes (1981) suggests that the long-run assumptions 
inherent in the principle of expectation maximisation might be 
entirely reasonable for immortal casino owners, but unrealistic 
as a. guide to short-run decision-making. Lopes notes that the St. 
Petersburg Paradox (Chapter 1, Note 3, this volume) is fundamentally 
unattractive because in the practical short-run it clearly favours 
the seller rather than the purchaser of the gamble. Lopes argues 
that people quite reasonably violate the principle of Expected Utility 
maximisation because in evaluating the gamble they consider only 
what the payoff will be most of the time. The prodigiously large 
payoff s, manifestly unlikely within any reasonable time scale, but 
upon which the-gamble's overall Expected Value is critically 
dependent, are correspondingly neglected. 
The problems associated with the extrapolation. from the laboratory 
to real life contexts are clearly illustrated by the comparative 
studies of Ebbesen and Konecni, and Phelps and Shantau. Ebbesen 
and Konecni, in a set of investigations. of legal decision-making 
(e. g. 1975,1980), find highly significant discrepancies in decision 
strategies between laboratory and real world contexts. For example, 
factors found to influence significantly decisions . during simulation 
studies proved irrelevant when. the same subjects (judges and probation 
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officers) were observed in their day-tb-day work. Although 
Ebbesen and Konecni do not pass judgement upon the overall competence 
of the decisons they do note that their experiments underline the 
task-dependent nature of decision strategies, and that this calls 
into question the external validity of all simulation 
"judgement and 
decision-making studies. 
In a second important set of studies, Phelps and Shanteau 
(1978; see also Shanteau and Phelps, 1977) utilise both controlled 
and naturalistic experimental. designs to investigate evaluations of 
gilt (sow) quality by student livestock judges. In the traditional, 
factorial simulation study they find evidence to support the 
conclusion that the judges utilise a total of between nine and 
eleven theoretically relevant cues to quality: for example, body 
weight and height of gilt. However, when the students judged 
sets of naturalistic photographs of livestock they appeared to 
concentrate upon a limited subset of these cues, typically less 
than three in total. The reason for this apparent discrepancy 
may reside in the fact that in the ecology of gilts (as, we assume, 
is represented reasonably accurately by the photographs) groups of 
the theoretically independent judgemental cues are in fact inter- 
correlated. A similar observation has been made by Ebbesen, Parker, 
and Konecni (1977), in a study of automobile driver risk-taking. 
Phelps and Shanteau interpret their discrepant findings as having 
resulted from the experimental designs selected; i. e. simulation 
v 
versus naturalistic. In contrast to Ebbesen and Konecni they do 
comment upon the issue of judgemental competence. They suggest 
that the confounding correlations present in their naturalistic 
stimuli might have led them to a misleading interpretation of the 
amount of information that experts can utilise (i. e. very little). 
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They contrast this to the more rigorously controlled simulation 
design, where the students appear to be operating quite well, and 
comment as follows: 
'... contrary to previous reports, expert judges are indeed 
capable of integrating many sources of information. 
The source of the discrepancy may lie in the research 
design selected. Since the two approaches studied 
led to such different conclusions about the abilities 
of the same expert judges, it is clear that we must 
not jump to conclusions about any so-called limitations 
of those abilities' (Phelps and Shanteau, 1978, 
pp. 218-219). 
While we would concur with this general conclusion, note that 
an alternative interpretation can be placed on their findings. 
Clearly the students' apparent sensitivity to the cues in the 
simulation study is significant. However, this does not necessarily 
imply that the performance in the naturalistic task was inferior. 
In order to conclude this we require the assumption that judgemental 
competence is in one-to-one correspondence with the amount of 
information utilised. Such an assumption ignores the role of the 
task 'ecology'. In the natural ecology of livestock judging, 
informational redundancies, as reflected in the inter-correlations, 
may render the utilisation of all items inappropriate. Thus in 
the naturalistic study the judge who utilises the appropriate two or 
three items would hardly be worse off than one who attempts to 
integrate them all, and certainly this would result in a greater 
saving in cognitive effort. A hypotheticalcorollary to this is 
that the type of simplifying strategy most appropriate to the 
naturalistic setting would be likely to appear inappropriate if used 
in the controlled context. This difference'in interpretation 
notwithstanding, it is interesting to note, particularly in the 
light of Edwards' (1983) comments, that livestock judging, presumably 
upon the basis of Phelps' and Shanteau's research, and expert weather 
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forecasting (see Murphy and Winkler, 1977) are commonly reported 
as examples of good performance in judgement or decison-making 
(Christensen-Szalanski and Beach, 1984). Both sets of research, 
in contrast to the majority of laboratory/student based studies within 
the heuristics and biases tradition, significantly utilise actual 
experts and naturalistic designs. 
The general issue that is raised here is that of the 
representativeness, and hence the external validity, of the 
experimental designs traditionally employed in the context of 
heuristics and biases research. Clearly, unrepresentative designs 
yield potentially problematic findings, of limited generality; e. g. 
see Hammond's insightful (1978) discussion of illusory correlation 
experiments. Our analysis here would appear to suggest the need 
for only cautious generalisation of laboratory findings within 
Behavioral Decision Theory to real world contexts. In particular 
it indicates that the generalised meaning of the bias concept, which 
we note in the previous Chapter (Chapter 3), may indeed be an 
unfounded conclusion to draw from the-research to date. 
III. General Functionalist Critiques 
In this section the focus will be upon two important 
functionalist critiques of the heuristics, biases, and bounded 
rationality model. In their Annual Review article, Einhorn and 
Hogarth (1981) note that a number of arguments critical of the 
heuristics and biases research derive from functionalist assumptions 
about behaviour. That is 'heuristics exist because their benefits 
outweigh their costs' (1981, p. 54). Einhorn and Hogarth do qualify 
this by noting that the extreme form of the functionalist argument, 
that all judgement and decision behaviour is cost/benefit efficient 
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in some evolutionary sense, is clearly untenable. In many 
respects such a position would be difficult to reconcile with 
the empirical approach to behaviour adopted by psychology, being 
unfalsifiable and prone to tautological argument. Furthermore, as 
Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson, and Kunda (1983) suggest, it implies an 
unrealistically static view of the human inference system. 
Despite valid objections to its extreme form, the functionalist 
argument, as a meta-theoretical perspective, is of some utility. 
Four, not necessarily totally independent, reasons support this. 
Firstly, where there appears to be normative madness in the otherwise 
purposive and intelligent behaviour of individuals or organisations 
a critical assessment of the standard canons of rationality might 
be in order (cf. March, 1978). In particular we need to ask the 
critical question: given the conditionality of all normative 
models, have the simplifying assumptions introduced by a specific 
model been rightly violated by our decision-makers, in the particular 
context of choice? Secondly, functionalist arguments point to the 
central importance of locating any theoretical analysis of behaviour 
within a model of both the subject and the task environment, or 
ecology. This is not a suggestion that is new to psychology in 
general, or Behavioral Decision Theory in particular (e. g. see 
Edwards, 1971), although one finds little empirical expression of 
it. Thirdly, while accepting that it would indeed be inappropriate 
to attribute hidden method to all forms of madness (cf. Fischhoff 
and Beyth-Marom, 1983), the functionalist approach suggests that 
generalisations about cognitive limitations based primarily upon 
laboratory research require cautious and qualified interpretation 
(cf. our comments on external validity). This is particularly 
the case if the laboratory studies have been specifically constructed, 
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as is often the case with heuristics and biases research, to 
elicit only dysfunctional responses. Fourthly, and finally, 
the utility at a general level of the weaker forms of 
functionalist theory lies in their ability to provide an alternative 
conceptual framework to that of the dominant heuristics and biases 
paradigm, and to generate new and constructive hypotheses which 
are open to empirical test. 
Our first point of departure is the assumption, made within 
traditional theories of judgement and choice, of rationality as a 
calculating endeavour. This is an implicit assumption 
that, we suspect, has been accepted within heuristics and biases 
research as a direct result of the uncritical adoption of the 
information-processing framework (as initially proposed, for 
example, by Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1971). Clearly, this is not 
" to criticise the benefits that have been afforded by this new direction 
in research, but merely to point out the attendant tacit constraints 
to research that the adoption of such a framework entails. 
The roots of the notion that calculation is in some sense a 
necessary precondition to rational choice owes much historically, 
as our discussions in Chapter 1 illustrate, to developments within 
economics and statistics. However, it appears also to be related 
to the computer-brain analogy that has recently arisen within 
information-processing psychology (e. g. see Apter, 1970; Von Neumann, 
1958). It is an often stated homily that those who would study 
the workings of the mind have based their models throughout history 
upon the principles afforded by the most sophisticated machines 
available at any one point in time. Clearly, this suggestion 
can be readily applied to the information-processing approach to 
judgement and decision. One consequence of embracing such a model 
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of mind is that a primarily computational (or analysis-synthesis; 
Toda, 1980) perspective with respect to the issue of rational 
judgement and decision has been uncritically adopted. While of 
considerable utility, such a perspective should be tempered by the 
fact that, as Simon (1978) cogently points out, the limitations and 
strengths of human cognition and modern digital computers lie in 
respectively different spheres. In constructing the. computer-brain 
analogy, we have perhaps lost sight somewhat of the computer-brain 
distinction. In the context of Behavioral Decision Theory, the 
human cognitive system is traditionally discussed in terms of its 
limited Short Term Memory capacity and attention-span, and the 
implications of this for its explicit calculative capacity are clear. 
However, it is important to place such an observation together with 
the. fact that the cognitive system is also characterised by a 
relatively well developed, if sometimes fallible, mechanism for 
the encoding, long-term storage, and subsequent retrieval of a 
highly complex body of knowledge. Almost the reverse could be said, 
even with the most sophisticated technology available today, of the 
capabilities of the modern computer; highly efficient with respect 
to calculation, but relatively poor on volume and organisation 
for long-term storage. 
That a large proportion of researchers within Behavioral Decision 
Theory appear to have ignored the seemingly simple observation of 
the computer-brain distinction is somewhat surprising, and perhaps 
indicative of a lack of integration with mainstream cognitive psychology. 
The implications of this are clear. By adhering to a computational 
basis for rationality, the benefits afforded to human cognition by 
a'highly developed Long Term Memory have often been overlooked. 
The alternative response leads, as for example March (1978) illustrates, 
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to a contrast between the limited vision of calculated rationality 
and alternative forms of clearly intelligent human behaviour, 
such as learned responses, intuition, imitation, or appeal to 
expertise. It is thus hardly surprising, given the in-built 
affinity13 of the information-processing approach to judgement and 
decision to a singular notion of rationality that in effect discriminates 
in favour of 'good calculators', to find Edwards observing that: 
'the net effect [of the heuristics and biases research] 
has been a significant contribution to the widely held 
view that whenever possible human intellectual tasks 
should be done by computers instead' (Edwards, 
1983, p. 509). 
The practical implications of Edwards' observation are clearly 
far reaching, and cannot concern us here. However, we might conclude 
more narrowly that Behavioral Decision Theory might benefit from a 
closer relationship with mainstream cognitive psychology than has 
been the case to date (Pitz and Sachs, 1984; 'Wallsten, 1983). 
In. as far as adaptation to an environment requires, as one 
necessary precursor, a highly effective learning and recognition 
mechanism (cf. Einhorn, 1980), our discussion of the computer-brain 
distinction is entirely compatible with a functionalist approach to 
human inference and decision. Perhaps the most articulated statement 
of this is proposed by Thorngate in his principle of sagacious 
allocation (1979,1976; ' see also Toda's, 1980, rational allocation14 
principle) which suggests that: 
'whenever possible, the brain will favour cognitive 
processes which rely heavily on perception and long- 
term memory to those which rely heavily on short- 
term-memory and long intervals of undivided attention' 
(Thorngäte, 1979, p. 290). 
Thorngate's proposition'suggests that current theories of 
calculative rationality are qualitatively deficient as baselines for 
the comparison of human performance. A good example of non-calculative 
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expert judgement is provided by research into the performance of 
chess grand-masters, who appear not to search out as much as recognise 
a correct move (e. g. Chase and Simon, 1973). Hence, rather than 
merely . focus upon the non-calculative 
(and hence dysfunctional) 
aspects of retrieval and recognition processes such as"availability, 
and judgement by representativeness, Behavioral Decision Theory might 
come to benefit from the realisation that, as March notes, there may 
indeed be 'intelligence in the suspension of calculation' (1978, 
p. 593). 
The second important functionalist critique of the heuristics 
and biases research centres around the argument that descriptive models 
need to incorporate implicit decision costs. Such costs include the 
effort required for information search, or that of applying a given 
decision strategy without external aids (the 'cost' of thinking; 
Johnson, 1979; Shugan, 1980). By this argument, people can be 
regarded as being perfectly rational utility maximisers if such 
factors are incorporated explicitly in a cost-benefit model of their 
behaviour. For example, Beach and Mitchell (1978) propose that 
decision strategy selection can be characterised as a cost-benefit 
analysis sensitive to characteristics of both the decision-maker and 
the task. Such a suggestion is not without precedent,. as our 
discussion in Chapter 3 of the seminal research of Bruner, Goodnow, 
and Austin (1956) on cognitive strain indicates. While such an 
appeal to meta-rationality raises the problematic issue of infinite 
regress, this does not necessarily imply that such a cost-benefit 
model will be empirically vacuous. Recent empirical research, 
some based upon the theoretical framework of Beach and Mitchell, 
indicates that strategy selection is indeed mediated by variables 
that can-be theoretically related to implicit decision costs: for 
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example, task complexity as defined by the number of outcomes and 
alternatives15 (Klayman, 1982; Payne, 1976; Smith, Mitchell, and 
Beach, 1982; Thorngate and Maki, 1976), the worth of the decision 
(Christensen-Szalanski, 1978; McAllister, Mitchell, and Beach, 1979), 
time constraints (Christensen-Szalanski, 1980), ambiguity (Waller and 
Mitchell, 1984), and the trade-off between error and effort costs 
(Russo and Dosher, 1981). A corollary to this is seen in research 
investigating the applicability of sets of theoretical decision 
strategies in given task environments (Corbin, 1980; Johnson, 1979; 
Kleinmuntz and Kleinmuntz, 1981; Shugan, 1980; Thorngate, 1980). 
Whether the hypothesis that the decision-maker is an implicit 
cost-benefit analyser is to be borne out is ultimately an empirical 
question. However, what has clearly arisen from research conducted 
to date is the observation that decision strategies are sensitive 
to a range of 'cost' variables (amongst others), serving to highlight 
the highly contingent (Payne, 1982) nature of much., decision behaviour. 
IV. Thorngate's Study: The Functional Dimension to Heuristic Use 
In this section our argument unites two themes from previous 
sections: firstly, that of the external validity, and particularly 
the representativeness, of heuristics and biases research; secondly, 
the functionalist framework with respect to judgement and decision. 
Specifically, and following Thorngate (1980), it will be argued that 
evidence of dysfunctional judgement and decision processes operating in 
tightly controlled laboratory settings does not necessarily imply 
that such processes need often or always. lead to dysfunctional 
outcomes. 
It is instructive here to commence by restating our contention 
that the methodological aspects of the attempt to-identify departures 
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from normative principles are not wholly negative. Similarly, we 
have noted that Kahneman's and Tversky's visual illusion analogy is 
unobjectionable, as a methodological statement. However, it is 
also significant to recognise here that the existence of systematic 
visual' illusions under specifically constructed laboratory (or 
artists') conditions-is not generally taken to be evidence for the 
fallibility of specific perceptual processes, or of the perceptual 
system in general. Rather, visual illusions are typically seen to 
result from processes that are generally functional within real life 
contexts, but that have been induced by abnormal, experimentally 
manipulated conditions16. In perceptual 
psychology, 
evidence for 
such a functionalist position is most clearly derived from the classic 
demonstrations of'cultural differences in susceptibility to certain 
forms of illusion: for example, differences between western and 
primitive judgements of perspective based figures, such as the 
Muller-Lyer arrows or the Sander parallelogram (Segall, Campbell, 
and Herskovits, 1966). Although certain procedural aspects of 
such studies can be problematic (Pick and Pick, 1978), the evidence 
nevertheless suggests a cultural interpretation for such differences. 
The 'ecological' approach to visual perception is -. traced by 
Selrgall et al. to the work of Brunswik (e. g. 1956; Brunswik and 
Kamiya, 1953), and related to his notion of probabilistic functionalism. 
While accepting that in some cases non-functional explanations are 
necessary for given illusory effects (e. g. the finite speed of 
neural transmission) Segall et al. state that: 
'Our general theoretical position can perhaps best be 
epitomised by Brunswik's phrase "ecological cue 
validity". It involves some general assumptions 
that Brunswik summarised as "probabilistic 
functionalism". It is hypothesised-that the 
visual system is functional in general, although 
not in every specific utilisation. The modes 
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'of operation are what they are because they 
are useful in the statistical average of 
utilisations. 
When this is applied to optical illusions, it 
is hypothesised that the illusion taps a process 
that is in general functional, although it is '. 
misleading in-the particular instance because of 
"ecological unrepresentativeness"; that is, this 
type of situation is unlike the general run of 
situations to which the process is functionally 
adapted' (Segall, Campbell, and Herskovits, 1966, 
p. 74). 
The relevance of Brunswik's theoretical framework to the current 
thesis will be explored at a later stage in this volume (see Chapter 
6). For present purposes it will be sufficient to note a number 
of initial observations with respect to the operation of cognitive 
heuristics. It is clear that from such a position the utility of 
basic cognitive processes, whether judgemental or otherwise, must 
be evaluated in the context of their operation within a specific 
environment, or ecology. Hence in the visual domain reliance upon 
the perspective cue to depth is a generally effective strategy if 
we inhabit a carpentered world. The ecological perspective is of 
utility for two reasons: firstly, because it points to the possibly 
functional implications (within any given context) of specific 
heuristics and, secondly, to the conditions under which use of such 
strategies truly will be catastrophic. These two important issues 
have generally been neglected by researchers within Behavioral 
Decision Theory, largely, we suspect, because of its limited focus 
upon bias and error in the laboratory. The visual illusion analogy 
points to the fact that these issues are non-trivial, and in the 
context of our present discussion of the rationality. issue the 
following interesting question is raised. How often will the 
application-of simplifying heuristics, identified in highly 
structured laboratory studies, lead to functional or dysfunctional 
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outcomes in other contexts? The theoretical importance of this 
question is underlined by noting the fact that the heuristics, 
biases, and bounded rationality model depends partially upon the 
assumption that the simplifying strategies that people commonly 
employ are generally functional, and hence their use (e. g. Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1974), and yet the. - associated literature provides 
no empirical evidence to support such a contention. That such a 
critical assumption-has remained empirically undeveloped by advocates 
of the model for the best part of ten years represents a curious, 
although perhaps not surprising, situation. 
The functionality issue has been explored by critics of 
heuristics and biases research. Particularly relevant is the work 
of Warren Thorngate who, in one of the few articles to address the 
positive aspects of heuristic use, suggests the following: 
'If a judgement or decision. heuristic can lead 
individuals astray, we may not necessarily infer 
that it always will, nor may we infer that when it 
does the suboptimal result will be intolerable 
or tragic' (Thorngate, 1980, p.. 219). 
Thorngate illustrates his suggestion by means of an elegant 
Monte Carlo computer simulation. The program generates a number 
of random probability/payoff matrices, and to each of these matrices 
a number of theoretical decision rules is applied. For example, 
consider the matrix illustrated'in Figure 4.1: 
Figure 4.1 
Simple 2 Alternative 4 Outcome Probability/Payoff Matrix 
X. . 07 pays 332, . 23 pays 903, . 18 pays 
311, . 52 pays 342 
Y. . 33 pays 869, . 34 pays 
132, . 22 pays 625, . 11 pays 243 
The matrix in Figure 4.1 has two choice alternatives, X and Y. 
Associated with each alternative is a set of four. mutually exclusive, 
and exhaustive outcomes. Each outcome has a probability. of occurrence 
- 105 - 
and an associated payoff value (expressed in terms of some standard 
unit). The procedure for generating the payoff and probability 
values is reported in Thorngate (1980). Such a matrix represents 
the classical risky choice paradigm of Behavioral Decision Theory 
(see Chapter 2, this volume). In the example, Expected Value 
maximisation leads to a choice of alternative Y (EV(i) _ 
4 
E (viýý x piýý) EV(X) = 465, EV(Y) = 495. Having calculated 
j=1 
the Expected Value choice for a matrix, Thorngate's simulation 
program compares this to the choices of a number of theoretical 
decision heuristics, of which the following are examples: 
(i) Equiprobable (E) 
This rule sets all outcome probabilities equal, 
and thus in effect ignores the probability 
information. For every alternative an 
unweighted average of the payoffs is calculated. 
The alternative with highest average payoff 
is selected. For the example matrix, this 
rule selects alternative X; E(X) = 
(332 + 903 + 311 + 342)/4 = 472, E(Y) _ 
(869 + 132 + 625 + 243)/4 = 467). 
(ii) Probable (P) 
For each alternative the most probable outcomes 
are first identified (defined as those outcomes 
with probability of occurrence greater-than 1/n, 
where n. is the total number of outcomes within the 
alternative). An unweighted average of the 
payoffs on these most probable outcomes is then 
calculated for each alternative. The alternative 
with the highest average is selected. For the 
example matrix, this rule selects alternative 
Y; P(X) = (342/1) = 342, p(Y) = (869 + 132)/2 = 
501. 
(iii) Minimax (MIN) 
This rule selects. the alternative with the highest 
minimum payoff. For the example matrix, this 
rule selects alternative X; MIN(X) = 311, 
MIN(Y) = 132. 
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(iv) Maximax (MAX) 
This rule selects the alternative with the 
highest maximum payoff. For the example 
matrix, this rule selects alternative X, 
MAX(X) = 903, MAX(Y) = 869. 
(v) Most Likely (ML) 
/ 
This rule first identifies, within each 
alternative, the single most likely outcome; 
i. e. the outcome with the highest probability 
of occurrence. The alternative with the 
highest payoff on its most likely outcome 
is then selected. For the example matrix, 
this rule selects alternative X; ML(X) = 342, 
ML(Y) = 132. 
(vi) Probable Minimum (PMIN) 
This rule first' identifies the-minimum payoff 
within each alternative (as with the MIN rule). 
The alternative with the lowest probability of 
attaining its minimum payoff is then selected. 
For the example matrix, this rule selects 
alternative X; LL(X) = . 08, LL(Y) = . 14. Note that this rule is referred to as the Least 
Likely Rule in Thorngate's original paper. 
The surprising outcome of this study is that over a total of 
200 randomly generated matrices some of the simplest heuristic . 
rules reliably lead to the same choice as the 'optimal' maximum 
Expected Value criterion. Such heuristics, Thorngate suggests, 
can be termed efficient. In particular the Equiprobable and 
Probable Rules are highly efficient, with both selecting, in the 
2 alternative 4 outcome case illustrated above, the alternative with 
highest Expected Value 84% of the time (84% efficient). Other 
rules are less efficient,. but still. better than would be expected 
by chance. For example,, the Minimai Rule is 77% efficient, while 
the Probable Min Rule is 61%. Thorngate. replicates this general 
result with matrices of different complexity. {i. e. with different 
numbers of alternatives and/or outcomes). - 
In effect the heuristic efficiency criterion addresses one aspect 
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of the possible functional implications of a specific rule in 
relation to a particular task environment (in the case of Thorngate's 
study, the 'environment' of randomly generated gambles). Hence, 
any heuristic might be demonstrably efficient, or inefficient, 
given an adequate specification of the plausible values across which 
the relevant task dimensions are expected to vary. Such a position 
might be reached either by empirical (as Brunswik would perhaps 
urge) or theoretical examination of the relationships between 
heuristic and task. Such an exercise could also address, 
independently of the efficiency issue, the circumstances under which 
specific heuristic rules produce truly unacceptable outcomes. In the 
same way that the existence of bias does not necessarily imply 
inefficiency, the suggestion that a particular heuristic might be 
efficient does not necessarily imply that any potential consequences 
will be innocuous. For example, if it rains then the decision rule 
'stand under the nearest tree' is arguably adaptive, in-the sense 
of lowering the likelihood of contracting pneumonia, and demonstrably 
efficient given knowledge of the base-rate probability in the United 
Kingdom of the occurrence of thunder storms. However, exclusive 
reliance upon such a rule could prove fatal! 
Thorngate's (1980) paper can be criticised on the grounds that 
he fails to specify the relevance of his choice matrices to real 
world decision-contexts (we comment at a later stage on their 
relevance to the typical empirical paradigms within Behavioral 
Decision Theory). He merely demonstrates that some simple heuristics 
can be efficient when performance is considered over a range of 
artificially generated dimensions. However, as Einhorn and 
Hogarth (1981) imply, a more fundamental issue is, that of heuristic 
efficiency considered over a representative sample of natural 
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environmental decision situations. Thorngate's study is 
nevertheless of considerable importance theoretically, in that 
it clearly demonstrates that the issue of heuristic use has a 
functional as well as dysfunctional aspect. This implies that the 
issue of bias, as traditionally discussed, is one that is far 
from resolution. As in the case of visual illusion research, 
we might question the representativeness of experiments that, as 
we have noted, typically seek to promote errors by the construction 
of tightly controlled tasks. Lack of representativeness need 
not be a critical problem if, as is indeed the case in visual 
illusion research, this is explicitly recognised in discussions 
of any findings. However, such qualification, while sometimes 
noted, is rarely emphasised when the findings of heuristics and 
biases research are discussed. And the generalised meaning of 
the bias concept arising from this research, which' has been 
discussed in the previous Chapter (Chapter 3), certainly holds no 
such qualification. 
V. Conclusion 
The evidence that we have discussed in this Chapter highlights 
a number of interpretive difficulties associated with the heuristics 
and biases research. In each section our argument has led us to 
question the typical interpretations placed on findings from such 
research, and in particular suggests that the generalised 'cognitive 
cripple' (cf. Slovic, 1972) hypothesis is untenable. Following 
Thorngate (1980) we have noted that the issue of the functional 
aspect of heuristic use can, and should, be investigated. 
Exclusive reliance upon studies designed to. elicit dysfunctional 
responses neglects this issue, and thus would appear to represent 
C 
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a basic deficiency of the heuristics, biases, and bounded 
rationality research. 
It is perhaps of relevance here to conclude by noting a 
number of very general critiques of the heuristics and biases model. 
For example, Wallsten (1980,1983) suggests, following Olson (1976), 
that the determinants of heuristic use (e. g. what makes a particular 
stimulus available or representative) are so loosely defined that 
the construction of unequivocal empirical investigations of them 
are at best problematic. An illustrative example of this, specifically 
the apparent 'flexibility' of the availability heuristic as an 
explanatory construct, is cited by Hastie (1983) in a recent review 
article. He notes that, in similar research into the effects of 
temporal distance on attributions, Miller and. Porter (1980) and 
Moore, Lui, and Underwood (1979) reach, both by theoretical reference 
to availability processes, opposite conclusions with almost equivalent 
research methods! 
Ebbesenand Konecni (1980) suggest that once one removes the 
derogatory tone implicit in the term 'bias' then the only conclusion 
that can be drawn from the research is: 
'a simple descriptive statement suggesting that decision 
makers are sometimes responsive to task characteristics 
that are not specified by prior normative or theoretical 
conceptions (Olson, 1976) and that researchers do not 
know when such oversensitivitieswill emerge ... Put 
differently, there are no theories to tell us when 
people will be Bayesian, when they will average, when 
they will add, when they will be subjective-expected- 
utility maximisers, when they will be sufficiently 
sensitive to characteristics of data samples, when 
they-., 0f l show appropriate hindsight, when they will 
retrieve information from memory that is not typical 
but is actually representative, when they will know 
what they do not know, and so on' (Ebbesen and Konecni, 
1980, p. 24). 
Other critics have argued that heuristic explanations tend to 
be post-hoc (e. g. Groner, Groner and Bischof, 1983; Olson, 1976), 
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if not in fact circular (Berkeley and Humphreys, 1982; Evans and 
Pollard, 1982). And at a more general level Anderson proposes 
that: 
'From the descriptive standpoint, normative approaches 
seem typically irrelevant, typically indeed a 
hindrance to understanding. Deviations from 
normative prediction may in some sense be irrational 
or suboptimal, and_in a practical way, to be avoided. 
That does not make them true phenomena, however, 
for they exist only by reference to a conceptual 
framework that lacks psychological relevance'- 
(Anderson, 1979, p. 98). 
-a point that is echoed by Edwards when he notes that: 
'If someone says "2 +2= 4", that isn't psychology; 
it is just arithmetic. But "2 +2= 5" is psychology. 
If enough experimental subjects say it often enough, 
it will be a finding, and the experimental and 
theoretical literature about it will burgeon' 
(Edwards, 1983, p. 507). 
Perhaps all of these comments reflect deep-seated doubts with 
respect to the overall theoretical development of heuristics and 
biases research expressed, among other places, but most significantly, 
in all three recent Annual Review articles of Behavioral Decision 
Theory (Slovic, Fischhoff and Lichtenstein, 1977; Einhorn and 
Hogarth, 1981; Pitz and Sachs, 1984). It is clear that an ever- 
growing catalogue of biases (cf. our discussion at the end of the 
previous Chapter), together with some recent redefinition of key 
concepts such as representativeness (e. g. see Bar-Hillel, 1984; 
Tversky and. Kahneman, 1982b), may not be sufficient for robust 
prediction. In part such a situation may exist because, as Wallsten 
(1983) suggests, the focus upon the rationality-irrationality issue 
has diverted researchers' attention away from basic underlying 
processes, and that a closer contact with mainstream cognitive 
psychology would therefore be desirable. Perhaps, as our own 
analysis suggests, theoretical progress has been inadequate in 
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part because the unique focus upon the irrationality issue has 
obscured the basic rationality of those processes in many contexts. 
This latter issue will be the focus of the empirical programme, to 
be reported in the next Chapters. 
/ 
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NOTES 
1. In recognition of the more phenomenological direction of the 
heuristics, biases, and bounded rationality model, Hammond, 
McClelland, and Mumpower (1980)_ employ the term Psychological 
Decision Theory to describe the research. This distinguishes 
it from the earlier Behavioral Decision Theory. / 
2. See, for example, Manis, Dovalina, Avis, and Cardoze (1980), 
Manis, Avis, and Cardoze (1981), Bar-Hillel and Fischhoff 
(1981); Christensen-Szalanski and Beach (1982,1983), 
Beyth-Marom and Arkes (1983); Edwards (1983), Fischhoff 
(1983), Phillips (1983); Cohen (1979,1980c), Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979c); Kahneman and Tversky (1982a, 1982b), 
Evans (1982); Cohen and commentaries (1981). 
3. A recent example provides an interesting contrast between 
the emphasis upon error within heuristics and biases research 
and, in this instance, mainstream cognitive psychology. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1983) present"-evjdence from a number 
of studies investigating judgements of conjunctive probabilities. 
They note that under certain conditions conjunctive evaluations 
can be greater than their constituent components; i. e. 
if A and B are events then P(A h B) > MIN [P(A), P(B)]. 
Tversky'and Kahneman note that such a relationship is in 
violation of the standard uncertainty calculi (a result 
demonstrated by Blocklpy, Pilsworth, and Baldwin, 1983), and 
term the phenomenon the conjunctive"fallacy. In discussing 
similar experiments, Leddo, Abelson, and Gross (1984) 
are more charitable, preferring the term conjunctive effect. 
However, in discussing the same basic-empirical phenomenon 
in the domain of prototype theory (albeit with reference to 
characteristicness judgements rather than probabilities), 
Osherson and Smith (1981) and Jones (1982) make no reference 
at all to the supposed rationality or otherwise of these 
effects; the issue here is rather one of adequate descriptive 
modellinq. 
4. The non-justificationist philosophy has arisen primarily 
as a result of the paradox revealed when the evident 
practical success of science is juxtaposed with the 
'fallacy of induction' (Popper, 1935,1959). Popper, 
Kuhn, and Lakatos attempt to resolve this paradox by 
suggesting new demarcation criteria for the evaluation 
of rival scientific knowledge; the critical method, crisis 
theory, and the research program account respectively. 
While Popper's attempt was founded in logic (e. g.. his 
measure of theory corroboration), the latter two probably 
owe more to the sociology of science. In contrast 
Feyerabend (1975,1978), 'in presenting his scientific 
anarchism (which should not be confused with political 
anarchism), argues that we should reject the notion of 
the existence of specific criteria of demarcation. Rather, 
if knowledge is to progress then it is necessary to accept 
that 'anything goes', and that 'rationality is one tradition 
among many rather than a standard to which traditions 
must conform' (1978, p. 7).. 
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5. At one level of analysis the experimenter's perspective 
(or at least that of a body of 'informed' scientists) 
underlies all normative standards if we accept that any 
such construct is merely intersubjective. As Nisbett 
and. Ross (1980):. note: 
'How [does one know] that a given inferential 
strategy is "correct" or normatively appropriate? 
Our answer to this question is straightforward: 
We follow conventional practice by using the 
term "normative" to describe the use of a rule 
when there is a consensus among formal scientists 
that the rule is appropriate for the particular 
problem' (Nisbett and Ross, 1980, p. 13). 
Of course, the dangers of 'knowledge elitism' inherent 
in such a position (Sjöberg, 1980) are clear if and when 
the formal scientist's consensus does not correspond to 
that of the layperson. 
6. Kruglanski and Ajzen (1983) also make an interesting 
distinction between the concepts of bias and error. 
They note that these have traditionally been viewed as 
interchangeable concepts in the judgement and decision 
literature (a position that we have maintained here in 
the review sections of this volume), but argue the 
following from the non-justificationist position: 
'We define bias as a subjectively-based preference 
for a given conclusion or inference over possible 
alternative conclusions. According to our theory 
it is, in principle, possible to generate a vast 
number of alternative hypotheses consistent with 
a given array of evidence. The decision to stop 
the cognition-generating process at some point is 
assumed to be governed by such factors as the mental 
availability of a given conception and the person's 
epistemically relevant motivations ... In this 
sense, then, all knowledge can be considered "biased", 
for it is affected by various psychological mechanisms 
whose specific manifestation vary across persons. 
In a similar fashion we also define error subjectively 
as the type of experience a person might have 
following an encountered inconsistency between a 
given hypothesis, conclusion or inference, and a 
firmly held belief. For instance, most of us 
would admit to an error about not having any money 
upon discovering a $100 bill in our wallets ... 
It is noteworthy that, just as with the 'truth' label, 
the 'error' label can be attached to a given judgment 
only tentatively and might be revoked upon further 
examination.... 
According to these definitions, bias need not result 
in error. A11 knowledge is subject to bias, but 
not all knowledge need be experienced as erroneous. 
Indeed it can be shown that the various sources of 
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'bias listed in the contemporary literature need 
not result in erroneous inferences, as here 
defined' (Kruglanski and Ajzen, 1983, p. 19). 
Interestingly, such a distinction similarly arises when the 
efficacy of social judgement is discussed from an 'ecological' 
perspective (e. g. McArthur and Barron, 1983). 
7. Cohen (1981) also argues that in some of the experiments 
the subjects have been 'misled' by the experimenters 
because of the inclusion of specific task characteristics 
(in the manner that an illusionist might mislead his 
audience)y.,. or in some cases-are unreasonably asked 
to respond in correspondence with what are, to Cohen, 
highly subtle and complex criteria (e. g. the Law of Large 
Numbers). 
8. This is given that the civil law, unlike the criminal law, 
requires merely the weak test of a balance of probabilities 
(p > 0.5) in favour of the plaintiff. 
9. 'Lindley's paradox' is of particular interest, since it 
highlights an apparent contradiction between Bayesian 
and Classical statistics (Lindley, 1977). Pflug (1983) 
describes the paradox as follows: 
'A window was smashed when a burglary'was 
committed in:. a jewellry. A piece of broken 
glass was found in a suspect. The breaking 
index of the shop's window-pane was estimated to [be] 
1.518458. The breaking index of the glass 
splinter was investigated and calculated to 
[be] 1.518472 with a standard deviation of 
0.000004 due to the measurement error. A 
classical statistical test rejects the 
hypothesis of equality. Since the breaking 
indexes of window-panes vary between 1.51 and 
1.53 the hypothesis of equality can be accepted 
from the Bayesian standpoint and thus the culprit 
could be caught. which conclusion is the 
correct-., one? ' (Pflug, 1983, p. "3381). 
10. One example of dogmatism would be Lindley's recent (1982) 
defence of the Bayesian position with respect to uncertainty, 
and his assertion of the 'inevitability' of probability. 
11. In an interesting paper Montgomery (1983; also Dahlstrand 
and Montgomery, 1984) conceptualises the role played by 
predecisional-structuring' in multiattribute situations 
as a search for 'good arguments', by which the decision 
can be subsequently justified (cf. also Slovic, 1975). 
Specifically, such processes can be seen as operating 
in the attempt to produce for the decision-maker a dominance 
structure 'in which one alternative can be seen as dominant 
over the others' (1983, p. 343). 
.I 
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12. Against Edwards' formulation can be raised tabulations such 
as Fischhoff's (1982) taxonomy of 'debiasing' manipulations 
that have been empirically studied. The inference to 
be drawn here is that if a number of theoretically relevant 
manipulations produce a consistent result (in this case 
failure to eradicate or reduce the biasing response) then 
more confidence can be placed in the cumulative research 
results, and this will be in some sense independent of the 
representativeness issue (cf. Turner, 1981). While it is 
clear that direct comparison of taxonomies such as those 
proposed by Edwards and Fischhoff is problematic (and 
ultimately an empirical issue) the immediate value of 
such exercises lies in their identification of the plausible 
boundary conditions to the research findings. 
13. We would not like to add here to the burgeoning literature 
by suggesting that this effect be labelled-the 'calculative 
fallacy'! 
14. Toda notes that the dominant rationality paradigm of normative 
decision theory is computational, or, in his terms, 
decompositional (analytic-synthetic). This he contrasts 
with the notion of compositional rationality, as follows: 
'The decompositional rationality of normative 
decision theory has been handed down to contemporary 
descriptive decision theory which has recently 
become more cognitively oriented. In taking a 
more cognitively oriented view one must pay strong 
attention to the fact that human cognitive 
operations are limited. An information-processing 
system with a finite capacity cannot base its 
rationality on fineness of its analysis alone, but 
must base on efficient allocation of its analytical 
resources. The rational allocation principle should 
be stated as: analyze finely where there is information, 
but combine elements together as a chunk where there 
is redundancy (Miller, 1956). Therefore under limiting 
conditions of any kind, one should consider compositional 
rationality as well as decompositional rationality' 
(Toda, 1980, p. 140). 
The similarity of Toda's thesis to that of Thorngate (1979) 
is remarkable, despite slightly differing emphases with 
respect to the descriptive status of their conjectures. 
Furthermore, both point to the potential utility to the 
decision-maker, in informationally redundant, and relatively 
stationary, ienvironments, of non-calculative decision 
procedures such as habitual response. 
15. But see also Mackinnon's', andýWearing's (1980) discussion of 
the notion of system complexity, which is clearly a function 
of more than merely the number of outcomes and alternatives 
available to the decision-maker. More complex environments 
(defined purely in terms of elements present) need not 
necessarily lead to poorer quality decision-making, particularly 
if redundancy is present. Similarly, the relationship between 
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strategy selection and complexity in multiattribute choice 
may not be a simple one (e. g. Onken, Hastie, and Revell, 
1985). 
16. Such a position with respect to the error concept is similarly 
found in areas of cognitive psychology. For example, 
Reason and Mycielska (1982) discuss the 'ordinary' category 
of mental lapse that may have contributed to a number of 
well known disasters (e. g. the 1977 Teneriffe runway 
collision; the 1975 Moorgate tube crash). While apurely 
psychological level of analysis of such incidents is clearly 
incomplete (e. g. see Perrow, 1984; Turner, 1978), for 
present purposes it is instructive to note the following: 
'Although the primary focus of this book is upon 
human error, and upon absent-minded actions in 
particular, it is important to acknowledge at the 
outset that errors are the exception rather than 
the rule. If we are to understand more about why 
absent-minded slips occur, and-why they take the 
largely predictable forms that they do, we must 
first have some idea of how the [cognitive] control 
mechanisms work to achieve the desired performance' 
(Reason and Mycielska, 1982, p. 40). 
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CHAPTER 5 
STUDY 1 
A "BEHAVIOURAL REPLICATION" OF THORNGATE'S STUDY 
Introduction and Summary / 
In the previous Chapter we have explored a number of current 
critiques of the heuristics and biases research: firstly, that the 
conditionality of all normative models renders the task of labelling 
any response 'erroneous' as philosophically problematic; secondly, 
that the heuristics and biases research suffers from a number of as 
yet unresolved methodological problems; thirdly, that a functionalist 
perspective suggests that a more charitable view of individual cognitive 
processes may be required. As a consequence, we have concluded that 
acceptance of the 'cognitive cripple' hypothesis, as a general statement 
of human judgemental and decision-making capacity, would be at best 
premature1. More specifically, and following Thorngate (1980), it 
has been suggested that the distinctive focus of the heuristics, 
biases, and bounded rationality model upon the investigation of 
inferential 'errors' in tightly controlled laboratory tasks has 
resulted in empirical findings that- should be highly circumscribed. 
It has been argued that the lack of direct empirical investigations 
of the functional aspects of heuristic use, either in simulated or 
in naturalistic contexts, has resulted in a basic empirical and 
theoretical deficiency within the Behavioral Decision Theory literature. 
The principal research question to be investigated in the current 
Chapter arises directly from consideration of this problem. 
Specifically, how might we empirically investigate the possible 
functional aspects of heuristic use? 
This Chapter is organised in five principal sections. Firstly, 
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an introduction section discusses the background to and relevance 
of the first study, together with some preliminary hypotheses. 
Secondly, the materials and methods section documents the basic 
experimental procedure of the study. Thirdly, the results section 
documents the empirical findings of the study. Fourthly, these are 
interpreted in the discussion section. Fifth, and finally, the 
conclusions to be drawn from the study are briefly noted. 
I. Study I- Introduction 
We have noted, in the previous Chapter (Chapter 4), that the 
heuristics, biases, and bounded rationality model makes the assumption 
that the simplifying strategies that people commonly employ are 
indeed generally functional, and hence their use (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974), and yet the associated literature provides no 
empirical evidence to support such a contention. In one sense, 
therefore, our basic empirical proposal is entirely compatible with 
this model. Hence, it is expected that an investigation of the 
functional aspects of heuristic use, while primarily designed to 
provide evidence refuting the 'cognitive cripple' hypothesis, will 
nevertheless ultimately contribute to the overall theoretical developmen 
of the information-processing approach to judgement and decision-making. 
The importance of such empirical evidence should not be under-estimated, 
given that the functionality assumption remains merely speculation, 
rather than being grounded in rigorous scientific inquiry. Small 
wonder perhaps that, as Fischhoff (1983) comments: 'The retelling 
of these [early heuristics and biases] results has tended to accentuate 
the negative, in part because the errors are more salient than the 
heuristics ... ' (p. 522). 
Before proceeding further, however, it is important to raise here 
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a qualification to the meta-theoretical perspective that we adopt. 
By suggesting that heuristics may serve some function for the 
decision-maker it is not intended to imply that all judgement can, 
or should, be interpreted as being perfectly adapted to some idealised 
set of task conditions. This, as is noted in the previous Chapter, 
would be an empirically vacuous position. Rather, the use of-the 
term function is much weaker and therefore, in the spirit of, for 
example, Beach's and Mitchell's (1978) cost-benefit model, open to 
direct empirical investigation. Specifically, it is suggested here 
that there may well exist a functional dimension to human judgement 
and decision-making, and that it is a legitimate research strategy 
to attempt to investigate this. In pursuing this suggestion no 
attempt will be made here to explain the evolution of such a phenomenon, 
an issue which, while important, need not concern us. 
The investigation to be reported in this Chapter was initially 
conceived as an extension of Thorngate's (1980) simulation study, 
the theoretical significance of which has been discussed in the 
previous Chapter. Since Thorngate investigates the performance of 
a number of decision heuristics within the classical risky choice 
paradigm, his findings can be related to our earlier review of the 
literature documenting the failure of expectation based models (i. e. 
EV, SEU) as substantive descriptors of human decision-making under risk. 
This literature suggests that a theoretical approach to decision- 
making under risk, and judgement and decision behaviour in general, 
emphasising the information-processing demands of the task, and the 
operation of simplifying heuristics and decision strategies, offers 
the more acceptable phenomenological model. Evidence for this, as 
a general assertion (without at all prejudging the precise form of 
particular heuristic models), derives from three primary sources. 
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Firstly, the empirical research conducted within the heuristics and 
biases paradigm, aside from any specific criticisms of scope or 
interpretation, would appear to support this. Secondly, the moment 
versus risk-dimension debate with respect to risky decision-making 
(Libby and Fishburn, 1977; Payne, 1973; Schoemaker, 1979) favours 
the descriptive validity of heuristic based models. Thirdly, a 
number of recent empirical investigations suggest that individuals 
employ a wide range of simple decision strategies in attempting to 
cope with multiattribute choice tasks, of which risky choice is one 
sub-class (e. g. see Montgomery and Svenson, 1976; Payne, 1982; 
Svenson, 1979). Of these three principal sources the first and 
second have been comprehensively discussed in Chapters 3 and 2 
respectively of the current dissertation, and our analysis need not 
be repeated here. The-third , multiattribute studies, will also not 
be reviewed in detail at this stage, since for present purposes interest 
is less in predicting the use by individuals of specific rules, but 
rather the general form of the information-processing underlying 
intuitive decision-making under, risk. 
Given that there is considerable evidence to suggest that 
individuals do indeed utilise a range of often relatively simple- 
decision strategies, Thorngate's (1980) findings appear particularly 
significant. Recall that he demonstrates that with respect to randomly 
generated choice matrices a number of quite simple heuristics are 
highly efficient (i. e. often select alternatives with maximum 
Expected Value). Given this the following question is raised. 
How efficient would individuals be if faced with tasks similar to 
those investigated by Thorngate? In effect the initial proposal 
is therefore to conduct a. 'behavioural replication' of the Thorngate 
study, by. requiring experimental subjects to make choices across sets 
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of randomly generated matrices of differing levels of complexity. 
The proposed study represents a practical attempt to investigate, 
within a well defined task environment, one specific functional 
implication of heuristic use. And the Thorngate procedure appears 
particularly suited to such a task since (a) a well specified 
performance criterion exists (efficiency with respect to Expected 
Value maximisation), (b) it will allow the behavioural performance 
index to be directly compared to results from a range of theoretical 
decision strategies, (c) task complexity can be readily manipulated 
by increasing the number of alternatives and outcomes within a 
matrix, and (d) the choice matrix task is one specific variant of 
the standard risky choice paradigm of Behavioral Decision Theory, and 
hence any findings will relate not only to the heuristics-and biases 
controversy, but also the field in general2. Conversely, and as we 
suggest in the previous Chapter, the Thorngate procedure can be 
criticised upon the grounds of artificiality, and a more fundamental 
issue would be that of heuristic efficiency in the context of 
naturalistic decision tasks (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1981). Nevertheless, 
desirable though naturalistic study designs might ultimately be, 
pragmatic considerations support the use of the Thorngate procedure 
in an initial behavioural study. 
While the central empirical question posed here may be simple, 
any attempt to frame specific hypotheses is less so. One problem 
of prediction results from the fact that the performance of any 
individual will depend both upon the decision strategy, or strategies, 
he or she adopts and the baseline efficiency of such 
a rule, or rules. Strategy selection'is. likely to be sensitive to 
a wide range of familiar psychological variables, such as individual 
differences in attitude towards risk and motivation, while both 
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selection and baseline efficiency will be sensitive to characteristics 
of the task (cf. Payne, 1982). This latter consideration in 
particular renders problematic the prediction, on the basis of other 
studies, of the precise strategies that might be utilised by individuals 
in the Thorngate matrix task, where significantly different task 
characteristics may be present. For example, generalising results 
from the simple (and warf-studied) two outcome gamble to a Thorngate 
4 alternative 4 outcome choice matrix would clearly present difficulties, 
given that in the latter task the number of possible strategies 
available to the individual is likely to be relatively large. It 
is primarily for this reason that-we-shäll not-. Attempt to make any 
precise predictions with respect to the types of strategy likely 
to be adopted by individuals in the Thorngate matrix task. In any 
event, it is unlikely that we could simultaneously predict the efficiency, 
without further simulation study, of any rule not investigated in the 
original Thorngate experiment; and there is no guarantee that some, or 
any, individual will necessarily adopt these particular rules. 
Nevertheless, while a problem may exist with respect to the framing 
of precise hypotheses, this does not preclude expectations with 
respect to the general bounds within which any behavioural efficiency 
scores might be expected to fall. Consider the example 2 alternative 
2 outcome (2 x 2) matrix, which is of identical structure to those 
employed by Thorngate, depicted in Figure 5.1. 
Figure 5.1 
Simple 2 Alternative x2 Outcome Choice Matrix3 
Outcomes 
12 
X. . 53 pays . 756, .. 47 pays 357 
Alternatives 
Y. . 90 pays 328, . 10 pays 878 
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In Figure 5.1 the decision-maker- has a choice between two 
alternatives, X and Y. Each alternative has two separate outcomes. 
Every outcome has a payoff, in some standard units, and an associated 
probability of ö. ccurrence. Note that, following Thorngate's 
procedure, all payoffs are positive values (i. e. no losses), and that 
for each alternative the two outcomes are mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive. Adherence here to the principle of Expected Value 
maximisation would imply choice of the X alternative: E. V. (X) = 535; 
E. V. (Y) = 333. Consider, however, a number of the rules investigated 
by Thorngate, which we have discussed in the previous Chapter 
(Chapter 4): firstly, the Equiprobable rule-(E), which merely 
compares the average payoff for each alternative. Such a rule 
selects alternative Y, at variance with expectation maximisation. 
The maximax rule (MAX), selecting that alternative with the highest 
single payoff, similarly chooses Y. However, the minimax strategy 
(MIN) selects, on the basis of the highest minimum payoff, 
alternative X. 
How might individuals be expected to perform, in comparison to 
the various rules, over a randomly generated set of matrices of any 
one specific level of complexity? Cerainly not 100% efficiently, 
since this would imply the consistent application of a pure Expected 
Value maximisation strategy and, as we have noted earlier, the 
evidence indicates that people do not commonly use such a rule. 
The E strategy outlined above, which is in effect an unweighted 
linear decision rule, was found by Thorngate to be highly efficient. 
It is of interest to note here that our earlier review (Chapter 3) 
of the statistical versus clinical prediction-literature indicates 
that such rules are mathematically robust, and this may well be one 
reason for its success in the Thorngate simulation. However, this 
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literature also suggests that simple linear rules have often been 
found to set a performance ceiling to even expert judgements (Dawes, 
1979; Dawes and Corrigan, 1974). While fully accepting that the 
choice matrix does not set an entirely similar task to that of 
prediction we might : nevertheless, on the basis of this literature, 
tentatively expect that the E rule will similarly outperform naive 
experimental subjects. 
The lower bound to the likely behavioural efficiency scores is 
perhaps harder to estimate. However, it might be expected that 
subjects, inncommon with all of Thorngate's rules, will be at least 
better at identifying the higher Expected Value options than would 
be expected by chance responding (i. e. 50%, in the 2 alternative 
conditions). Also, a rather general and somewhat equivocal finding 
to have arisen from the recent studies of multiattribute choice is 
that decision-makers often utilise not only holistic intra-alternative 
processing strategies, but also simple dimensional intra-attribute 
rules (e. g. see Payne and Braunstein, 1978; Rosen and Rosenkoetter, 
1976; Russo and Rosen, 1975). Interestingly, these findings are 
clearly commensurable with the risk-dimension model of risky choice 
(Payne, 1973; Payne and Braunstein, 1971; Slovic and Lichtenstein, 
1968a). Consideration of this evidence would suggest that, in the 
absence of any unanticipated effects, we might expect experimental 
subjects to be at least as efficient as the crudest dimensional 
strategies; e. g. the simple MAX and MIN rules. This interpretation 
does depend upon the assumption that subjects will in fact adopt 
an internal representation of the matrix task based upon maximum and 
minimum payoffs as basic risk-dimensions (cf. Kozielecki, 1975). 
Ultimately this is an empirical question, which we do not address 
at this stage. 
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To summarise, the very general hypothesis is advanced that the 
average subject's efficiency, scored over a suitable set of randomly 
generated choice matrices, will fall somewhere between the highly 
efficient holistic E strategy, and the moderately efficient, 
dimensional, MAX and MIN *rules. Certainly, the lower bound MIN 
rule would appear to define the classical 'cautious' decision-maker 
of game theory (e. g. see Edwards, 1954a). 
Finally, some remarks can be advanced with respect to the 
influence of matrix complexity upon efficiency. Thorngate's 
original results indicate that all rules decrease in efficiency to 
some extent as complexity (i. e. number of alternatives and outcomes) 
is increased. This is not entirely unexpected. Similarly, it 
should also be expected that an equivalent trend will be observed for 
subjects, an effect that should be partially independent of the 
specific strategies adopted by individuals under any complexity 
condition. However, an interesting subsidiary finding of Thorngate's 
study is that not all of the rules decrease uniformly in efficiency 
as complexity increases. The simple dimensional MAX and MIN show 
relatively large decrements in absolute performance, while the holistic 
and robust E decreases to a lesser extent. This effect may be due 
not only to the general robustness of the E strategy, but also because 
as the number of outcomes increase the pure dimensional MAX and MIN 
strategies process a lower proportion of the available information 
X1, where n is the number of outcomes, for MAX and MIN compared 
to =, under every complexity condition, for E). This finding can be 
circumstantially related to the behavioural finding of Payne (1976), 
that as alternatives and attributes increase in multiittribute choice 
tasks subjects tend to search more of the absolute available information, 
but proportionally less. In a review of this and other studies of 
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the processing implications of alternative and attribute complexity 
Svenson (1979) confirms this effect. In addition to this Svenson 
tentatively suggests that an increase in the number of attributes 
appears to have the more consistent effect upon the proportion of 
information searched. This general result can be related to the 
choice matrix structure, where the basic payoff dimensions can be 
conceptualised intuitively as attributes of the task. This suggests 
the hypothesis, conditional again upon the assumption that individuals 
will utilise an appropriate form of maximum-minimum dimensional 
processing, that as matrix complexity increases the behavioural 
efficiency scores will tend towards the lower bound defined by 
the pure dimensional MAX and MIN strategies. In effect we are 
suggesting that increased complexity will rapidly 'overwhelm' any 
attempt by individuals to employ robust holistic strategies, such as 
the E rule, where the proportion of information utilised is invariant 
under the complexity manipulation (cf. Johnson, 1979). 
It must be remembered, however, that, while the proposed complexity 
manipulation may appear unproblematic and simple, the behavioural 
effects of increasing outcomes or alternatives may well not be 
symmetric (Thorngate and Maki, 1976). As Svenson (1979) suggests, 
given that the effective operation of many specific multiattribute 
decision rules will be sensitive to structural characteristics of 
the task, of which the number of alternatives and attributes will be 
primary determinants, any complexity manipulation might result in 
the use of qualitatively different choice strategies across conditions. 
For example, when the number of alternatives, is greater than 2 some 
variant of the Elimination By Aspects (Tversky, 1972) might be employed 
to reduce efficiently the number to two principal contenders, with 
a final chöice being made by a different (perhaps holistic) rule. 
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Hence, we should not necessarily expect the relationship between 
behavioural efficiency and complexity to be a simple one. 
To conclude this introduction section, we restate some of the 
principal questions that have been raised, and the general hypotheses 
that have been proposed. Firstly, a fundamental gap in the 
Behavioral Decision Theory literature with respect to the functionality 
assumption underlying the heuristics, biases, and bounded rationality 
model has been noted. In response, the general utility of'a program 
of research to investigate this issue has been outlined, and as a 
consequence a 'behavioural replication' of Thorngate's (1980) 
experiment has been proposed. This study will attempt to investigate 
behavioural efficiencies, scored over a range of randomly generated 
choice matrices of varying alternative and outcome complexity. 
While it has been suggested that the framing of specific expectations 
is problematic, the following general hypotheses have been raised: 
a. Behavioural efficiency is expected to be less 
than 100%, and bounded above by the performance 
level of the highly efficient and holistic 
Equiprobable rule. 
b. Behavioural efficiency is expected to be 
above chance levels, and bounded below by 
the levels attained by the simple dimensional 
- rules such as Maximax and Minimax. 
c. As complexity increases the behavioural 
efficiency scores should approach the lower 
bound defined by the simple dimensional rules. 
II. Materials and Method 
This section is divided into the following sub-sections: 
(i) Chice Matrix Generation 
(ii) Basic Design, Materials, and Subjects 
(iii) Procedure. 
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(i) Choice Matrix Generation 
Of the nine complexity conditions originally investigated by 
Thorngate (all combinations of 2,4, and B alternatives with 2,4, 
and 8 outcomes), four were investigated in. the current study. These 
were the 2 alternative by 2 outcome (2 x2 type), 2 alternative by 4 
outcome (2 x 4), 4 alternative by 2 outcome (4 x 2), and 4 alternative 
by 4 outcome (4 x 4). This selection represented a compromise 
between the needs of practical experimentation and the desire to 
vary the outcome and alternative complexity systematically. It 
was recognised that, for example, any reasonable number (for efficiency 
calculation purposes) of 8x8 matrices would be likely to take an 
unreasonable time to complete. Although some multiattribute studies 
have investigated a larger number of alternatives and outcomes than we 
do here (e. g. Payne, 1976; Thorngate and Maki, 1976), this has 
typically entailed, for practical reasons, having a 'small number of 
subjects and/or a restricted set of choice tasks. Since the present 
study seeks to establish efficiency scores, requiring a considerable 
number of matrices to be presented to each subject, the restriction 
of the complexity manipulation to 4 alternative 4 outcome (4 x 4) 
as the most complex condition was seen as a reasonable practical 
compromise. 
Initially, ninety choice matrices for each of the four selected 
complexity conditions, making a total of three hundred and sixty, 
were individually generated using random number tables (heave, 1978, 
pp. 64-65). The generation procedure was as follows. The individual 
payoffs were simply generated from triplets of numbers, producing 
integer values (vi/j: where i refers to the alternatives, and j the 
outcomes) for each separate outcome (oi, j) ranging between 1 and 999. 
Probability generation followed a more complex procedure, and was 
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identical to that used by Thorngate (1980)4. Firstly, for each 
separate outcome (oi, j )a random digit (di, j ) between 1 and 99 
was obtained from the tables. This procedure was repeated for 
all outcomes (either two or four) within any one alternative. 
The obtained values within each alternative were then summed 
(E di'j). This, -sum was then used to normalise the original diij 
j=1 
values, to produce probabilities within each alternative (pi'j) 
that summed to one. These probabilities were also rounded 
appropriately to integer values. So, for example, for---an n 
outcome matrix, the following would hold: 
Alternative A. is defined as: 1 
A1 .)oi, 1 
(p 
i, 1, vi, 1),... ,oi, n 
(p 
i, n ,vi, n 
) 
Where v. . belongs to: 
{1,2, 
..., 999}, 
And pi, j = Integer 
[(di'j )/(d i11 + ... di, n 
given that di'j belongs to: {1,2, ..., 99}, 
And n, the number of outcomes, is either 2 or 4. 
This procedure was repeated for each alternative until the 
matrix of the appropriate type was produced. Of the ninety choice 
matrices generated of each type (numbered 1 to 90 respectively for 
each condition), seventy were ultimately utilised within each of the 
four experimental conditions. These sets of seventy 2x2,2 x 4, 
4x2, and 4x4 matrices are given in Appendices A. 1, A. 2, A. 3, 
and A. 4 respectively. 
(ii) Basic Design, Materials, and Subjects 
The four major complexity conditions were investigated in a two 
(2 or 4 alternatives) by two (2 or 4 outcomes) independent Subjects 
(Ss) design. Such a design allowed, within a one hour commitment 
from each participant, a reasonable number of matrices to be used 
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within each complexity condition. On the basis of an earlier pilot 
study it was decided to utilise a total of sixty matrices within 
each condition (numbers 20-79 inclusive within each of the four 
conditions; see Appendices A. 1-A. 4 respectively). The basic 
design, showing the number of Ss within each of the conditions, is 
given in Figure 5.2. Ss were randomly 'assigned to conditions. 
All Ss were first and second year undergraduates of the University 
of Bristol, recruited by the experimenter (Ex)5 at lectures to take 
part in 'a study of some aspects of decision-making'. The Ss 
represented a wide range of the disciplines within the University, 
and a total of twenty participated in each condition, except the 
4x2 condition, where twenty-two took part. The total number of Ss 
was therefore eighty-two. 
Figure 5.2 






2x2 Condition 2x4 Condition 
n=20 n=20. 
(14 male, 6 female) (14 male, 6 female) 
Matrix Numbers: Matrix Numbers: 
20-79 (2 x2 type), 20-79 (2 x4 type), 
See Appendix A. 1 See Appendix A. 2 
4x2 Condition 4x4 Condition 
n=22 n=20 
(19 male, 3 female) (11 male, 9-female) 
Matrix Numbers: Matrix Numbers: 
20-79 (4 x2 type), 20-79 (4 x4 type), 
See Appendix A. 3 See Appendix A. 4 
I 
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For each of the four complexity conditions two separate 
booklets were prepared. The first of these was a practice booklet. 
Each practice booklet consisted of a frontispiece of instructions, 
together with the first ten of the ninety matrices generated for 
each condition. The general instructions for the four conditions 
were similar, although some details differed, as appropriate, according 
to the type of matrix. The general instructions explained the format 
of the matrices (i. e. -. as gambles)3, the choice task (to select one 
from each set of alternatives), and the meaning of the matrix task 
in terms of choice amongst lotteries. The booklet frontispiece for 
the most complex, 4x4 condition, together with examples of the 
presentation format for the 2x2,2 x 4, and 4x2 matrices, are 
given in Appendix A. 5. All probability values were expressed in 
terms of percentages, and payoffs in pounds sterling. The second 
booklet for each complexity condition contained the main experimental 
stimuli; i. e. the sixty selected matrices. Presentation format 
for these matrices was the same as in the practice booklet. 
In the 2 alternative conditions (2 x2 and 2x 4) there were 
ten matrices per page in the main booklets, and in the 4 alternative 
conditions (4 x2 and 4x 4) there were six. In order to provide 
a check for possible order effects each set of sixty matrices was 
divided into two subsets, and counterbalanced as follows. Within 
each complexity condition two types (A and B) of main booklet were 
devised. One of these (A type) had the sixty matrices in the 
numerical order 20 through to 79 inclusive. The other (B type) had 
matrices in the order 50 through to 79 first, followed by 20 through 
to 49. Apart from this manipulation, the A and B type booklets were 
identical. Within each complexity condition-approximately half of 
the Ss were randomly assigned A type booklets, and half the B type. 
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(iii) Procedure 
Excepting that in each condition only one type of matrix is 
investigated, and hence that the instructions and materials varied 
in detail accordingly, the general method, instructions, and procedure 
were similar for all four complexity conditions. The instruction 
script used by Ex during the sessions, appropriately varied to allow 
for the relevant condition, followed a standardised format. This 
is_given in Appendix A. 6. Although each complexity condition was 
run in a separate session, the general procedure used in all sessions 
was as follows. First, Ss were introduced to the investigation by 
Ex, who described it as being on 'some aspects of decision-making'. 
This explanation was by design general in order to avoid introducing 
expectancies with respect to the aims of the study. After a preamble 
outlining matters of procedure (e. g. that Ss should not communicate 
with each other during the course of the session, etc. ), Ss were 
instructed to remove the two booklets (practice and-main) from an 
envelope on their desks. While Ss referred to the instructions on 
the front of the practice booklet (i. e. as given in Appendix A. 5) 
Ex explained the nature of the task, utilising as a visual aid an 
illustrative matrix of the appropriate type on a large board. 
The matrices were described to Ss as gambles, and their meaning in terms 
of choice amongst lotteries was explained. Ex also pointed out that, 
while such choices might at first appear strange, particularly given 
that there were no losses, they were in fact similar to certain 'safe' 
investment decisions, such as investment in the Post Office or a 
Building Society. Here the ultimate payoff would be positive but 
uncertain, perhaps due to the operation of such long-term factors 
as fluctuating interest rates. 
Once the task had been fully explained, Ss were asked to read 
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through the instructions on the frontispiece of the practice 
booklet, and then, unless they had any questions, to work through 
the ten trial matrices in this booklet in their own time. 
When all Ss had completed the practice matrices they were 
instructed to put this booklet away in the envelope, and Ex read out 
the instructions on the frontispiece of the main booklet containing 
the sixty selected matrices. These were as follows: 
'Please tick one gamble from each set, in the same 
way you did for the practice booklet. Please 
work on your own and work through the questions 
in the order that they occur in the booklet. 
Answer all questions. Turn over. ' 
After reading out these instructions, Ex asked the Ss to work 
through the pages of the booklet in order, and to check, when they 
had finished, that all of-the-matrices had been completed. 
When all Ss had completed the booklets a short debriefing session 
was held in order to explain the nature of the study, and its aims. 
III. Results. 
This section is divided into the following sub-sections: 
(i) Heuristic Efficiency Analysis 
(ii) Order Manipulation 
(iii) Behavioural Efficiency Analysis 
(iv) Behavioural-Heuristic Efficiency Comparison 
(i) Heuristic Efficiency Analysis 
Before the significance of the behavioural data can be properly 
evaluated the matrices used in the study have to be subject to 
preliminary analysis. Firstly, Expected Values have to be 
calculated for each of the alternatives in the two hundred and 
forty matrices (sixty in each of the four complexity conditions). 
Secondly, -baseline efficiency scores for a range of relevant theoretical 
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heuristics'-have to be calculated across the sets of matrices utilised 
in the study, for comparison with the behavioural data (and also 
Thorngate's, 1980, original simulation findings). Given the problem 
of accurately completing such a task by hand, a general purpose 
computer program, ANALYZER, was developed to perform the Expected 
Value and heuristic choice calculations for the type of matrix 
used here. This program was written in BASIC, and implemented 
on an Apple II microcomputer in two variants; one variant for 
alternatives with 2 outcomes, and the other for alternatives with 4. 
The general structure of the 4 outcome--program, together with the 
BASIC listing, is given in Appendix A. 7. - 
Seven heuristic strategies were selected for baseline comparison 
with the behavioural data. Six of these rules were originally 
investigated in Thorngate's (1980) simulation study, and have been 
defined previously in Chapter 4 (see page 105) of this volume. 
These were as follows: 
(i) Equiprobable (E) 
(ii) Probable (P) 
(iii) Minimax (MIN) 
(iv) Maximax (MAX) 
(v) Most Likely (ML) 
(vi) Probable Minimum (PMIN). 
The seventh rule, not originally investigated by Thorngate, was 
a logical corollary to PMIN, and was defined as follows: 
(vii) Probable Maximum (PMAX): 
This represents the converse rule to PMIN. 
This rule first identifies the maximum payoff 
within each alternative (as with the MAX rule). 
The alternative with the highest probability 
of attaining its maximum payoff is then 
selected. 
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Note that when there are only two outcomes (i. e. the 2x2 
and 4x2 conditions) the ML rule is identical to P, and PMIN 
equivalent to PMAX. Also, one difference exists between the 
current matrices and those investigated by Thorngate. Here, the 
use of integer probabilities and payoffs results, on a small number 
of occasions, in some of the seven rules producing tied choices; 
for example, when the probabilities of the maximum payoffs are equal 
for two alternatives within a matrix. Under such circumstances 
simple tie-break operations were performed. 
6 
Five of the seven rules were selected for the comparative 
analysis primarily because they define the upper and lower bounds 
within which it has been hypothesised the behavioural efficiency 
scores will lie. Specifically, the upper bound is represented by 
the highly efficient E and P rules, and ML has also been included 
as a simplified variant of the P rule. The relevance of the remaining 
four rules as baseline comparators depends to some extent upon the 
ways in which the Ss structure the relevant dimensions of the matrices. 
However, as we have suggested earlier, it seems reasonable to 
conceptualise the task dimensionally in terms of the high and low 
payoffs (and associated probabilities of occurrence) within each 
alternative; i. e. in terms of a dimensional distinction between 
maximums and minimums. In effect this maximum-minimum dichotomy 
is analogous to the gain-loss distinction within a standard risky 
gamble. Under such an assumption the MAX, MIN, PMIN, and PMAX rules 
each focus upon one of the basic matrix 'risk-dimensions' (cf. Payne, 
1973): that is, the maximum and minimum payoffs, and their associated 
probabilities 
7. As has been argued in the introduction section to 
this Chapter, empirical evidence of dimensional processing in 
multiattribute choice tasks raises the hypothesis that the MAX, MIN, 
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PMIDNand PMAX rules will define the lower performance bound to the 
behavioural data. Clearly, within the confines of the current 
study identification of the actual dimensional structure utilised 
by Ss is not possible. This remains an empirical matter, and one 
which will be the focus of a subsequent study. 
The basic results of the ANALYZER analysis , giving Expected 
Values and rule choices for each of the matrices utilised as 
stimuli in the study, are incorporated in the relevant Appendices 
A. 1-A. 4. Efficiency percentages, over the sets of sixty matrices, 
for the two 2 outcome conditions (2 x2 and 4x 2), together with 
Thorngate's (1980) findings over two hundred matrices, are given in 
Table 5.1. The distribution of choices upon which these percentages 
are based is given in Appendix A. 8. 
Table 5.1 
Percentaqe of Trials on which the Selected Heuristics Choose 
the 2 
Alternatives with Different Expected Values in 
Outcome Conditions, 2x2 and 4x2 (Thorngate' s, 1980, 
Data Given in Brackets) 
hank Order of Expected Value of Chosen Alte rnative 
Two Alternatives Four Alternatives 
Heuristic (2 x 2) (4 x 2) 
12 12 3 4 
E 95(88) 5(12) 80(80) 17(16) 3 (4) 0 (0) 
P/ML 87(84) 13(16) 70(72) 23(20) 7 (6) 0 (2) 
MIN 88(76) 12(24) 63(67) 34(25) 3 (7) 0 (1) 
MAX 85(85) 15(15) 53(60) 25(20) 22(14) 0 (6) 
PMIN/PMAX 67(63) 33(37) 35(36) 32(30) 20(18) 13(16) 
N. B. n= 60(200) for c urrent(Thorngate) data. 
As can be seen from Table 5.1, the results of the present 
simulation, while over a smaller number of matrices, almost identically 
mirror the pattern in Thorngate's (in brackets) data. The E and P 
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rules are clearly the most efficient, and the-'dimensionally-oriented' 
MAX, MIN, and PMIN/PMAX rules show a relative decline in performance 
when compared to E and P in the more complex 4x2 condition. 
Efficiency percentages, over the sets of sixty matrices, for the 
two 4 outcome conditions (2 x4 and 4x 4), together with Thorngate's 
(1980) findings over two hundred matrices, are given in Table 5.2. 
The distribution of choices upon which these percentages are based 
is given in Appendix A. B. 
Table 5.2 
Percentage of Trials on which the Selected Heuristics Choose 
Alternatives with Different Expected Values in 
the 4 Outcome Conditions, 2x4 and 4x4 (Thorngate's, 1980, 
Data Given in Brackets) 
Heuristics 
Rank Order of Expected Value of Chosen Alternative 
Two Alternatives Four Alternatives 
(2 x 4) (4 x 4) 
121234 
E 78(84) 22(16) 72(70) 20(22) 5 (6) 3 (2) 
P 80(84) 20(16) 77(73) 16(18) 7 (8) 0 (1) 
ML 67(74) 33(26) 60(65) 27(32) 10 (8) 3 (4) 
MIN 73(77) 27(23) 60(56) 22(34) 10 (7) 8 (3) 
MAX 73(68) 27(32) 53(45) 23(25) 13(19) 10(11) 
PMIN 60(61) 40(39)@ 35(38) 32(27) 20(26) 13 (9) 
PMAX 63(N/A) '37(N/A) 32(N/A) 36(N/A) 20(N/A) 12(N/A) 
N. B. n= 60(200) for current(Thorngate) data. 
@ For the PMIN(LL) rule in the 2x4 condition, the 
original data table in Thorngate's report (1980, 
p. 223) gives first and second rank choice 
percentages of 61% and 29% respectively. 
Here it has been assumed that the true figures 
are 61% and 39%. This adjustment does not 
affect the general trends in the overall data. 
As in the 2 outcome conditions, and excepting the PMAX rule, 
which Thorngate does not study, the results again mirror the pattern 
in Thorngate's (in brackets) data. Once again the E and P rules are 
the most efficient, while MIN, MAX, and PMIN Show a relative decline. 
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As might be expected on theoretical grounds, the PMAX rule closely 
mirrors the performance of PMIN. We conclude this section therefore 
by asserting that the -ANALYZER YeSLIAS can be held 
to have replicated Thorngate's original findings. 
(ii) Order manipulation 
As noted earlier, in an attempt to provide a check to possible 
order effects the sixty matrices within each complexity condition 
were partitioned into two subsets of thirty. These were presented 
to approximately half of the Ss, in each of the respective conditions, 
in different orders (order A, matrices numbered 20 through to 79 
inclusive; and order B, matrices numbered 50 through to 79 and then 
20 through to 49 inclusive). Analysis of the effect of this 
manipulation was carried out, for each of the four complexity 
conditions, as follows. First, the Ss within each of the four 
complexity conditions were partitioned into two sub-groups; those 
who had received order A, and those who had received order B. Second, 
within each A or B sub-group, each S's choice data was further partitionedi 
into two subsets; that generated from matrices 20 through to 49 
inclusive, and that from 50 through to 79. Third, for every S 
behavioural efficiency percentages (percentage choice of 1st, 2nd- 
and, in the 4 alternative conditions, 3rd and 4th Expected Value ranked 
alternatives) were calculated across each of the two subsets of 
matrices. Finally, these efficiency percentages were averaged 
across the Ss within each of the four cells produced by the sub- 
group/subset division; that is, for A group Ss on matrices 20 
through to 49, for A group Ss on matrices 50 through to 79, for 
B group Ss on matrices 20 through to 49, and for B group Ss on 
matrices 50 through to 79. Table 5.3 gives, for the 2x2 complexity 
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condition, the four sets of efficiency percentages produced by 
this analysis. Tables 5.4,5.5, and 5.6 give the corresponding 
efficiency percentages within the 2x4,4 x 2, and 4x4 conditions 
respectively. 
Table 5.3 
Average Percentage of Trials on which Subjects Within. 
Sub-groups A and B Choose Alternatives with Different 
Expected Values for each of the Two Sub-sets of Matrices 





Subject n= 12 
Rank Order of Expected Value of Chosen Alternative 
Matrix Sub-set Matrix Sub-set 
Nos. 20 to 49 
12 
Nos. 50 to 79 
12 
98 2 




Average Percentage of Trials on which Subjects within 
Sub-groups A and B Choose Alternatives with Different 
Expected Values for each of the Two Sub-sets of Matrices 
2 Alternative 4 Outcome (2 x 4) Condition 
Rank Order of Expected Value of Chosen Alternative 
Subject Matrix Sub-set Matrix Sub-set 
Sub-groups Nos. 20 to 49 Nos. 50 to 79 
12 
Order A 81 19 
(20-79) 
Subject n= 10 
Order B 84 16 
(50-79,20-49) 
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Table 5.5 
Average Percentage of Trials on which Subjects within 
Sub-groups A and B Choose Alternatives with Different 
Expected Values for each of the Two Sub-sets of Matrices 
4 Alternative 2 Outcome (4 x 2) Condition 















Order A 83 14 3 76 22 2 
(20-79) 
Subject n= 11 
Order B 83 15 2 78 19 3 
(50-79,20-49) 
Subject n= 11 
N. B. Due to small frequency, 3rd and 4th ranked choices collapsed. 
Table 5.6 
Average Percentages of Trials on which Subjects within 
Sub-groups A and B Choose Alternatives with Different 
Expected Values for each of the Two Sub-sets of Matrices 
4 Alternative 4 Outcome (4 x 4) Condition 
Rank Order of Expected Value of Chosen Alternative 
Subject Matrix Sub-set Matrix Sub-set 




Subject n= 10 
Order B 
(50-79,20-49) 
Subject n= 10 
61 26 94 
78 15 521 74 21 32 
It would appear from inspection of Tables 5.3 to 5.6 that, despite 
some variations across groups of Ss and sub-sets of matrices (e. g. 
in the 4x4 condition, Table 5.6, the group B Ss appear to obtain 
more high Expected Value choices than group A on both sub-sets of 
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matrices), the distributions of choices are not influenced by the 
order manipulation. Such an effect would be manifest by the occurrence 
of a reliable interaction between matrix sub-set and subject sub-group. 
It would appear that no such trend is present in the tabulated 
percentages for any of the four complexity conditions. 
The conclusion that no order effects are present in the data is 
supported by noting the distribution of choices on specific matrices 
(i. e. comparing, for any specific matrix, the distribution of choices 
of the A and B order Ss). Table 5.7 gives the total number of 
matrices out of the sixty within each complexity condition where the 
alternative chosen by a majority of Ss was-not the same for-both A 
and B sub-groups. 
Total Number of Matrices where the Majority 
Choice within Subject Sub-groups A and B does 
not Correspond 
Complexity 
Condition Number of Matrices As Percentage 
2 Alternative 2'0 (Out of 60) 0% 
Outcome (2 x 2) 
2 Alternative 45(") 8% 
Outcome (2 x 4) 
8% 4 Alternative 215()1 
Outcome (4 x 2) 
4 Alternative 41 4( )1 7% 
Outcome (4 x 4) 
The conclusion that can be drawn here is that the order manipulation 
appears not to have had any observable effect on the data. Of course, 
any acceptance of the null hypothesis is a problematic issue, and 
hence the possibility cannot be entirely ruled out that some complex, 
and counterbalancing, shift in Ss' choice strategies has indeed been 
produced by the manipulation, but is obscured in the overall efficiency 
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data. However, the principal focus in the current study is not the 
actual strategies that might be utilised by Ss, but the'basic 
efficiency levels. Since the latter appear uninfluenced by the 
order manipulation the data from sub-groups A and B have been 
collapsed, and are treated as a whole for all subsequent analyses. 
(iii) Behavioural Efficiency Analysis 
The distributions of collapsed choice data for each matrix are 
shown, for the 2x2,2 x 4,4 x 2, and 4x 4-complexity conditions, 
in Appendices A. 1-A. 4 respectively. In addition to this the raw 
frequencies of choice, by each individual S, -of alternatives ranked 
ist and 2nd by Expected Value, and in the 4 alternative conditions 
3rd and 4th, are given in Appendix A. B. In order to facilitate 
comparison with the calculated baseline rule efficiencies for the 
sets of sixty matrices, and Thorngate's original findings, these raw 
frequencies were converted to percentages. Within each complexity 
condition these percentages were then averaged across Ss. The 
average behavioural efficiencies (based upon a denominator of sixty 
in each case, and rounded appropriately to the nearest percentage 
point) are given, for all four of the complexity conditions investigated 
in the study, in Table 5.8. 
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Table 5.8 
Average Percentage of Matrices (total = 60) on which 
Subjects Choose Alternatives with Different Expected 
Values 
Rank Order of Expected Value of Chosen Alternative 
Complexity 1234 
Condition x Cy xOxQx (Q 
2 Alternative 2 97 (2.1) 3 (2.1) ---- 
Outcome (2 x 2) 
Subject n= 20 
2 Alternative 4 
Outcome (2 x 4) 
Subject n= 20 
4 Alternative 2 
Outcome (4 x 2) 
Subject n= 22 
4 Alternative 4 
Outcome (4 x 4) 
Subject n= 20 
86 (4.6) 1 14 (4.6) 1--I-- 
80 (5.8) 1 17 (5.1) 13 (2.0) 10 (0) 
72 (8.9) 1 21 (5.5) 15 (4.0) 12 (1.9) 
Visual inspection of the data in Table 5.8 suggests that, like 
the heuristics, Ss tend to select high Expected Value alternatives, 
and avoid low ones, more often than would be expected by chance (50% 
efficiency in the 2 alternative conditions, and 25% in the 4 alternative 
conditions). Since the classification of the behavioural choices 
in terms of rank Expected Value introduces a nominal relationship 
into the data, this observation can be confirmed by application of 
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov one sample test (see Siegel, 1956, pp. 47-52) 
to the choice frequencies associated with individual matrices. 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov procedure tests for the deviation of an 
observed discrete distribution of nominally scaled scores from a 
theoretically specified distribution. In this case we wish to test 
whether the S sample distribution of scores on any specific matrix 
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deviates significantly from that to be expected upon the basis of 
purely random responding; effectively a null hypothesis of . 5:. 5, 
and . 25:. 25:. 25:. 25, respons. e distributions in the 2 and 4 alternative 
conditions respectively. 
In the 2 alternative conditions (2 x2 and 2x 4), the Kolmogorov- 
Smirnov test indicates that, for any set of choices associated with 
a particular matrix, the null hypothesis can be rejected at p<0.05 
(two-tailed) if four or fewer (of a total n of twenty) Ss choose the 
alternative with the lowest Expected Value. Out of the total of 
sixty matrices in each of these conditions, only four (2 x 2) 
and fifteen (2 x 4) of the choice distributions fail to satisfy this 
criterion. 
Extension of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to the 4 alternative 
conditions (4 x2 and 4x 4) indicates that the null hypothesis can 
be rejected at p<0.05 (two-tailed) for a set of choices if either: 
(a) as in the previous case, four or fewer (of a total n of twenty) 
8 
Ss choose one of the two alternatives with lowest Expected Value, 
that is either the 4th or 3rd ranked alternatives, or (b) nine or 
fewer Ss choose one of the alternatives ranked 2nd, 3rd or 4th by 
Expected Value. By these criteria only two (4 x 2) and three (4 x 4) 
of the choice distributions fail to have the null hypothesis rejected. 
On the basis of the tests performed upon the matrix choice 
frequencies, and visual inspection of the data in Table 5.8, it is 
concluded that Ss are responding at levels significantly above chance. 
A general test of the significance of the complexity manipulations 
upon S efficiencies can be effected by means of a two-way (alternatives 
by outcomes) Analysis of Variance, performed upon the efficiency 
percentages for choice of the alternatives ranked 1st in Expected 
Value. In order to simplify this analysis the cell size for each 
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of the complexity conditions was standardised at n= 20 by means 
of random rejection of two Ss' scores from the 4x2 data set. 
These were Ss number eleven and sixteen in this condition (see 
Appendix A. 8). Given, due to the collapsing of the data, the 
relatively large number of data-points within each cell, such an 
operation is unlikely to bias the outcome of the analysis. 
Since the raw scores to be analysed are percentages, most relatively 
close to 100%, the homogeneity of variance assumption necessary with 
the Analysis of Variance technique may be violated in. the data, the 
cell variance being likely to have an inverse relationship with the 
cell meanli That this is in fact the case is readily seen by 
inspection of Table 5.8. Here, for example, the sample standard 
deviation in the least efficient 4 alternative 4 outcome condition 
(an = 8.9) is over four times larger than that for the most efficient 
2 alternative 2 outcome condition (an = 2.1). Under such circumstances 
an arcsin transform (see Lindman, 1974, p. 326) can be applied to the 
raw percentage data. This will equalise cell variances independently 
of means. Figure 5.3 plots the cell averages (before transformation), 
while Table 5.9 gives the summary table for the Analysis of Variance 
performed upon the transformed data. 
I 
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Figure 5.3 0 
Subject Average Percentage Choice of Alternative 









4 Alternative - 
2 Outcomes 4 Outcomes 
Table 5.9 
Summary Table for 2x2 (Alternatives by Outcomes) 
ANOVA on Transformed Behavioural Efficiency Percentages 
Sum of % of 
Degrees of Squares Mean Square - Variance 
Due to Freedom (df) (ss) (ms = ss/df) F Sig. Explained. 
Alternatives 1 2.17 2.17 163. p <. 001 50% 
Outcomes 1 1.01 1.01 76 p <. 001 23% 
Alternatives 1 0.11 0.11 8.3 p <. 01 3% 
x Outcomes 
Error 76 1.01 0.013 -- 
Total 79 4.30 --- 
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Given the complex nature of the matrix stimuli, and the 
dependence of the raw percentage data upon the mode of calculation 
(i. e. with respect to the somewhat non-psychological standard of rank 
Expected Value) the results of the Analysis of Variance, tabulated 
in Table 5.9, must be interpreted with particular caution. The 
clear main effects (both p< . 001) for alternatives and outcomes, 
while as expected, should only be regarded as indicative of the 
pattern of the data shown in Figure 53 , rather than as holding any 
underlying simple significance. The two main effects are likely 
to hale resulted from a number of complex and interacting factors; 
e. g. differential strategy utilisation by Ss across conditions, and 
relative efficiencies of strategies across conditions. Such factors, 
which might perhaps be best viewed as intervening variables, are 
ultimately related to the complexity manipulation, but not necessarily 
in any clear and simple way. The Analysis of Variance also indicates 
a weak interaction. From visual inspection of the graphical 
representation of percentage means, the increase in the number of 
outcomes has a marginally greater impact with 2 alternatives, as 
compared to 4 alternatives. However, in the absence of any direct 
evidence of the likely strategies adopted by Ss in the respective 
conditions, the possible reasons for this interaction are not clear, 
and hence will not be pursued here. In any event, the interaction 
term accounts for merely 3% of the variance, as compared to 50% for 
the alternatives and 23% for outcomes. 
To summarise briefly the findings in this section: the behavioural 
data suggest that subjects choose alternatives with high Expected 
Value at a level significantly above that to be expected by chance. 
Graphical representation of the average efficiency percentages within 
the four complexity conditions indicates that increasing complexity 
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(whether alternatives or outcomes) reduces efficiency percentages. 
This trend is confirmed by an Analysis of Variance on the treriS- 
formed scores. 
(iv) Behavioural-Heuristic Efficiency Comparison 
For present purposes the most important analysis is the 
comparison, across the current sets of matrices, between the 
behavioural data and the simulation (rule) efficiencies. Figure 
5.4 shows the S group average efficiency percentages for the four 
complexity conditions (choice of alternatives ranked 1st in Expected 
Value only), together with the corresponding efficiency percentages 
for the rules investigated by the ANALYZER program. In order to 
simplify the graphical treatment the ML and PMAX heuristics are 
not represented, these being similar to the P and PMIN rules 
respectively. 
Figure 5.4 illustrates the trends present in the data: firstly, 
that for both Ss and heuristics increasing the alternatives has a 
greater absolute effect upon efficiency than a corresponding increase 
in the number of outcomes9. Secondly, it would appear that the 
average S is at least as good in identifying the high Expected Value 
alternatives, across all four conditions, as the best of the simulated 
heuristics, P and E. Indeed, on only one occasion (P, in the 4x4 
condition) does any rule perform at a level greater than the average 
for the Ss. Conversely, both the dimensional MIN and MAX heuristics 
do consistently worse than the Ss, by some 10-15% in all cases, while 
the least efficient heuristic, PMIN, appears to attain a level of 
performance closer to chance than the average S. That the dimensional 
rules do consistently worse is confirmed by inspection of the raw data 
for both heuristics and individual Ss, given in Appendix A. 8. From 
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Figure 5.4 
Subject Average Efficiency (Choice of Alternatives 












30% p- -- -0 Equiprobable, E 
"""""""""""""ý Probable, P 
,,,,.. 
chance.. 
20% Q-=f] Minimax, MIN 
c-"-"-"-'ýC Maximax, MAX 
10%- l--t Probable Minimum, PMIN 
2 Alternative 2 Alternative 4 Alternative 4 Alternative 
2 Outcome 4 Outcome 2 Outcome 4 Outcome 
(2 x 2) (2 x 4) (4"x 2) (4 x 4) 
Complexity Condition 
this it can be seen that only two Ss, of the total of eighty-two 
participating in the study, select a total of alternatives ranked 
1st by Expected Values that is bettered by a (in the appropriate 
complexity condition) of the four rules, MIN, MAX, PMIN and PMAX. 
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The overall trends exhibit a similar pattern if the behavioural 
data is compared to the tabulated efficiencies from Thorngate's 
original study (Tables 5.1 and 5.2; figures in brackets). Furthermore, 
comparison, in the 4 alternative conditions (4 x2 and 4x 4), of 
selection of 2nd, 3rd, and 4th ranked alternatives gives a similar, 
if inverted, picture; i. e. the Ss are generally comparable (and often 
better) than the E and P rules in avoiding the low ranked alternatives, 
and consistently superior to the MIN, MAX, LL, and PMAX rules. 
While some of these results appear surprising (and we consider 
their implications more fully in the following, discussion, section 
of this Chapter), consideration of the extremely high average efficiency 
for Ss in the simple 2 alternative 2 outcome condition (x = 97%, 
an = 2.1) raises an important issue. Perhaps the data can be 
explained by the fact that the random generation, particularly in 
the simpler conditions, results in matrices that present too easy a 
task. If this is indeed the case (although interpretation of the 
meaning of the term 'too easy' is problematic), then Thorngate's 
original study might be re-interpreted as showing that all but the 
best heuristics, while still better than chance levels, do relatively 
poorly with respect to what ultimately should be seen as relatively 
trivial decision tasks. Some indication of the ease or difficulty 
of the matrix task can be obtained by noting the number of individual 
matrices where random generation has produced an alternative with 
highest Expected Value that dominates all of the contenders (such 
matrices will be referred to as DOM type): that is, where-the 
minimum payoff of the high Expected Value alternative is higher than 
the maximum payoff on the 2nd (and 3rd and 4th) alternatives. One 
might expect individuals to recognise a dominance relationship within 
a matrix, and readily choose the high Expected Value alternative 
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accordingly. Indeed, if this suggestion is correct, then, under 
certain task conditions, such a recognition can be accorded the 
status of a decision heuristic. Too many DOM type matrices within 
any one set of sixty might have had a significant influence upon 
the obtained behavioural efficiency data. Inspection"of the matrices 
does indeed reveal a number of these DOM type matrices, totalling, 
respectively, twenty-one (2 x 2), two (2 x 4), twelve (4 x 2), and 
one (4 x 4). The specific matrices are noted in Appendices A. 1-A. 4. 
As might be intuitively expected, DOM type matrices are relatively 
rare in the 4 outcome conditions (2 x4 and 4x 4) as compared to the 
2 outcome (2 x2 and 4x 2). In order to check for the possible 
influence of such matrices a new efficiency analysis was conducted, 
as before for both Ss and rules, but across reduced sets of matrices 
with the DOM types removed. Efficiency percentages were calculated 
only for the choice of 1st ranked alternatives, and the results of 
this analysis are shown in Table 5.10. 
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Table 5.10 
Percentage of Matrices on which Selected Heuristics 
and Subjects (Average) Choose Alternatives with 
Highest Expected Value: Recomputed ignoring DOM 
Type Matrices 
Complexity Condition 
2 Alter- 2 Alter- 4 Alter- 4 Alter- 
native native native native 
2 Outcome 4 Outcome 2 Outcome 4 Outcome 
(2 x 2) (2 x 4) (4 x 2) (4 x 4) 
(n = 39) (n = 58) (n = 48) (n = 59) 






Most Likely ML 
Probable Min. PMIN 
Probable Max. PMAX 
92 78 75 71 
80 79 63 76 
82 72 54 59 
77 72 42 56 
80 66 63 59 
67 59 44 36 
67 64 44 32 
N. B. n indicates the reduced number of matrices over which 
percentage is calculated (i. e. after removal of DOM 
type). 
The data in Table 5.10 suggest that, while some of the efficiency 
percentages, particularly in the 4 alternative 2 outcome condition 
(4 x 2), have been depressed as a result of removal of the DOM type 
matrices, the effect is marginal. For example, for Ss in the 2 
alternative 2 outcome (2 x 2) condition, which has the most DOM 
matrices, the average efficiency is reduced by only 2%, and in the 
4 alternative 2 outcome (4 x 2) condition by only 4%. Furthermore, 
excepting the PMIN and PMAX rules, which appear to do better in the 
4 alternative 2 outcome (4 x 2) condition10, both heuristic and S 
efficiencies decrease by proportional amounts, preserving the overall 
relationship between behavioural and simulation data. It is therefore 
concluded that the presence of a number of DOM type matrices does not 
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significantly influence the findings. 
IV. Discussion 
The discussion section will by design be brief. This is for 
two principal reasons: firstly, because at one level of analysis, 
that of utilising the basic efficiency data as an index of individuals' 
performance in comparison to that of the theoretical heuristics, the 
findings are relatively unequivocal. The Ss appear to be consistently at 
least as efficient as the two best heuristics, E and P. Secondly, 
however, a closer inspection of the data suggests that at a finer 
level of analysis, specifically with respect-to the question of the 
actual choice strategies that Ss might be utilising, the findings 
are no more than suggestive. This is not a result of any failing 
in the study design, since this was closely related to the first, 
performance issue, and hence not intended to facilitate a critical 
test of strategy use. Rather, the random generation can be conceived 
as producing a generally specified range of decision tasks across which 
aggregate performance of both Ss and heuristics can be determined. 
As such the current study is based upon a radical conceptual departure 
from the typical heuristics and biases experiment, that seeks to 
demonstrate inferential 'error' under tightly controlled task conditions, 
and the reasons why such an approach has been adopted need not be 
repeated here. Given the lack of clear discrimination with respect 
to the precise strategies that Ss might be utilising. in any one of 
the four complexity conditions studied, we shall refrain from post hoc 
discussion of the possible interpretations to be placed upon the 
'distributions of choices within any given matrix. (although the reader 
is of course free to inspect some of the more interesting choice 
distributions in Appendices A. 1-A. 4). . The discussion will therefore 
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be general, treating the current findings as no more than suggestive 
of the next phase in the research program, rather than as providing 
definitive answers to the questions that have been posed. 
Firstly, mention can be made of the clear finding that arises 
from the heuristic simulation data. The ANALYZER analysis, while 
primarily performed in order to provide baseline comparisons to the 
behavioural data, clearly replicates (albeit across a restricted 
complexity space) Thorngate's original (1980) result. Although 
replications are rarely accorded their due status in the literature, 
for many reasons, their importance as corroborating evidence should 
not be underestimated. So it is with the current case. 
With respect to the behavioural data, let us briefly examine 
the general hypotheses that were posed. 
a. Behavioural=efficiency is expected to be less 
than 100%, and bounded above by the performance 
level of the highly efficient and holistic' 
Equiprobable rule. 
The results appear to support the first part of this hypothesis, 
and yet not, somewhat surprisingly, the second. On the average Ss 
would appear to perform at efficiency levels that are as good as, if 
not better than, the highly efficient E and P rules. 
b. Behavioural efficiency is expected to be 
above chance levels, and bounded below by 
the levels attained by the simple dimensional 
rules such as Maximai and Minimax. 
This second general hypothesis is supported by the data in all 
complexity conditions studied. Group response has been shown to be 
significantly above chance . 
levels, and by inspection appears to be 
at a level above that of the simple dimensional heuristics. 
c. As complexity increases the behavioural- 
efficiency scores should approach the 
lower bound defined by the simple dimensional 
rules. 
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While the complexity manipulation appears to have influenced 
the behavioural efficiencies in the appropriate direction, this final 
hypothesis would appear, upon the-basis of comparison of behavioural 
and simulation data (Figure 5.4), not to be supported. Although 
it may be significant that Ss appear to be clearly more efficient 
than the E and P rules in the 2x2 and 2x4 conditions, but by 
contrast more equivalent in the 4x2 and 4x4 conditions, there 
nevertheless appears to be little evidence to support a differential 
decrease in behavioural efficiency across complexity conditions. 
The precise reasons for this are not clear. It may be that the 
assumption upon which this hypothesis is grounded, that individauls 
will utilise the maximum-minimum dichotomy to structure basic 'risk- 
dimensions', is inappropriate. Conversely, the possibility arises 
that this assumption is in fact valid, but that the Ss have employed 
'sophisticated' dimensional strategies (cf. Payne's and Braunstein's, 
1971, information-processing model), that perhaps vary with changing 
complexity, and which bootstrap performance beyond that of the basic 
dimensional rules such as MIN and MAX. This is a suggestion to which 
we shall briefly return at a later stage in this discussion. 
Specific hypotheses aside, it is instructive to reflect briefly 
upon the absolute efficiency levels attained by the Ss, particularly 
in the most complex 4 alternative 4 outcome (4 x 4) condition, where 
the 'optimal' Expected Value maximisation strategy requires integration 
of no less than thirty-two separate items of information (sixteen 
probability values and sixteen payoffs). It must be accepted here 
that the Ss sample, consisting of undergraduate students, is potentially 
unrepresentative with respect to academic intellectual skill. However, 
that Ss are on average seventy-two percent efficient in the 4 
alternative 4 outcome condition represents a genuinely surprising 
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result, both intuitively, and also if viewed in the light of much 
of the research that we have reviewed earlier. This is reinforced 
by the fact that (a) Expected Value maximisation is probably the 
least supported expectation based descriptive model of risky choice 
(cf. Chapter 2, this volume), and (b) no attempt has been made here 
to fit the results to any variant of the basic expectation model, 
perhaps by incorporating in the procedure some estimate of individual 
utility functions across the range of payoffs, subjective probabilities, 
or the effects of higher order moments. 
In many respects, the present findings, in the absence of any 
indicators of the actual choice strategies that Ss might have employed 
in the task, merely reinforce Corbin's (1980) paradoxl. That is, 
it has been demonstrated here that the intuitive decision-maker can 
indeed perform efficiently, and that such a demonstration may pose a 
question with respect to the generalisability of the'heuristics 
and biases findings. What is perhaps of particular significance 
with the current study is that performance has been defined not with 
reference to a naturalistic context, but a 'task environment' 
derived from the central empirical paradigm of Behavioral Decision 
Theory; that of risky choice. With this in mind it is of interest 
to recall some of our comments in Chapter 2 of this volume with 
respect to early research on decision-making under risk, which may 
assist the interpretation of the results obtained here. Our 
review of this early research concluded with the observation that 
more than a decade and a half of inquiry had demonstrated (although 
equivocally) that decision-making under risk could indeed be described, 
at least as a first approximation, in terms of-models derived from 
the principle of mathematical expectation (and particularly the 
Subjective Expected Utility model). Such models appeared to receive 
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most support in the context of general (e. g. factorially generated, 
as in Tversky's [1967] study) sets of risky options. However, . 
this observation was also contrasted with the findings of a number 
of studies, often employing highly specific choice options (e. g. 
Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1968a; Slovic and Tversky, 1974; Tversky, 
1969), that suggest that the psychological processes underpinning 
decision-making under risk may entail the use of choice strategies 
that are incompatible with normative theory. This implies that 
the expectation based models are inadequate in a 
. 
descriptive 
substantive sense. A parallel can be drawn here between the 
randomly generated matrices utilised in the present study and the 
factorially generated sets of gambles typical of the former research 
tradition. If random and factorial (i. e. systematic variation 
of payoffs and probabilities) generation produce relatively similar 
option sets, and this would seem a not unreasonable Assertion, then 
the present findings appear to be in accordance with the general 
tests of expectation based models, although our interpretation of 
this, in terms of the underlying cognitive processes, is clearly 
different. We shall certainly not be drawn into suggesting that 
high efficiency percentages necessarily imply that our Ss are true 
Expected Value maximisers! 
Why then might choice amongst randomly generated, or factorial, 
sets of risky options closely mimic the prescriptions of the Expected 
Value rule? We have previously noted Payne's and Braunstein's 
(1971) resolution of this question, which is worthy of a second 
hearing: 
'... familiar abstractions of-gambles, such as expected 
value and variance, may be good predictors of choices 
amongst pairs of gambles only because they correlate 
with the relevant (risk dimension) variable(s)' (Payne 
and Braunstein, 1971, p. 18). 
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The findings of the present study raise the following corollary 
to Payne's and Braunstein's observation. The decision-maker who 
utilises an efficient heuristic will (by definition) often choose 
high Expected Value alternatives, and avoid low ones, and therefore 
appear to be maximising Expected Value under fairly general constraints 
(see also Aschenbrenner, 1984; Lopes and Ekberg, 1980; Montgomery 
and Adelbratt, 1982; Russo and Dosher, 1981). And it is consequently 
only when tasks are constructed to exploit the weaknesses of particular 
heuristics (i. e. highly controlled gamble sets) that critical input- 
output tests of expectation maximisation, as a descriptive model, 
can be adequately made. 
Clearly, the interpretation of the findings offered above does 
depend critically upon one assumption, albeit one that, as we have 
indicated, is supported by a considerable body of evidence within 
the literature. This is that Ss do indeed employ heuristic 
strategies when making decisions under risk! Inevitably, therefore, 
we must pose the question of precisely what strategies are utilised 
by Ss in the matrix task? It is this empirical issue that provides 
the focus for our second study, to be fully reported in the next 
Chapter of this dissertation. However, some initial speculations, 
consistent with the current findings, can be advanced: 
(i) Firstly, it is possible that individuals 
might consistently utilise one of the 
highly efficient strategies; i. e. E or P. 
(ii) Individuals might, as we have suggested 
earlier, adopt some simple combination of 
the basic 'risk-dimension' oriented rules 
in a way that bootstraps efficiency beyond 
that of the basic MAX, MIN, PMIN, and 
PMAX levels. 
(iii) Individuals may be attempting to""maximise 
Expected Value, or some subjective variant 
of this, but cannot apply such a rule 
consistently as complexity increases due 
to the information-processing demands of the task. 
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(iv) Individuals may be utilising some other form 
of efficient rule not covered above. 
Clearly, the four suggestions above can be regarded only as 
generalised hypotheses, since in any one group of individuals a 
wide range of choice strategies is likely to be found (cf. Payne, 
1980; Simon, 1976). Of the four possibilities, we have discussed 
previously why expectation maximisation (iii) would appear improbable, 
although final judgement with respect to this is reserved here. 
Uses of the E or P rules (i) and other (iv) are both plausible 
explanations, while the bootstrapping suggestion (ii) would appear 
to be particularly interesting, and one which would be compatible 
with not only the current findings. but also both the early input- 
output tests of the expectation models and the 'risk-dimension' 
research. However, these are empirical matters, and, having 
established that Ss perform well in the context of randomly generated 
choice matrices, it would appear that the next phase in the research 
program needs to investigate the actual strategies, together with 
the internal representation, adopted by individuals in the matrix 
task, with a view to relating the findings back to the results of 
the efficiency analysis here. 
V. Conclusion 
The first study, of individual choice efficiency under four 
conditions of task complexity, raises a number of issues. The 
behavioural data from the study indicates, partly counter to 
expectations, that in all four complexity conditions individuals 
perform significantly better than chance, and are at least as 
efficient (i. e. select alternatives with high Expected Value, and 
avoid those with low) as the best heuristics, the Equiprobable and 
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Probable rules, investigated by Thorngate (1980). This finding is 
not sensitive to the inclusion in the stimulus matrices, as a result 
of the random generation procedure, of a number of relatively 'easy' 
choices, where the high Expected Value alternative in a set dominates 
all contenders. At the level of the basic efficiency-analysis these 
findings appear relatively unequivocal; in comparison to the choice 
heuristics analysed here Ss appear to do well in the matrix task. 
Hence, there would indeed appear to be a functional dimension to 
individuals' strategies for decision-making under risk, although 
this conclusion does depend critically upon the assumption that 
individuals utilise simplifying strategies ip the current task. 
Although the literature would support the validity of this assumption, 
the present data are no more than suggestive of the possible cognitive 
processes actually underlying individual choices. In this respect 
the current findings raise more questions than they answer, and as 
such produce a basis for subsequent study. Of particular interest 
here is the observation that Ss are consistently more efficient than 
the simple 'risk-dimensional' oriented rules MAX, MIN, PMIN, and PMAX. 
This would appear to suggest, conditional upon a number of structuring 
assumptions, that if individuals do indeed use 'risk-dimensional' 
oriented' choice rules, as the literature that has been reviewed 
in Chapter 2 of this volume would suggest, then these are likely to 
be relatively sophisticated strategies. The identification of the 
precise internal representation of the task adopted by individuals, 
and the strategies utilised within-this'representation, will be'the 
focus of the empirical inquiry to be reported in the next Chapter. 
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NOTES 
1. Corbin (1980) rightly notes that a somewhat paradoxical 
picture of the intuitive judge and decision-maker is raised 
if the findings of the heuristics and biases research are 
viewed in relation to the very real complexities that exist 
in the environment, and with which the human decision-maker 
must (and often does) daily cope. Put quite simply, if 
people are as cognitively flawed as these findings, on the 
surface, would tend to suggest, how then is it that we appear 
generally to cope adequately with the information-processing 
demands imposed upon us by our day-to-day tasks (let alone 
those of, for example, splitting the atom, or reaching the 
moon! )? 
2. There is one principal difference between Thorngate's (1980) 
study and many risky choice experiments: specifically, the 
lack of an explicit loss dimension. Thorngate's procedure 
utilises only positive payoffs, and this is a restriction to 
which it appears desirable to adhere in the present study, 
for purposes of replication. We expect that this restriction 
can be applied without too much loss of generality (and indeed, 
the lack of a loss dimension will probably make interpretation 
of findings less problematic; cf. Huber, 1982), and that the 
findings of the present study can ultimately be directly 
related to other research on risky choice. 
3. As a matter of terminology, we refer to these tasks consistently 
throughout the dissertation as matrices. However, subjects 
in the studies were introduced to the task as one of choice 
amongst gambles. 
4. Personal communication. 
5. As a matter of terminology, the abbreviation Ex is used 
throughout this dissertation to refer to the experimenter 
(the author). This differs from the more conventional use 
of E, and is intended to avoid confusion with references to 
the Equiprobable heuristic, which is referred to as E here. 
6. Although such ties were rare, wherever possible the tie-break 
procedure was an appropriate variation of the basic rule 
procedure that had resulted in the tie. 
7. Strictly this is the case only for 2 outcome types (2 x2 
and 4x 2). For 4 outcome types, what constitutes a basic 
'risk-dimension' is perhaps harder to define. However, we 
maintain the assertion here, for the purposes of our argument, 
that MAX, MIN, PMIN, and PMAX will define these dimensions, 
in a very general sense, for all four complexity conditions 
studied. 
8. The fact that the 4 alternative 2 outcome (4 x 2) condition 
has twenty-two rather than twenty subjects does not influence 
this criterion significantly. 
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9. This conclusion must be treated with some caution, however, 
given that in the 4 alternative conditions (4 x2 and 4x 4) 
there are more response categories available to the Ss per 
matrix. The efficiency percentages given in Figure 54 are 
based only upon choice of the alternatives ranked 1st by 
Expected Value. If we had, for example, collapsed Ist and 2nd 
ranked choices in the-4 alternative conditions, and then 
compared this to the 1st ranked choices in the 2 alternative 
conditions, a different picture would emerge. 
10. The fact that the PMIN and PMAX rules appear'to do better, 
in the 4 alternative 2 outcome (4 x 2) condition, with the 
DOM matrices neglected, is perhaps not surprising. These are 
the two rules that, being based primarily upon probabilities, 
are insensitive to the dominance relationship; i. e. they, 
unlike the other rules, will still sometimes select the low 
ranked alternatives with a DOM type matrix. Hence, removing 
the DOM type matrices from consideration removes, unlike 
with any of the other rules, some of the 'sub-optimal' choices 
that these rules have made across the full set of sixty. 
11. For percentage means greater than 5. 





A PROCESS-TRACING INVESTIGATION 
Introduction and Summary 
Our critique, in Chapter 4 of this volume, of the heuristics, 
biases, and bounded rationality model has raised the suggestion 
that the lack of direct empirical investigation of the functional 
aspects of heuristic use represents a basic theoretical and empirical 
deficiency within the current Behavioral Decision Theory literature. 
One result of this is that the findings of this research tradition, 
which views the individual as a 'cognitive cripple', present a 
paradoxical picture if viewed in relation to the very real complexities 
in the World Outside the Laboratory, with which the intuitive judge 
and decision-maker must, 'and often does, successfully cope from day- 
to-day. Our first study, reported in the previous Chapter, was an 
initial attempt, albeit within a restricted task domain, to address 
empirically some of the functional aspects of heuristic use. 
Several findings emerged. Firstly, the ANALYZER stimulation data 
replicate Thorngate's (1980) finding that simple choice heuristics, 
and in particular the Equiprobable (E) and Probable (P) strategies, 
can be highly efficient across sets of randomly generated choice 
matrices. The second finding is that in all four complexity 
conditions studied the experimental Ss perform at levels of efficiency 
significantly better than chance, and, perhaps somewhat more. 
surprisingly, are as efficient as the best of Thorngate's heuristics, 
E and P. i 
Our discussion in the previous-Chapter. suggests-that at the level 
of the basic performance analysis the findings of the-. first study are 
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unequivocal. At this general level of analysis we also draw 
a parallel between the current findings and Payne's and Braunstein's 
(1971) resolution of the early debates with respect to risk-dimension 
versus moment oriented models of risky choice (see Chapter 2, this 
volume): specifically, that moments of gambles such as Expected Value 
may be good predictors of choice amongst pairs of gambles simply 
because they correlate with the relevant risk dimensions upon which 
individuals' actual choice strategies are based. Consideration of 
the findings of the first study raises a corollary to this. The 
decision-maker who utilises an efficient heuristic will, under fairly 
general task constraints, a ear to be maximising Expected Value if 
input-output data alone are analysed. 
The discussion of the Study 1 data also raises the question of 
the actual choice strategies used by the Ss. However, since the 
first study was by design not meant to facilitate a critical test 
between specific strategies, the findings are no more than suggestive 
of the possible cognitive processes underlying individual choices. 
Hence it is proposed, in the study to be reported in this Chapter, to 
explore further the implications of these findings by means of a 
direct empirical investigation of the actual choice strategies employed 
by individuals in the matrix task. 
The current Chapter is organised in six principal sections. 
Firstly, a number of methodological issues are raised, leading to 
an outline proposal for an empirical method suitable for the study. 
Secondly, a number of theoretical--and-empirical issues are discussed 
in the light of the methodological position adopted. Thirdly, the 
method and materials of the study are detailed. This is followed 
by an analysis section, detailing methods of analysis and findings. 
The findings are subsequently =interpreted, "and-. related'. to the-, first 
5 
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study, in a discussion section. Finally, the conclusions to be 
drawn are briefly noted. 
I. Study 2- Introduction 
This section is divided into the following sub-sections: 
(i) Methodology 
(ii) Theoretical Issues. 
(i) Methodology 
When attempting to address the question of individuals' decision 
strategies in the matrix task, the issue of the most appropriate 
methodological approach to adopt is perhaps inevitably raised. 
General input-output tests of the form of individuals' choice 
strategies (e. g. Anderson, 1970; Anderson and Shanteau, 1970; 
Aschenbrenner, 1978,1981,1984) would not appear to allow for the 
fine-grained analysis necessary here. Also, critical input-output 
tests, involving sets of gambles specifically constructed to discriminate 
between the use of particular strategies (e. g. Huber, 1982) would 
appear equally inappropriate here, given the complexity of the matrix 
stimuli. In any event, input-output investigations of internal 
cognitive processes, while holding the advantage of not requiring the 
'opening of the box' (and hence in principle not influencing the content), 
may result in equivocal findings. As we have noted previously, the 
heuristics, biases, and bounded rationality model is grounded 
primarily in such methods, and its interpretation consequently 
dependent upon unverified-assumptions introduced by the researchers 
as to their Ss' structuring of the experimental tasks (Berkeley and 
Humphreys, 1982). Since our own position is critical of this school, 
it would seem unwise to repeat its methodological failings here. 
', A methodology more suited than input-output, techniques to the 
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proposed investigation of individuals' choice strategies, and one 
which will allow great flexibility and require fewer implicit 
structuring assumptions1, would appear to be that of process-tracing. 
While such methods have only been utilised in decision-making studies 
relatively recently (for reviews see Payne, Braunstein, and Carroll, 
1978; Svenson, 1979), their complementarity to the more traditional 
input-output techniques has nevertheless been noted. In particular, 
it has been suggested that Behavioral Decision Theory would benefit 
from a more multi-methodological empiricism (e. g. Einhorn, Kleinmuntz, 
and Kleinmuntz, 1979; Svenson, 1984). This is a view with which, 
without presenting detailed arguments, we are in complete agreement. 
The current study should therefore be seen as being methodologically 
complementary to the first. 
The techniques of process-tracing are relatively common, and 
derive from mainstream cognitive psychology (e. g. Newell and Simon, 
1972). It is perhaps of significance to recall here that one critique 
that has been noted in Chapter 4, of much current Behavioral Decision 
Theory as an explicitly cognitive approach, is that it lacks contact 
with mainstream cognitive psychology. This is echoed by Simon (1976), 
who rightly notes that the field should adopt not just the theoretical 
metaphors from information-processing theory, but also the tools 
and techniques necessary to build and test adequate information- 
processing models. Process-tracing techniques represent just such 
tools. 
A small number of empirical precedents exist for the use of 
process-tracing methods in decision research, with one of three ' 
specific techniques commonly employed: firstly, 'direct': measures 
of information search patterns, by means of information boards or 
computer displays (e. g. Billings and Marcus, '-1983; Klayman, 1983,1985; 
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Payne and Braunstein, 1978; Thorngate and Maki, 1976); secondly, 
'indirect' measures of information search, principally by the tracing 
of Ss' eye-movements (e. g. Rosen and Rosenkoetter, 1976; Russo and 
Rosen, 1975). The third, and perhaps most common, technique, is 
the collection of some form of verbal protocol (e. g. Adelbratt and 
Montgomery, 1980; Huber, 1980,1983; Montgomery, 1977; Svenson, 1973, 
1974,1983). Such techniques are not necessarily mutually exclusive, 
and some studies employ more than one simultaneously (e. g. Payne, 1976; 
Russo and Dosher, 1981). Of the three, the two information search 
techniques, despite providing the more ostensibly 'objective' data, 
would appear least suited to our present needs. Several reasons can 
be advanced to support this. Firstly, as Svenson (1979) suggests, 
search pattern data can prove difficult to interpret unproblematically 
if taken in isolation of other measures (cf. also Klayman, 1982). 
Secondly, information search data allow access only to external patterns 
of acquisition, with no guarantee that what is searched is isomorphic 
to what is processed (Payne, 1980). Thirdly, as Payne, Braunstein, 
and Carroll (1978) note, information search methods require, for the 
data to be readily interpretable, that the task be relatively well 
structured in advance. Conversely, verbal protocol data, if properly 
obtained and rigorously analysed (and we comment extensively upon 
these issues below), can provide relatively unambiguous insights into 
both external and internal search, and without necessarily requiring 
that the task be highly structured in advance. This latter issue 
appears particularly relevant here. The choice matrices used in 
Study 1 are relatively unstructured-tasks; for example, the payoffs 
are not presented to the individual explicitly an terms of maximums 
and minimums), who has freedom to adopt his or her own subjective 
representation. Hence, the effective interpretation of search data 
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in the context of such stimuli would probably require some form of 
initial pre-structuring. Given that one of the critical conjectures 
to be raised in the discussion of the first study concerns the ways 
in which individuals subjectively represent the matrix task, pre- 
structuring would appear to impose unacceptable constraints. Thus 
verbal protocol techniques appear best suited to a study of individuals' 
structuring and choice strategies. Before the discussion can move 
on to specific hypotheses, however, several methodological issues 
associated with the use of verbal protocol techniques require 
explication. 
Historically, from the time that behaviourism finally superseded 
the introspectionist methods of structuralism (e. g. Titchener, 1912) 
as the dominant paradigm in Western psychology, psychologists have 
viewed all forms of self-report with considerable suspicion (for a 
retrospective overview see Ericsson and Simon, 1981). Nevertheless, 
and as Ericsson and Simon (1980,1984) rightly suggest, it is a simplified, 
and often prejudiced view that identifies all. forms of verbal report 
as inherently subjective, and hence untrustworthy as scientific data. 
At a fundamental philosophical level Ericsson and Simon (1984) point 
out that the often cited distinction between 'soft', subjective data 
(e. g. verbal reports) and 'hard',. objective data (e. g. response 
latencies) is clearly something of a pseudo-issue. All data, 
whatever the initial source, ultimately rely for interpretation 
upon a theoretical model constructed by the researcher. However, 
this issue aside, several basic empirical objections to the use of 
verbal protocol data exist. In their classic Psychological Review 
article, 'Verbal Reports as Data' (1980), and the later comprehensive 
monograph of the same title (1984), Ericsson and Simon discuss the 
most important of these objections: 
(a) that instructions to verbalise 
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will alter the nature of an individual's cognitive processes, 
(b) that verbal reports are often inconsistent with other indices 
of behaviour, and hence unreliable (Nisbett and Wilson, 1977), 
and (c) that verbal reports will be incomplete. 
While a comprehensive discussion of Ericsson's and Simon's 
arguments is beyond the scope of our current review, their general 
thesis can be outlined as follows (see also Smith and Miller, 1978). 
They first make the not unreasonable assumption that human cognition 
is information-processing, and that information recently attended to 
is kept in Short Term Memory (STM), from where it is accessible for 
verbal report. Thus, they argue, a verbal report will at best be 
a direct trace of the internal cognitive processes of the individual. 
It would be naive indeed to assume, as some critics appear to, that. a 
one-to-one correspondence exists, or ought (for validity) to exist, 
between report and process. Ericsson and Simon also note that various 
forms of intermediate processing may intervene between attention to an 
item of information and its subsequent reproduction as a-verbal report. 
Utilising this as a basic criterion, they distinguish betweenn three 
levels of verbalisation. Level 1 'verbalisation occurs when information 
that is attended to is directly reproduced by the individual, without 
the interference of any intervening processing; for example, 
rehearsing out loud a poem that is being learned. Level 2 verbalisation 
occurs when the information attended to is initially not in verbal 
code (e. g. images), and hence requires recoding into verbal code prior 
to verbalisation. Level 3 verbalisation is associated with the operation 
of more complex intervening processes such as, scanning or filtering 
of the basic information in STM, or when the S is required to attend 
to information not normally heeded. Ericsson and Simon contend that 
valid verbal reports will be obtained if the conditions for Levels 1 and 2 
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are met, while Level 3 verbalisation risks changes to the cognitive 
processes, and possible inconsistency. While this assertion might 
be viewed as being somewhat tautologous, Ericsson and Simon do report 
an impressive amount of evidence to support their view. In 
particular they suggest that many of the studies held by Nisbett 
and Wilson (1977) to demonstrate the unreliability of verbal reports 
do not in fact meet Level 1 or 2 conditions. For example, most of 
the studies cited by Nisbett and Wilson involve retrospective, as 
opposed to concurrent, verbalisation, which is liable to introduce 
complex intervening memory processes. Comparative empirical studies 
within Behavioral Decision Theory which lend support to Ericsson's 
and Simon's model are those by Fidler (1983), Carroll and Payne (1977), 
Payne and Braunstein (1977), and Montgomery (1977) and Tversky (1969). 
For current purposes it is sufficient to note the following 
important deductions that can be made from Ericsson's and Simon's 
model. The precise experimental conditions for any such study (e. g. 
whether verbalisation is retrospective or concurrent), and the form 
of the instructions to verbalise (e. g. to verbalise all thoughts or 
just selected items; see also Wright, 1974), will have a critical 
influence upon the ultimate reliability of the data. Conversely, it 
also follows that with careful procedures the probability of obtaining 
highly reliable reports can be optimised. As Ericsson and Simon 
conclude: 
'... we have undertaken to show that verbal reports, 
elicited with care and interpreted with full 
understanding of the circumstances under which 
they were obtained, are a valuable and thoroughly' 
reliable source of information about cognitive 
processes. It is time to abandon the careless 
charge of "introspection" as a means for 
disparaging such data' (Ericsson and. Simon, 1980, 
p. 247). 
With respect to the third objection-to the use of verbal reports, 
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that of incompleteness, Ericsson and Simon are more circumspect. 
They admit that such data, however carefully obtained, need not 
necessarily represent, and certainly should not be expected to 
represent, all of an individual's cognitive processing. For example, 
a protocol may be incomplete if the subject of study is an expert 
at the particular task, and capable of relatively 'automatic' 
processing (cf. Polanyi's, 1958, concept of 'tacit' knowledge). 
Such limitations must always be recognised when verbal protocol 
data are utilised, even when properly obtained, and when care is 
taken to avoid potential sources of, incompleteness (for example, 
not using the technique for studies of expert decision-making; see 
Einhorn, Kleinmuntz and Kleinmuntz, 1979). As Duncker has observed: 
'A protocol is relatively reliable only for what it 
positively contains, but not for that which it omits' 
(Duncker, 1945, p. 11). 
Despite Ericsson's and Simon's (1980,1984) well argued defence, 
the technique of process-tracing by means of verbal protocols remains 
a relatively controversial method. Nevertheless, despite its 
drawbacks, not least the large effort required to code and interpret 
the data, this technique would appear to be suited to the current 
need. 
(ii) Theoretical Issues 
Having presented arguments, Eor the adoption of--pröcess-tracing 
methods-the discussion can now turn to the expectations of such a 
study. Firstly, recall the principal focus of the study, which is 
to investigate the reasons for the somewhat surprising performance 
levels observed in the first study., Here individuals were found 
to be performing, in all four complexity conditions, at levels of 
efficiency significantly above chance, and to be on average at least 
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as efficient as the E and P rules. It has also been suggested, in 
the discussion section to the previous Chapter, that the sets of 
randomly generated matrices used in Study 1 might be similar to the 
sets of factorially generated gambles used in early tests of expectation 
based models of decision-making under risk (see Chapter 2, this volume). 
This being the case, the findings of Study 1 would appear to be entirely 
commensurate with the early research. However, the findings of 
the first study must also be related to the more recent 'risk-dimension' 
research, which suggests that, far from being expectation maximisers, 
individuals attend rather to the basic, concrete (Slovic, 1972) risk- 
dimensions of a gamble, such as the wins, losses, and probabilities 
to win and lose. It has also been suggested that, if the findings 
of this latter school of research can be generalised to the current 
matrices, which appears not unreasonable, then the findings of the 
first study cannot be accounted for by the use by Ss of. any single 
simple risk-dimensional rule (for example, Minimax). This conjecture 
is conditional upon the further assumption that individuals generally 
structure the task in terms of the maximum and minimum payoffs, and 
their associated probabilities of occurrence, as basic risk-dimensions 
(and this latter assumption is one that we wish to investigate 
empirically in the current study). Our conjecture has led us to 
the second of four proposed explanations of the findings of the first 
study: 
(i) Individuals might consistently-utilise one 
of the highly efficient strategies; i. e. 
E or P. 4 
(ii) Individuals might adopt some simple combination 
of the basic 'risk-dimension' oriented rules 
in a way that bootstraps efficiency beyond that 
of the basic MAX, MIN, PMAX and PMIN levels. 
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(iii) Individuals may be attempting to maximise Expected 
Value, or some subjective variant of this, but 
cannot apply such a rule consistently as complexity 
increases due to the information-processing 
demands of the task. 
(iv) Individuals may be utilising some other form of 
efficient rule. 
The first, and perhaps most important, goal of the present study will 
be the investigation of the actual subjective representation of the 
task adopted by individuals. Thus a clear discrimination between 
hypotheses (i)-(iv) may subsequently be effected. 
At a more detailed level of analysis, what might a protocol study 
be expected to reveal? Here theoretical guidance might possibly be 
obtained from the general taxonomies of multiattribute choice rules, 
of which that proposed by Montgomery and Svenson (1976; also Svenson, 
1979) is possibly the most comprehensive. The multiattribute 
approach depends upon the assumption that a decision situation 
consists of a number of choice alternatives, each of which can be 
subjectively defined in terms of a number of aspects, characterised 
as levels of attractiveness along a number of independent dimensions. 
A common example of such a representation would be the format typically 
adopted in consumer magazines for product information. A number of 
example: -rules from Montgomery's and Svenson's (1976) taxonomy are 
illustrated in Table 6.1. 
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Table 6.1 
Example Multiattribute Choice Rules 
Rule Operation (A1 and A1 refer to alternatives) 
Dominance (DOM) Choose A over A if A is better than A on 1 2 2 
at least one attribute, and not worse than 
A2 on any attribute. 
'Conjunctive Rule Choose any alternative which exceeds or is 
(CON) equal to a set of criterion values c across i 
all attributes. 
Disjunctive Rule Choose any alternative which exceeds or is 
(DIS) equal to at least one of a set of criterion 
values di across all attributes. 
Elimination By Eliminate all alternatives which do not exceed 
Aspects (EBA) a criterion value c on the most important 
attribute. Repeatlthis procedure, until only 
one alternative remains, with the second, third, 
etc., most important attributes. 
Elimination By Eliminate the alternative with the overall 
Least Attractive worst aspect. 
Aspect Rule (ELA) 
Choice By Most Choose the alternative with the overall 
Attractive best aspect. 
Aspect Rule: (CMA) 
Maximising Number Choose A over A differs favourably if A 
Of Aspects With 
2 1 1 from A on a greater number of attributes than 
Greater 
2 
the number of attributes on which A differs 
Attractiveness 
2 favourably from AV 
Addition Of Choose the alternative with the greatest 
Utilities Rule sum of utilities across all attributes. 
(AU) 
Note that, if the matrix task is indeed structured in terms of 
maximum and minimum payoffs as basic dimensions, then the ELA rule 
is equivalent to Thorngate's (1980) MIN, and the CMA rule to MAX. 
Rules such as those illustrated in Table 6.1 are often discussed 
(cf; Einhorn, 1970) as being either compensatory, where conflicting 
, attractiveness values are allowed 
to balance out (e. g. AU or MNA), or 
non-compensatory, where tradeoffs do not occur (e. g. DOM, CON, DIS, 
EBA)?. Montgomery (1983) discusses the relative merits of such 
{ 
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rules, and suggests that non-compensatory rules are easy to utilise, 
but have the drawback of limited applicability 
3, 
and may neglect 
important information. Conversely, compensatory rules, which are 
theoretically applicable to all choice situations, and preserve 
most of the available information, generally require more complex 
judgements, such as difficult tradeoffs between relatively 
incommensurable dimensions, and hence are probably less intuitively 
appealing to the decision-maker. 
However, while it is relatively easy to rank rules in terms of 
such characteristics, it is more difficult to predict directly the 
use of any particular rule under specified task conditions. This 
is probably because current taxonomies lack overall theoretical 
coherence (Huber, 1980), together with the fact that the applicability 
of any particular rule, particularly the more 'psychological' non- 
compensatory types, will be contingent (Payne, 1982) upon a wide range 
of task variables. Furthermore, several authors have noted that 
such taxonomies do not reflect a number of empirically verified 
properties of multiattribute choice: for example, the balance between 
relative and absolute evaluations (Ranyard and Crozier, 1983), or 
the multi-stage characteristics of complex choice processes (Payne, 
1980). These difficulties would appear to compound the problems of 
prior theoretical prediction. 
Rather than seek theoretical guidance for the purposes of prediction 
we might, alternatively, inquire into empirical studies of multiattribute 
choice. However, such efforts will be constrained, as in the case 
of theoretical prediction, by the difficulties of generalising highly 
contingent findings from other studies. That this is the case is 
supported if we compare the present matrices to other stimuli that 
have typically been utilised in multiattribute choice studies., The 
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present matrices, particularly in the three most complex conditions, 
are constructed from a relatively large, and by design unconstrained, 
set of payoff and probability values. These can be contrasted with 
the majority of relevant process-tracing studies, which fall broadly 
into one of two categories: firstly, multiattribute choice tasks 
under certainty, where the weights associated with the attributes 
are assumed to be constant across the alternatives (e. g. Payne, 1976; 
Russo and Dosher, 1981; Svenson, 1974); secondly, investigations 
of choice under risk, as in the current study, but generally 
employing simplified gambles which allow payoff and probability values 
to be systematically, and independently, varied (e. g. Montgomery, 
1977; Ranyard, 1982; Ranyard and Crozier, 1983; Russo and Dosher, 
1981). The generalisability of specific findings from either type 
of study to the current context must be questionable. The critical 
dependence of findings upon task characteristics is illustrated, 
for example, by a study by Ranyard (1982). He interprets his 
finding that individuals utilise different choice strategies from 
those reported by Montgomery (1977) in structurally similar gambles 
in terms of the latter's use of a restricted range of probabilities 
and payoffs in the stimulus set! 
Perhaps, therefore, rather than attempting to generalise from 
ostensibly similar studies, we should accept that there exist 
significant differences between the matrices employed here and the 
tasks that have been investigated in most other process-tracing 
studies. In this respect, and provided that we do not select a 
restricted set of matrices for our investigation, these differences 
should themselves be one focus of attention during our discussion 
of the data. 
In conclusion, the following issues have been raised. It has 
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been argued that verbal protocol analysis is an appropriate method 
for the investigation of choice strategies in the matrix task. 
The disadvantages of this approach have been discussed, but it has 
been concluded that this technique is methodologically sound if 
utilised with proper care and precaution. The first aim of the 
study will be to investigate the subjective task representation 
adopted by Ss, and the second to explore process-oriented explanations 
for the findings of the first study. Prior prediction of the 
precise strategies that individuals might utilise, on either theoretical 
or empirical grounds, has been seen to be problematic, and thus has 
not been attempted here. 
4 
II. Materials and Method 
This section is divided into the following sub-sections: 
(i) Matrix Selection 
(ii) Basic Design, Materials, and Subjects 
(iii) Procedure. 
(i) Matrix Selection 
Rather than construct, for the main verbalisation sessions, 
new and specific sets of matrices, it was decided to select the 
stimuli from the sets generated for Study 1. Two principal 
considerations dictated this decision. Firstly, it was recognised 
that, as a result of the inherent complexity of all but the 2x2 
type of matrix, the size of the set of matrices that might be generated 
by systematic variation of probabilities and payoffs would be 
unmanageable in the context of a process-tracing study, both in 
terms of subject time and the effort required for analysis. 
Secondly, any: attempt to reduce the potential stimulus set, perhaps 
by systematic variation of only a restricted number of variables, might 
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prove too restrictive, and not allow findings to be compared across 
the first and present study. Clearly, the requirement of comparability 
is central to the proposed protocol study, and one that it would seem 
difficult to relax. In addition to this, one benefit of utilising 
the same matrices as in the first study is that this will facilitate 
a check as to whether the instructions to verbalise radically influence 
Ss' patterns of choices. 
For comparative purposes, therefore, the need to select a set of 
matrices that is representative of those used in the first study . 
is. 
extremely important. This suggests that selection should not be 
arbitrary (for exaMple, we would not want, in the 2x2 condition, 
to use all DOM type matrices), but at least controlled to reflect 
the general theoretical concern of the study, as well as the different 
types of matrix produced by random generation. Since the primary 
aim of the process-tracing study is to investigate individuals' 
choice strategies as compared to the theoretical Thorngate (1980) 
heuristics, the matrices used should reflect the patterns of heuristic 
choice over the generated sets. Of course, there are many potential 
decision strategies that one might want to use as criteria here. 
However, for our purposes it is important that the selection be 
guided by those rules that have been the focus of our discussion 
of the Study 1 data: that is, EV, E, P, MIN, MAX, PMIN, PMAX, and 
DOM. On the basis of this several, more or less crisp, categories 
of matrix type can be defined. These categories apply in general 
terms to all four complexity conditions. 
(i) DOM Type As has been discussed previously, a 
DOM type matrix is one where the 
alternative with the highest Expected 
Value also strictly dominates all 
contender alternatives. . 
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(ii) ALL RULES In this type of matrix, all of the 
Type theoretical heuristics (E, P, MIN, 
etc. ) select the alternative with the 
highest Expected Value, but this 
alternative does not strictly' dominate 
the contending alternatives. 
(iii) ONE RULE AT These are matrices where all but one 
VARIANCE of the theoretical heuristics choose 
Type the alternative with the highest 
Expected Value. 
(iv) SPLIT RULES These are matrices where, on balance, 
Type the heuristics as a whole do not point 
to a clear preference for the alternative 
with the highest Expected Value; that 
is, a significant minority (or indeed 
the majority) of'-the heuristics select 
the alternative(s) with low Expected 
Value(s). 
(v) SUBJECT These matrices are of particular significance 
MAJORITY for comparative purposes, being the ones 
CHOICE Type from the first study where the majority of 
the Ss do not select the-alternative with 
maximum Expected Value.. 
Of the five categories, (i)-(iv) can be conceptualised in terms 
of decreasing heuristic correlation with Expected Value, while 
Category (v) is included for comparative purposes. Table 6.2 gives 
the matrices selected, within each -complexity condition, according 
to these general criteria. The matrix numbers correspond to those 
in Appendices A. 1-A. 4. 
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Table 6.2 
Matrices Selected for Verbal Protocol Study 
(Identified numerically as in Appendices A. 1-A. 4) 
Complexity Condition 
Rule 2 Alternative 2 Alternative 4 Alternative 4 Alternative 
Category 2 Outcome (2x2) 4 Outcome (2x4) 2 Outcome (4x2) 4 Outcome (4x4) 
Nos. Nos. Nos. Nos. 
DOM 43 45 36 72 
ALL RULES 70 37 35 54 
ONE RULE AT 
VARIANCE 
RULE 
E 38* 31* 54* 75 
E 59* 59* 22* - 
P 23* 77* 65 57 
P 35* - - - 
P 62* - - - 
MIN 48 22 47 67 
MAX 58 42 38 64 
ML n/a 26* n/a 47 
PMIN 26 46 27 31 
PMAX n/a 78 n/a 34 
SPLIT RULES 50 54 26 28 
56 58 39 30 
57 72 - 48 
63 
SUBJECT 22** 28 37 26 
MAJORITY - 29 61 62 
CHOICE - 38 68 66 
- - 70 79 
- - 72 - 
TOTALS 15 16 15 16 
N. B.: * indicates matrices in ONE RULE category where the specified 
rule could not be --varied uniquely, but could only be 
varied with one other rule. Where possible this procedure 
was repeated with a different other rule. 
: ** indicates matrix in 2x2 condition where SUBJECT MAJORITY 
CHOICE criterion not uniquely satisfiable. This matrix 
is the closest of all 2x2 types to this criterion. 
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There were in total fifteen matrices selected in the 2x2 
and 4x2 conditions, and sixteen in the 2x4 and 4x4. A short 
pilot study had shown that this was a reasonable number for a 1-1; 
hour session. Clearly these subsets of the original sets of sixty 
matrices are not strictly statistically representative; for example, 
we have chosen only one DOM type for each complexity condition, 
whereas there were twenty-one and twelve of these in the 2x2 
and 4x2 sets respectively. However, they do at least broadly 
reflect, along the important theoretical dimension of aggregate 
rule choice, the range of matrices in the original stimulus sets. 
(ii) Basic Design, Subjects, and Materials 
As in Study 1, the four complexity conditions were investigated 
in a two (2 or 4 alternatives) by two (2"or 4 outcomes) independent 
Ss design. Since the amounts of data produced during verbalisation 
render large subject samples problematic, only six Ss were used in 
each of the four complexity conditions. Thus, the total number of 
Ss was twenty-four. As for the first study, all Ss were students 
of the University of Bristol (both undergraduate and postgraduate), 
of a wide range of disciplines, recruited by the Ex to take part in 
a study of 'some aspects of decision-making'. Ss were informed at 
the time of their recruitment that they would be required to 'think- 
aloud'. 
Each participant was identified by a number from one to twenty- 
four. Unfortunately, of-the original recruits it was subsequently 
discovered that one, number six, who was in the 4x2 condition, had 
been making rough calculations. in the answer booklets. during the 
verbalisation session. This S's data was not analysed, and anew 
participant recruited as a replacement. This replacement was allocated 
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the identifier number of twenty-five. 
All Ss were randomly assigned to conditions (although the overall 
numbers, and male/female ratio, were controlled for). The 
basic design, showing the Ss in each condition, is given in 
Figure 6.1. 
Figure 6.1 







2x2 Condition 2x4 Condition 
n= 6'13M/3F) n=6 (3M/3F) 
Subject Nos.: 1, 4,12, Subject Nos.: 2, 3,10, 
17,18,20 11,14,22 
Matrices Total = 15 Matrices Total = 16 
4x2 Condition 4x4 Condition 
n=6 (3M/3F) n=6 (3M/3F) 
Subject Nos.: 7, 8,13, Subject Nos.: 5, 9,15, 
16,21,25 19,23,24 
Matrices Total = 15 Matrices Total = 16 
For each of the four complexity conditions separate small booklets 
were prepared. These contained the selected matrices, one per page, 
in a randomised order. Each S within a complexity condition received 
a different random ordering. 
The presentation format for the matrices was identical to that 
used in the first study, although each page of the booklet was marked 
with a coloured identifier, composed of a letter (A, B, C, or D, 
corresponding to the 2x2,2 x 4,4,. x 2, and 4x4 complexity 
conditions respectively), together with a number (the number, within 
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the generated sets of ninety, of the particular matrix on that page; 
that is, as numbered in Appendices A. 1-A. 4). Thus matrix number 
seventy-two in the 4x4 condition was marked with the identifier 
D72, etc. By requesting that the S read this out at the start of 
each page, the matrix being attended to during each portion of the 
tape recording could be readily. ' identified during transcription. 
(iii) Procedure 
Except that in each condition only one type of matrix was 
investigated, and hence that some details and materials varied 
across sessions accordingly, the general method, instructions, and 
procedure were similar for all four complexity conditions. The 
instruction/trial booklets originally developed for Study 1. (see 
Appendix A. 5) were used here for practice trials. These were then 
followed by the main verbalisation session, using the matrices in 
the prepared booklets. 
The instruction script used in the sessions, appropriately varied 
at points to allow for the relevant complexity condition, followed a 
standardised format. This is given in Appendix B. I. Each S 
participated individually, in sessions that lasted from 1 to 112 
hours. Equipment consisted of a JVC stereo tape recorder, placed 
upon the table at which the S sat. 
The general procedure for the sessions ran as follows. After 
arrival, the study was explained to the-S as being concerned with 
, some aspects of decision-making', and it was pointed out that during 
the main part of the session he or she would be required to complete 
a number of judgement tasks while 'thinking-aloud'.. First, however, 
Ex explained, some practice trials would be carried out. in order to 
familiarise the S with the task. This practice part'of the session 
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was similar to the practice procedure adopted for the first study, 
as follows. After a short preamble, the S was instructed to remove 
the large practice booklet from an envelope on the desk (the type of 
booklet'corresponded to the appropriate complexity condition to which 
the S had been assigned). While the S referred to the instructions 
on the frontispiece of this booklet, Ex explained the general nature 
of the matrix task, utilising an illustration matrix, as in the first 
study, on a large card. As in the first study, the matrices were 
described to the S as gambles, and the lottery analogy was explained. 
The Ex also pointed out the similarity of these gambles to certain 
'safe' investment decisions. Once Ex had explained the task, the S 
was instructed to read through the instructions on the frontispiece 
of the practice booklet and then, unless he or she had any questions, 
to work through the trial gambles silently5 and in his or her own 
time. 
When the S had completed the practice matrices instructions 
were given to replace the booklet in the envelope, and take out the 
small booklet containing the main selected matrices. Ex pointed 
out to S that, although the gamblesin this new booklet required 
exactly the same type of judgements as in the practice trials, there 
were three procedural differences: firstly, that cthere would be 
only one gamble per page; secondly, that the S should, at the start 
of each new page, read out-loud the coloured identifier; thirdly, 
that the S should speak-aloud everything that came into his or her 
head while making a choice. These instructions (see Appendix. B. 1) 
were purposefully as general, and non-directive, as possible, -. in 
order to guard against the occurrence of intermediate processing 
between attention to, and verbalisation of, the information (see 
our,. earlier discussion of Ericsson and Simon, 1980,1984). :A short 
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pilot study had confirmed that such general instructions to verbalise 
resulted in comprehensive verbal reporting by Ss, although the 
verbalisation did appear to slow down the choice process somewhat 
(cf. Carroll and Payne, 1977; Payne and Braunstein, 1977). 
Having explained the differences Ex then switched on the recorder, 
and repeated the main instructions to S. The S was then free to work 
through. the booklet, while thinking-aloud, in his or her own time, 
and the Ex sat in the room with S throughout the session, but out of 
view. Once the S had completed the main booklet, and checked through 
the pages, the tape recorder was switched off, and a short debriefing 
session held. 
III. Protocol Analysis: 
This section is divided into the following sub-sections: 
(i) Protocol Coding: 
a. Protocol Coding Scheme 
b. Intercoder Reliability 
(ii) Results 
a. Initial Analysis 
b. Principal Coaings 
c. Global Processes. 
(i) Protocol Coding 
a. Protocol Coding Scheme 
The obtained tape recordings were first transcribed by the author. 
Following the procedure outlined by Payne (1976; cf. also Newell and 
Simon, 1972), the protocols were broken up, during transcription, into 
short phrases. The divisions were upon the basis of the author's 
assessment of what constituted a singular statement, and each separate 
statement was numbered. This procedure helps to 'isolate a series of 
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unambiguous "measurements" of what information the subject had at 
particular times' (Newell and Simon, 1972, p. 166). The full 
transcribed protocols, amounting to the equivalents of approximately 
200 pages of typed A4 script, will not be reproduced here. However, 
illustrative examples will be given. 
In their 1984 monograph, Ericsson and Simon note that the level 
of resolution-at which a transcribed protocol is to be interpreted 
and analysed may vary. The principal determinants of the level 
ultimately adopted will be the theoretical focus of the study, and 
the hypotheses under investigation. In general terms, our prior 
theoretical model of the cognitive processes producing the data 
(and what it is legitimate to regard as 'data'; cf. Feyerabend, 
1975) will have a direct bearing upon the coding scheme that we 
ultimately devise. This is not meant to imply that a protocol 
coding scheme will necessarily be more subjective (and hence 
'unreliable') than more traditional behavioural indices. As we 
have previously noted, the interpretation of any -measurement must be 
ultimately informed by theoretical concerns. What is important is 
the fact that theoretical concerns will clearly. differ for different 
researchers. And hence, for example, a psycholinguist is likely 
to want to analyse a particular protocol at a rather different level 
of resolution than, say, a cognitive psychologist interested in 
problem solving strategies. , 
The coding scheme developed for the present study operates at 
three levels of theoretical generality. Firstly, at the macro-level 
the scheme reflects the multiattribute assumption described previously; 
thatUs, that the choice process can be characterised in terms of 
evaluations by the S of the attractiveness of certain subjective 
attribute values., Hence, we, focus.. here only upon evaluative statements 
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within the protocols, such as 'X looks bad ... ', 'the wins are 
acceptable ... ', 'reject because of that E2 ... ' (cf. Svenson, 1983). 
By default all other, non-evaluative, parts of the protocols are 
not coded. At a second, lower level of resolution it is expected 
that such statements will be either absolute (that is relating to 
an aspect of a singular alternative) or relative, relating to a 
comparison between two or more alternatives on a particular aspect 
(Svenson, 1979). Furthermore, at this level we should intuitively 
expect the evaluations to have a direction (that is, to be favourable 
or unfavourable to"a particular alternative) or perhaps indifferent 
between two alternatives. At the third, finest level of resolution 
we shall want to test our expectations about (a) the structure adopted 
by the Ss, and (b) the basic decision rules utilised. We have 
previously raised, during the discussion of the data from the first 
study, a number of theoretical expectations with respect to the 
structure and rules that Ss might possibly adopt, and these need 
not be repeated here. Upon the basis of these expectations, together 
with an informal inspection of the pilot data6, the following eleven 
code categories for the analysis of the evaluative statements have 
been developed: 
(i) Expected Value (EV) 
(ii) Equiprobable (E) 
(iii) Probable (P) 
(iv) Minimax (MIN) 
(v) Maximax (MAX) 
(vi) Probable Minimum (PMIN) 
(vii) Probable Maximum (PMAX) 
(viii) Probable Minimum/Minimax (PMIN/MIN) 
(ix) Probable Maximum/Maximax (PMAX/MAX) 
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(x) Other Rule (0) 
(xi) Ambiguous Statement (A). 
Of the eleven categories, (i)-(vii) derive from our theoretical 
consideration of the Study 1 data, plus the inspection of the pilot 
data, which indicated that these types of heuristic strategy were 
indeed employed by individuals. The PMIN/MIN and PMAX/MAX categories 
derive directly from our consideration of the pilot data. Here it 
was evident that there were a not insignificant number of statements 
that were clearly evaluative, but that could not be unambiguously 
classified separately as PMIN and/or MIN (or PMAX and/or MAX): 
for example, the statement 'I don't like the 30% of getting that £57' 
(coded as PMIN/MIN), or 'good because of 50% winning E9661 (coded 
as PMAX/MAX). 
For simplicity of coding, it was decided at the outset that these 
eleven basic rule categories would represent the finest level of 
analysis. Hence no attempt is made to code the strength of each 
evaluation; for example, 'the minimum on X is reasonable', as against 
, the minimum is very good'. It would certainly be naive to expect 
that Ss treat all such evaluations as merely ordinal in arriving at 
a final choice. However, while an attractiveness analysis is 
certainly feasible (see Svenson, 1983), in the context of our current 
aims, the extra effort in coding involved would appear to outweigh 
any potential additional benefits. 
Full. details of the coding scheme, including the definitions 
associated with each category, exemplar members of each category, 
and the coding notation used, are given in Appendix B. 2. 
b. Intercoder Reliability 
Two coders were employed to analyse the transcribed protocols. 
- 189 - 
I 
These were the author and a paid assistant. The assistant, who 
was a non-psychologist, and naive as to the general theoretical 
aims of the research programme, was trained by the author in the 
use of the coding scheme, utitilising some of the pilot data as 
exemplars. 
Both coders independently evaluated the protocols, a procedure 
which took some sixty man-hours each. Agreement between the coders 
upon the classification of statements as absolute or relative, and 
the direction of the evaluations, was generally unproblematic. 
Agreement upon the classification in terms of decision rule, 
Categories (i)-(xi), was less clear. However, the interjudge 
agreement on these categories is remarkably consistent across 
complexity condition, and reasonably high; gross proportional 
agreements are . 82 (2x 2), . 82 (2 x 4), . 80 (4 x 2), and . 79 (4 x 4). 
Adjustment of these gross proportions to account for agreement that 
would be expected merely by chance, by calculation of Cohen's 
(J. A. Cohen, 1960) kappa, reduces these figures marginally to 
. 796, . 798, . 769, and . 761 respectively. Clearly, as Ericsson and 
Simon (1984) point out, such gross indices may overly reflect the 
reliability of the most common category. Hence it is important to 
investigate interjudge agreement for the separate coding categories. 
In view of this the data upon which the gross reliability indices 
are based, expressed as tabulated frequencies of agreement and 
disagreement for each category, are reproduced in Appendix B. 3. 
With one principal exception, which we discuss further below, the 
agreement for separate categories is as good as, or above, that of 
the gross indices. 
Focus upon the issue of interjudgereliability must not be 
allowed to obscure the fact that, as in all such analyses, a residual 
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number of statements upon which agreement has not been reached 
exist. This problem is rarely comprehensively discussed in the 
literature, which is perhaps surprising given that it presents a 
particularly difficult problem for the researcher; which of the two 
sets of codings, where agreement has not been reached, should be 
reported? One common solution, if gross agreement is sufficiently 
high, is for the two judges to recode the conflicting items 
jointly (e. g. Montgomery, 1977; Ranyard and Crozier, 1983)7. 
While such a procedure would appear to devalue the use of a prior 
coding scheme, it will probably not introduce unacceptable bias 
if interjüdge agreement is homogeneous across the coding categories. 
The recoding of statements jointly was not felt to be appropriate 
in the present case, for the following reason. Of the 20% or so 
of non-agreement pairs of statements within each complexity condition, 
approximately half in each case involved a classification of ambiguous 
(coding category xi) by one or other of the judges. This is 
illustrated in Table 6.3. 
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Table 6.3 
Breakdown of 'Non-agreement' Statements, showin 
Totals Involving 'Ambiguous' Classification _ Complexity Condition 
2 Alter- 2 Alter- 4 Alter- 4 Alter- 
native native native native 
2 Outcome 4 Outcome 




51 68 104 105 
Statements coded 24 33.. 33 46 
'Ambiguous' by 
Coder 1 (author) 





Total Percentage' 60% ' 52% 
Coded 'Ambiguous' 
by One of the 
Coders 
49% 46% 
Table 6.3 also illustrates that the majority of the 'ambiguous' 
classifications were by the first coder, the author (with the second 
coder classifying such statements in one of the remaining categories). 
This latter observation has several important implications: firstly, 
that there appears to be a significant difference between the two 
judges' classification strategies for the 'ambiguous' category. 
That this does indeed appear to be the case is supported by the fact 
that the interjudge reliability for this category was, unlike all of the 
others, very low at . 27 (2 x 2), . 33 (2 x 4), . 54 (4 x 2), and . 42 
(4 x 4) respectively. Of course, one positive effect of this is 
that, given that the classification of a statement as ambiguous is 
relatively common (Appendix B. 3), the interjudge agreement across 
the remaining classifications is typically above that of the gross 
reliability figures. 
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How might the observed differences between the two coders have 
come about? It is possible that Coder 1 (the author) was applying 
the classification scheme more conservatively than Coder 2. 
Alternatively, perhaps Coder 2 took greater care in classifying the 
marginal statements. Explanation aside, however, there remains 
the practical problem of resolving the disagreement in order that 
we may proceed to consider the results of the codings. The fact 
that the disagreement occurs with the ambiguous category would 
suggest that joint recoding would be an inappropriate course of 
action, since Ericsson and Simon have argued that: 
'a central task'in using verbally reported information 
is to make the encoding process as objective as possible. 
Without appropriate safeguards, the encoder, exposed 
to a series of ambiguous verbal statements, may encode 
them with a bias toward his own preferred interpretation' 
(Ericsson and Simon, 1984, p. 287). 
It seems reasonable, under the current circumstances, to assume 
that any statement coded 'ambiguous' by at least one coder is 
indeed so, or at least potentially so. Since, as Ericsson and Simon 
imply above, it is ambiguous statements of which we. should be 
particularly cautious when coding (and'indeed can be taken as evidence 
for a degree of residual subjectivity in the coding scheme being 
employed), it follows that joint recoding of such statements may be 
particularly prone to bias (without at all prejudging what the form 
of such bias might be). Of course, our argument here is conjectural. 
However, it does suggest that joint recoding might well pose an 
unacceptable risk of bias. Thus, rather than recode, we merely 
report, in the subsequent sections of this Chapter, only the codings 
of one of the judges, the author (cf. Fidler, 1983). Use of this 
particular judge's codings is not an arbitrary choice, for the 
following reason. Recall that it was this coder who produced the 
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vast majority of 'ambiguous' classifications on non-agreement 
statements. The reporting of this set of codings represents a 
conservative decision, since it will, by maximising the frequency of 
'ambiguous' classifications (as compared to the codings of the second 
judge), minimise the possibility of misclassifying truly ambiguous 
statements. Consequently, high reliability across the remaining 
categories will be maintained, but at the expense of a smaller set of 
useful classifications. 
(ii) Results 
a. Initial Analysis 
The first analysis to be reported is a simple check to see 
whether any evidence exists to suggest that the instructions to 
verbalise have-changed the nature of the choice process. This can 
be carried out, as we have noted earlier, because equivalent matrices 
are used in both this and the first study. A comparison of choice 
frequencies across the two sets of subjects (silent choice in Study 1, 
and verbalised choice in the current study) can be made, and this is 
fully tabulated, for each of the complexity conditions, in Appendix 
B. 4. Although judgement of lack of significant differences is 
often a problematic issue, the tabulated choice frequencies for the 
two conditions appear remarkably similar. And this is despite the 
small subject samples (n = 6) in the verbalised conditions, which 
implies that any random effects would tend, if anything, to obscure 
similarities. The similarity between the distributions is underlined 
by noting that, in fully fifty-two (84%) of the sixty-two matrices 
common to both studies, the majority choice was the same in both 
silent and verbalised conditions, while for only two. (3%) was the 
majority clearly in favour of a different alternative in the two 
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conditions. The residual eight (13%) were not clear with respect 
to the majority choice criterion (for example, when one of the S 
samples was divided evenly between two alternatives). Thus we 
can conclude that, at the level of aggregate choice at least, the 
instructions to verbalise do not appear to have significantly 
influenced responses. Interestingly, a corollary to this is that, 
to the extent that the reduced sub-sets of matrices do indeed reflect 
significant aspects of the original randomly generated sets, then 
the current choice data represents a partial replication of the 
first result. 
For the purposes of the analysis and discussion, the convention 
is adopted here of utilising the term protocol to refer to the full 
verbalisation, produced by a single S, making a single choice. Thus 
the number of protocols analysed was sixty-two (total number of 
matrices across all complexity conditions) times six (total number 
of Ss per matrix), which is a total of three hundred and seventy-two. 
As noted earlier, each protocol was first broken up into short phrases, 
and then codings applied to each identified evaluative statement8. 
As. might be expected, the total number of phrases and statements 
increased across the complexity conditions. For the 2 alternative 
2 outcome (2 x2 type) there was an average of 11.0 phrases and 3.0 
evaluative statements per protocol, for the 2 alternative 4 outcome 
(2 x4 type) 13.7 and 3.8, for the 4 alternative 2 outcome (4 x2 
type) 18.5 and 5.7, and for the 4 alternative 4 outcome (4 x4 type) 
25.8 and 7.4 respectively. 
As we have noted, at the next level of analysis each evaluative 
statement was coded as either relative, absolute, or unclassified 
(for example, statements coded 'ambiguous'). Table 6.4 gives, for 
each complexity condition, the percentages of these types of statement. 
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Table 6.4 
Percentage Relative, Absolute, and Unclassified 
Statements 
Complexity Condition 
2 Alter- 2 Alter- 4 Alter- 4 Alter- 
native native native native 
2 Outcome 4 Outcome 2 Outcome 4 Outcome 
(2 x 2) (2 x 4) (4 x 2) (4 x 4) 
Relative 50 48 37 29 
Absolute 35 34 44 50 
Unclassified 15 18 19 21 
Total N 276 376 516 761 
The data in Table 6.4 indicate that, for those statements that 
could be clearly classified, the ratio of relative to absolute 
judgements decreases as the number of alternatives increases. This 
is consistent with the general findings in other similar studies 
(e. g. Payne, Braunstein and Carroll, 1978; Ranyard and Crozier, 
1983; Svenson, 1979). Svenson notes that this effect would be 
congruent with an increase in intra-alternative search as the number 
of available options increases. We comment further upon this, and 
provide an illustration of the balance between relative and absolute 
evaluations, at a later stage in the discussion of the protocol data. 
That the coded evaluative statements are positively related to 
the Ss'final choices is confirmed by the fact that the-majority of 
relative statements favour the alternative finally chosen: 64%, 
70%, 49% and 55% of all relative statements in the 2x2,2 x 4, 
4x2, and 4x4 conditions respectively. The larger percentages 
in the 2 alternative as compared to the 4 alternative conditions 
probably reflect the fact that in the latter a significant number 
of relative evaluations, early on in the protocols, will involve pairs 
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of alternatives that do not include the alternative finally chosen 
(cf. Russo's and Rosen's, 1975, 'winner versus challenger' strategy 
for multi-alternative choice). A similar breakdown of the absolute 
statements indicates that most are either favourable to the alternative 
ultimately chosen (32%, 33%, 36%, 38% for the 2x2,2 x 4,4 x 2, 
and 4x4 conditions respectively), or unfavourable to alternatives 
not chosen (54%, 40%, 38%, and 35%). The raw data upon which these 
percentages are based are reported in Appendix B. 5. 
b. Principal Codings 
For--each of the four complexity conditions, the percentages 
of statements classified under each of the primary rule categories 
(i. e. EV, E, P, MIN, etc. ) are given in Table 6.5. A number of 
salient features of these data can be noted. Firstly, the percentage 
of 'ambiguous' statements is similar across complexity conditions, 
at . 
13-18%. The reasons why these figures are high have been 
discussed previously, and will not be repeated here, although 
we note that this represents an undesirable, but unavoidable, 
situation. 
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Table 6.5 
Percentage* of Total Evaluative Statements 
Within Each Rule Category 
Complexity Condition 
2 Alter- 2 Alter- 4 Alter- 4 Alter- 
native native native native 
Rule 2 Outcome 4 Outcome 2 Outcome 4 Outcome 
Category (2 x 2) (2 x 4) (4 x 2) (4 x 4) 
(i) EV - - 1 1 
(ii) E 3 8 8 6 
(iii) P 9 10 6 3 
(iv) MIN 22 12 22 20 
(v) MAX 11 11 18 16 
(vi) PMIN 6 4 5 11 
(vii) PMAX 16 10 11 12 
(viii) PMIN/MIN 4 7 2 6 
(ix) PMAX/MAX 3 4 2 9 
(x) O 12 19 6 2 
(xi) A 13 14 18 14 
Total N of 270 367 510 712 
Statements 
* Note that, due to rounding, some percentages fail to 
total 100%. 
The high percentage, in three of the complexity conditions, of 
statements classified as 'other' (0) might be of concern, perhaps 
being indicative of a problem with the inclusiveness of the coding 
scheme. However, these figures can be accounted for by two factors. 
Firstly, in the 2 alternative 4 outcome (2 x 4) condition, fully 17% 
of the 19% of statements coded 'other' are derived from the protocols 
of a single S (S14). This S consistently, although not always 
entirely unambiguously, appears to employ a highly idiosyncratic choice 
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strategy. This is based primarily upon a hybrid type of evaluation, 
combining elements of the P and EV rules, with final choice by means 
of a Maximum Number Of Aspects With Greater Attractiveness (MNA; see 
Table 6.1) type strategy. We shall give an example: of the protocols 
of S14 later. The second factor is peculiar to the 2 outcome 
conditions (2 x2 and 4x 2). Here a large number of the statements 
coded 'other' are of a. highly specific type, and had not been anticipated 
in advance. These are direct comparisons between a Maximum payoff 
value (MAX) on one alternative and a Minimum payoff value (MIN) on a 
second alternative. This is illustrated in protocol Excerpt 1, below. 
Excerpt 1: 4x 2; S7; C27* 
14: And the lower prize for X, 
15: £431, 
16: is not much lower than ... 
17: the highest prize for W ... MIN(X) AX(W) - FAV(X) 
* Note the following conventions, to be adopted here for 
all protocol extracts. The heading gives Excerpt Number, 
Complexity Condition, Subject Identifier, and Matrix 
Number. The extracts are reproduced as transcribed, with 
separate phrases numbered consecutively. The protocol 
codings (see Appendix B. 2 for meaning of notation) are 
given in the right-hand column. 
Statements of the MIN/MAX form, which might of course be 
conceptualised as a 'test for dominance', account for 7% of the 12% 
of statements classified 'other' in the 2 alternative 2 outcome (2 x 2) 
condition, and 3% of the 6% classified 'other'in the 4 alternative 
2 outcome (4 x 2) condition. This strategy is generally not in 
evidence in the 4 outcome conditions to the same extent, although why_ 
this'is the case is not clear. Thus, if we take account of the 
idiosyncratic strategy of S14 in the 2 alternative 4 outcome condition 
(2 x 4), and the use of the MIN/MAX strategy in the 2 outcome conditions, 
I 
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the residual 'other' classifications are a far more acceptable 5% 
(2 x 2), 2% (2 x 4), 3% (4 x 2), and 2% (4 x 4) respectively. 
Of the nine remaining categories, few of the evaluative statements 
(excepting possibly those by S14) could be categorised as explicit 
use of the Expected Value rule. Thisffinding is remarkably consistent 
with that of Russo and Dosher (1981), who report, utilising a very 
simple binary risky choice task which, they argue, should be highly 
conducive to the use of holistic strategies such as EV, that in 
only 6% of a total of 334 protocols was there evidence of EV like 
multiplication (however approximate). It would appear from this 
that we can now reject with some confidence the hypothesis that Ss 
are directly utilising an EV type choice strategy in the matrix task. 
That this is the case is further corroborated by a recent study by 
Montgomery and Adelbratt (1982), who report that Ss actually presented 
with the calculated EV information for gambles find this of only 
marginal relevance to single choice. 
There is some evidence, which is relatively stable across all four 
complexity conditions, of the use; of the highly efficient E and. P 
heuristics. However, in comparison to some of the other rule 
categories, the level of utilisation is not high. This is reinforced 
by the fact that the consistent use of these pure rules, as the sole 
determinant of choice, was not observed in any S's complete set of 
protocols. However, it is nevertheless clear that many of the Ss did, 
at certain points, use these rules. 
The substantial proportion of statements are in the four basic 
categories MIN, MAX, PMIN, and PMAX, with a further residual proportion 
in PMIN/MIN and PMAX/MAX. For the four basic 'dimensional' categories, 
a consistent pattern is observed across all four complexity conditions; 
MIN is the most common and PMIN the least, with MAX and pw{ intermediate 
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between these two. If we accept that, in a choice task, the 
evaluative statements produced by Ss will be closely related to 
their-'internal representation of that task (cf. Montgomery, 1983), 
then these data would appear to corroborate the central expectation 
raised at the outset of the study; that Ss would in general adopt a 
subjective representation, or structure, of the task that is based 
principally upon the maximum-minimum payoff values, and their 
associated probabilities of occurrence. These: then-. tcomprise the 
basic 'risk-dimensions' along which the majority of evaluation takes 
place. This is illustrated by the following Excerpts, obtained from 
different Ss, but the same matrix. 
Excerpt 2: 2x4; S14; B77 
2: So pick the highest probability for X 
3: the highest probability from Y ... 
4: Uh ... the highest individual probability 
is 34% from X ... 
5: Nice, 
6: because it's 981 ... P1(X) -º FAV(X) 
7: Wish I could do a few lotteries like this 
myself really ... 
8: Better than the Graduate Club one! 
9: So, anyway, 
10: let's compare them ... 
11: 34% chance of winning 981, 
12: with a 33% chance of winning 430 (in Y) ... 
13: So that considerably is in X ... 
14: X's favour ... O(X, Y) -º FAV(X) 
15: Next one is ... 
16: 24% chance of winning 79 ;.. 
17: is a quarter ... A 
18: So that really levels it up I feel ... 
19: So we can call that one-one ... 
20: So a 24, 
21: and 24 ... 
22: Ah no, I was wrong there ... 
23: It's ... 
24: It's 26, 
25: And 24. 
26: So that (Y) still wins quite handsomely 
... O(X, Y) -º FAV(Y) 
27: Right, so ... 
28: No that's wrong ... 
29: 26 ... 
30: So then we use the next one, 
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31: which will be 24 of 79 ... 
32: And ... 
33: the 31 of that. 
34: So that (X) certainly wins that one ... O(X, Y) -+ FAV(X) 
35: And the last one ... 
36: the ... 
37: X wins as well. O(X, Y) -º FAV(X) 
38: So that's three-one. 
39: So I'd say X. 
Excerpt 3: 2x4; S3; B77 
1: No small amounts in X ... 
2: Pretty reasonable. chance of getting ... 
3: 50% chance of getting 800 or more 
pounds (X) 
4: And also Y has a small one 
5: Whereas X's smallest one is £375 
6: So I choose X. 
-MIN(X) -+ FAV(X) 
PMAX/MAX(X) i FAV (X) 
MIN(X, Y) -+ FAV(X) 
Excerpt 4: 2x4: S2; B77 
1: Looking at X, 
2: all the winnings are quite high. E(X) + FAV (X) 
3: Looking at Y, 
4: There is one low one ... MIN(Y) i FAV(Y) 
5: And there is a quarter percent chance ... 
6: nearly a quarter chance of getting that 
_ 
one. PMIN(Y) -º FAV(Y) 
7: There is quite a large chance of winning 
over £900 with X ... 
8: Less so with Y, PMAX(X, Y) -º FAV(X) 
9: So I'd choose X. - 
In Excerpt 2, S14, as noted previously, appears to employ a 
highly idiosyncratic, but systematic strategy. The'gambles are_' 
structured by this S first in terms of pairs of rank ordered 
probabilities. An evaluation is then made with respect to each 
such pair, and the final choice upon the basis of the majority of.. 
favourable judgements (i. e. an MNA rule; see Table 6.1). _ .. This<can 
be contrasted to the other two Excerpts. , 
Both S2, 
_and S3-adopt the 
far more common payoff-probability structure, with use of the MIN, rule 
common to both protocols. Note, however, the.: fact,.. that, 
, 
despite 
- 202 - 
I 
different overall strategies, all three Ss arrive at the same (high 
Expected Value) choice. In fact in Study 1 nineteen of the twenty Ss 
chose this alternative. This is an issue to which we shall return 
shortly. 
c. Global Processes 
The basic category data represented in Table 6.5 would appear 
to be significant with respect to the S's subjective representations 
of the task, and is also consistent with the 'risk-dimensional' model 
of risky choice (Chapter 2, this volume). However, as the protocol 
Excerpts so far reported illustrate, pure tabulation of rule frequencies 
may not by itself be sufficient to-meet our primary purpose; to 
provide an adequate explanation in process terms of the findings of 
the first study. For this a more detailed consideration of the 
general features in the protocols would appear necessary. In 
particular, Table 6.5 obscures the fact that a majority of the 
protocols contain several different basic evaluations, with the overall 
global choice strategy adopted by any S being a function of these. 
Recall that the average number of coded statements per protocol 
ranges from 3.0 in the 2x2 condition to 7.4 in the 4x4 condition. 
In general, as the percentages in Table 6.6 illustrate, a typical 
protocol will often contain at least one, and generally several, 
'risk-dimensional' evaluations (that is, use of one or more of the 
rules MIN, MAX, PMIN, or PMAX). This is a partial reflection of ° 
the fact that the protocols, despite clearly revealing a similar 
dimensional structure across Ss and matrices, nevertheless also 
exhibit a high degree of global variability. That is, the overall 
pattern of basic evaluations by. which a choice is finally made -varies 
considerably across protocols. 
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Table 6.6 
Percentage of Protocols Containing 0,1 or 




Different 2 Alternative 2 Alternative 4 Alternative 4 Alternative 
Evaluations 
12 
Outcome 22x2) 4 Outcome (2x4) 2 Outcome (4x2) 4 Outcome (4x4 
0 13 28 10 8 
1 31 11 23 10 
>1 56 61 67 82 
Total Number 
of 90 96 90 96 
Protocols 
* Note, a single 'risk-dimensional' evaluation is defined 
as a MIN, MAX, PMAX, or PMIN statement. PMIN/MIN and 
PMAX/MAX are treated in this analysis as two such evaluations. 
The presence of variability in the global strategies clearly makes 
the further classification of the protocols at a high level of analysis 
problematic. While any particular protocol might, with the 
appropriate qualification, be classified as an example of a generalised 
rule or rules, the degrees of freedom associated with such a procedure 
would appear to render such an effort impractical for the entire data 
set (and possibly no less informative for our purposes than the complete 
reporting of all 200 pages of protocols, which we certainly do not 
intend to do here! ). Nevertheless, despite this, several general 
observations can be made with respect to, the protocols. These are 
offered not as the result of a rigorous analysis, but represent the 
author's assessment of some of the salient features of the data. 
Extensive comment is avoided here, allowing the focus to rest with 
the illustrative examples. 
1. Between S Variability . 
As illustrated in earlier Excerpts (2,3, and 4) Ss often employ , 
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different global strategies for the same matrix. The following 
three Excerpts are a further illustration of this. 
Excerpt 5: 2x2; S12; A57 
1: In X ... 
2: See there is a high probability again of 
winning quite a low number PMIN/MIN(X) -r FAV(X) 
3: And the high number is ... 
4: £635 you could get, 
5: 47% chance of winning. 
6: On the Y category ... 
7: the numbers are fairly even, 
8: 475 or 433 ... 
9: So we are either going to win that 
amount ... 
10: And as there is quite a , high chance MIN/MIN(X) -r FAV(X) 
of winning only 221 on X, 
11: 1 choose Y for this one 
Excerpt 6: 2x2; S4; A57 
1: Again X, 
2: because the gain in either case is 
fairly great, E(X) - FAV(X) 
3: and Y looks pretty boring because ... 4: And there is nearly 50% chance of 
winning 600 odd ... 
PMAX/MAX(X) - FAV(X) 
(chooses X) 
Excerpt 7: 2x2; Si; A57 
1: 221 can win, 53%, 
2: 47% will win 635. 
3: Ah, so ... 
4: I've got less than 1 in 2 chance of 
winning the topýone in X, PMAX(X) -º FAV(X) 
5: Whereas in Y I've got 4 out of 5 
chance on winning £433, 
6: and a1 out of 5 chance on winning 
£475 ... 
7: both of which are a lot more than the ... 
8: bigger chance I've got in X ... P(X1, Y12) -º FAV(Y) 
9: even though there is a slight chance that 
I'll win 635. A 
10: So I think I'll go for Y on that one. 
Here both S12 and S1, despite different overall strategies, choose 
the alternative (Y) with the highest Expected Value, while S4 chooses, 
the alternative ranked second: In Study 1, sixteen of"the twenty'Ss- 
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chose alternative Y. 
2. Within S Variability 
The second salient feature of the protocols is the within S 
variability across different matrices. The following Excerpts, from 
the same S, but different matrices, illustrate this. 
Excerpt 8: 2x4; S22; B28 
1: Top and bottom ... 
2: X has the lowest bottom, MIN(X, Y)-º FAV(X) 
3: but also the highest-top ... MAX(X, Y)-r FAV(X) 
4: And only 5% of winning 738 in the case 
of Y PMAX(Y) -r FAV(Y) 
5: Initial impression, 
6: there doesn't seem to be much difference 
between the two of them ... ' 
7: I'll go for the one on the previous page 
8: I don't know ... 
9: I. think in the end X, 
10: if only for the 23%, 
11: as opposed to 5%, 
12: chance of winning the top prize. PMAX(X, Y)-º FAV(X) 
Excerpt 9: 2x4; S22; B45 
1: Top win (X) 945, 
2: is much larger than Y ... MAX(X, Y) .+ FAV(X) 
3: But only a 24% chance ... PMAX(X) -* FAV(X) 
4: But the lowest win (X) is 666, 
5: which beats the highest win of Y ... DOM(X, Y)-+ FAV(X) 
6: So X fairly conclusively in that one. 
7: I can't see any reason whatsoever to go 
for Y unless you are a lunatic! 
Excerpt 10: 2x4; S22; B72 
1: X with 36% of 909 ... 
2: Y with 26% of 965 ... 
3: The lowest being 31% of 157 (X) ... 
4: But in Y the worst you can do is 549 ... MIN(X, Y) -+ FAV(Y) 
5: So it looks like a Y. 
The varied nature of this S's overall strategy is clearly 
illustrated in the three example protocols, and this was by no means 
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uncommon. It may well be the case that these changes in strategy 
reflect changes in the task across matrices; i. e. the S'adapts 
the overall strategy in response to changes in the salient features 
of the task. For example, in B28 there is a large difference in the 
PMAX values, in B45 a strict dominance relationship between the 
alternatives, and in B72 a large difference in the minimums. 
Note also in B45 the combination of a relative MAX with an absolute 
PMAX. Here all three choices were of the alternative with highest 
Expected Value. 
3. Multi-outcome Simplification I: Chunking 
Payne (1980; see also Kahneman and Tversky, 1979a) notes that 
the ways in which individuals simplify complex multi-outcome 
alternatives has yet to be empirically'investigated. However, he 
does suggest that one strategy may be to 'chunk' similar outcomes 
together. In the protocols of the 2x4 and 4x4 conditions this 
did indeed appear to be a popular strategy. Particularly common 
was the collapsing of several maximums or minimums (and sometimes 
their probabilities of occurrence), into an overall MAX or MIN 
evaluation. The following Excerpts illustrate this. 
Excerpt 11: 2x4; S2; B31 
5: Um ... looking at Y though, 
6: there is a very large chance, 
7: over 50%, 
8: of getting £928 ... PMAX(Y) -º FAV(Y) 
9: Also a 15% chance of only getting 99 ... MIN(Y) +"FAV(Y) 
10: Um ... the other three are quite large... MAX123(Y) f FAV(Y) 
11: So I think I'd have to choose Y, 
12: and just hope that I didn't get £99. 
`ýr 
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Excerpt 12: 4x4; S24; D66 
31: And the. third line seems the 
highest 900 ... 
MAX(W, Y, Z) -º FAV(Y) 
32: Third line has got a 4(00);. 
33: and a 6(00), 
34: besides the 9(00) ... 
35: which is quite good. MAX23(Y) - FAV(Y) 
Excerpt 13: 4x4; S19; D34 
1: Straightaway W looks bad, 
2: because of the two low figures that you 
first meet ... 
3: Well three low figures that you first 
meet ... 
MIN123(W) ; FAV(W) 
4: So that's not even a question of looking 
at the percentages ... 
5: I've automatically discounted that one. 
Excerpt 14: 4x4; S5; D28 
5: 23% win 853 (in W). 
6: That's the highest ... 
7: Almost 1 in 4 chance of that ... 
8: That's quite a good chance ... 
9: 46%, 
10: which is double that, 
11: of winning £800 ... 
12: So we are talking about 69% chance 
of winning £800 or more, 
13: which is a very good chance. 
PMAX2(W) -s FAV(W) 
PMAX12(W) - FAV(W) 
Excerpt 15: 2x4; S10; B37 
1: Well in X there is an extremely high 
chance of getting £804 ... 
2: And the next one is 369 ... 
3: which is higher than the 43% chance 
in Y, 
4: and the 38% chance, 
5: which are the two highest (probabilities 
in Y) P12(X, Y) -+ FAV(X) 
6: So I go for X. 
These Excerpts illustrate the range of collapsing strategies used 
by the Ss. In B31 three MAX values are collapsed, while in D66 a 
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relative MAX is first utilised to identify Y as promising, and then 
the next two maximums within this alternative are collapsed in an 
absolute evaluation. D34 illustrates a collapsed MIN, while D28 
a collapsed MAX. B37 is somewhat different in that choice has 
been made with respect to the combined payoffs on the two most 
probable outcomes for each alternative (effectively the P rule). 
This last example apart, the general observation can be made that, 
although such operations are'. likely to be sensitive to the actual 
range of values in an alternative, any multi-outcome (N) option can 
nevertheless be theoretically 'chunked' into a simple four dimensional 






NIn this way suitable pre-editing of 
the outcomes 
may allow the reduction of a complex alternative to a simple 
dimensional representation. This is a suggestion upon which we 
comment further at a later stage. The prevalence of collapsing 
operations within the 4 outcome protocols is illustrated by noting 
the overall frequency of such statements; ' 30% of all statements in 
rule categories (iii)-(ix) are of this type in the 2x4 condition, 
and 28% in the 4 x4 condition. Thus, the data would appear to 
corroborate Payne's (1980) original conjecture. 
4. Multi-outcome Simplification II: Cancellation 
A second strategy for the simplification of complex options 
suggested by Payne (1980) is the cancellation of low probability 
outcomes. Since such a strategy is highly dependent upon task 
characteristics it was relatively: rare in the current protocols. 
The following example illustrates its use: 
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Excerpt 16: S11; B46 
1: You have got a variety of different 
orders here ... 
2: Um ... X has got 2% of 537, 
3: so we'll ... 
4: That doesn't. really count for much ... P4(X) -+ I 
5. Multi-alternative Simplification: Finding Promising, and 
Eliminating Unpromising Alternatives 
As described by Payne, Braunstein, and Carroll, (1978), and Svenson 
(1979), one of the best documented multistage characteristics of 
multiattribute choice is that of elimination by pre-screening. Here 
the decision-maker uses a simple, perhaps non-compensatory, elimination 
strategy (e. g. EBA or CON; Table 6.1) firstýto simplify the alternative 
space. Then, if more than one alternative remains, the decision- 
maker may switch to a more complex, possibly compensatory strategy 
(e. g. MNA or AU) to choose amongst the remaining contenders. The 
converse to this is to use a simple strategy to identify promising 
alternatives (e. g. DIS), and then switch to a more complex rule for 
final choice. Conceptually, elimination of unpromising, and identifying 
promising alternatives are two facets of the same process; the pre- 
processing of multi-alternative arrays into contender and non-contender 
subsets. The two types of pre-processing, which were common'in 
the protocols obtained'in-the 4 alternative conditions (4 x2 and 
4x 4), are illustrated in the following examples. Particularly 
common were the MAX and MIN rules as pre-processing operators. 
- 210 - 
I 
Excerpt 17: 4x2; S16; C72 
1: The lowest amount in W is quite favourable 
2: That's 668 ... MIN(W)*-º FAV(W) 
3: In X it's 406. 
4: So X is eliminated ... MIN(X) -s FAV(X) 
5: And in Y ... 
6: the highest amount isn't as high as the 
W ... MAX(Y, W) + FAV(Y) 
7: although there is a very high chance of 
getting it 
8: very high chance indeed ... PMAX(Y) -+ FAV(Y) 
9: So I won't eliminate Y yet ... 
10: Z I'll eliminate, 
11: as that's lousy money. E(Z) i FAV(Z) 
12: So higher chance of getting 782 (Y), 
13: but I could end up with 412 ... 
14: So it's probably better to go for the 
£668 of W. MIN(Y, W) - FAV(W) 
Excerpt 18: 4x2; S7; C47 
1: Well the highest prize here is Y ... 
2: £850 37% chance ... MAX(W, X, Y, Z) -º FAV(Y) 
3: Again'if you don't get that you will 
get £132 ... 
4: But then X ... 
5: (corrects) Now beg your pardon, 
6: Y isn't the highest prize ... 
7: X is the highest prize, MAX(X, Y) -* FAV(X) 
8: £869 with 90% chance of winning it ... 
9: If you fail to win it you will get 
£312 ... 
10: Now that's a reasonable sum ... MIN(X) -º FAV(X) 
11: It's one of the highest lower prizes .. . 
12: The only one higher than that is £390 
(W). MIN(X, W) -º FAV(W) 
13: But then there is a 33% chance of winning 
that ... PMIN(W) -+ FAV(W) 
14: And the higher prize is not sohigh ... MAX(X, W) -º FAV(X) 
15: So I think X is definitely the one to 
go for there. 
The two Excerpts above clearly illustrate the common multi-stage 
processes. Sib adopts primarily the classic 'search-and-eliminate'. 
approach, until two contenders remain., Note here the absolute 
character of the eliminations (i. e intra-alternative, -as in -a 
CON 
type process). As we have noted previously, 
, 
it; is significant here 
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that the ratio of absolute to relative evaluations increases with 
increasing alternatives, and the operation, in the multi-alternative 
situation, of elimination strategies is presumably one facet of this. 
Interestingly, in the C72 example alternative Y has the highest 
Expected Value, and yet fourteen of the twenty Ss in the first study, 
and four of the six in the protocol study,, chose W. In the second 
example, C47, S7 adopts a rather different procedure. First a 
promising alternative is identified, upon the basis of MAX, and then a 
'winner versus challenger' strategy is adopted to confirm that there 
are no serious contenders. The ultimate choice (X) has highest 
Expected Value. 
The trends that we have illustrated in the preceding Excerpts 
are in general typical of the majority of protocols (and incidentally 
comprise at least one example from over half of the total S sample). 
In the following section the implications of these findings are 
discussed in the context of the findings from the first study. 
i 
IV. Discussion 
The principal aim of the current study is to investigate the 
choice strategies (and subjective task representation) adopted by 
individuals in the generalised risky-choice task represented by the 
matrices. The first question that requires resolution before' the 
discussion can proceed further is whether the findings from this 
and the first study can be directly compared? We believe that the 
answer to this is yes, and have previously presented theoretical 
arguments to suggest that under careful-experimental conditions (which 
have been observed here) instructions to verbalise will not change 
cognitive processes significantly. This presupposition is given 
-empirical support by the fact-that choice distributions for; the matrices 
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common to both silent and verbalised conditions (Study 1 versus 
Study 2) are similar. Hence, while accepting, because of the problem 
of potential incompleteness, that a verbal report should not be treated 
as if it is the cognitive process of any individual, but rather as 
data with which to model the process, the comparability issue will 
not be discussed further here. 
The first empirical question to be addressed in the current 
study has been that of individuals' basic subjective representations 
of the matrices. The findings would appear to corroborate our original 
conjecture here. That is that individuals generally structure the task 
in terms of the maximum-minimum payoff values, and their associated 
probabilities of occurrence. Principal information-processing is 
then based upon simple absolute-and relative dimensional evaluations 
conditional upon this structure9. Note also, however, that, depending 
upon the level of analysis adopted, an important distinction can be 
made between these basic dimensional evaluations and the global 
strategy adopted by the individual S. As we have seen, the global 
strategy is generally composed of a number of different simple 
evaluations. This is an issue to which the discussion will return 
shortly. 
Having resolved the representation issue, we can. turn to the 
second principal empirical question. That is, what form of choice 
strategy, within the observed representation, does the typical 
individual utilise, and how can this beheld to account for the 
findings of the first study? With respect to this question, a 
number of hypotheses were originally. proposed. It is now clear, . 
congruent, with our expectation from, the literature. (cf. Chapter 2,, 
this volume), that the notion-of expectation maximisation. should. be 
rejected as a substantive process description of risky; choice in the, 
., 
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matrix task. Furthermore, the protocol data also suggest that 
while the highly efficient E and P strategies are indeed used on a 
significant proportion of occasions, the frequency of use is not high 
enough for these rules to account fully for the Study 1 findings, 
or to be considered as general models of the choice processes observed. 
The protocol data is in fact congruent with the third substantive 
10 
hypothesis that was proposed: 
'Individuals might adopt some combination of the basic 
"risk-dimension" oriented rules in a way that bootstraps 
efficiency beyond that of the . basic MAX, MIN, PMAX and 
PMIN levels. ' 
Recall that this hypothesis was proposed because the Study 1 
data indicated that Ss were consistently more efficient than the 
best of the simple dimensionally-oriented rules, and yet the literature 
indicated that dimensional processing provided the most parsimonious 
descriptive model of multiattribute choice. 
The protocol data would appear to confirm the dimensional 
processing model suggested from the literature review. However, 
this does not in itself provide an explanation for the apparent' 
bootstrapping of performance; that is, the superiority of the Ss' 
performances above that of the simple dimensional rules. How might 
this question be resolved? It would appear reasonable to suggest, 
in answer to this, that the reason may be related to the precise form of 
global strategy associated with any particular choice. That is, there 
is something significant about the precise combinations of dimensional 
evaluations that comprise the overall protocols. However, 'on the 
grounds that there exists in the protocol data a high variability in 
global strategy, we have also suggested that further classification of 
the data at this level of analysis would appear to be problematic, 
although evidence of a number of very general trends (i. e. collapsing, 
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cancellation, elimination, etc. ) has been presented. 
At the level of global strategy therefore, the fitting of 
theoretical choice rules to the data (e. g. as illustrated in 
Table 6.1) presents a problem. Perhaps then a satisfactory explanation 
of the findings from both this and the first study can be sought in 
the relationships between the task structure and the basic dimensional 
evaluations employed by the Ss? This suggestion is given support if 
we reconsider several of the findings from the two studies. The 
protocols reveal consistency in the form of basic evaluations made 
by the Ss, but variability, both between and within Ss, at a global level 
of analysis. This can be contrasted with a high degree of conformity 
in final choice; i. e. it appears that many Ss, despite different 
global strategies, select the same (high Expected Value) alternatives. 
AndYet we have also argued that itis. in terms of the global strategies 
that an explanation for the stable choice patterns must be sought! 
How then might this apparent paradox be resolved? One -potential 
resolution concerns the influence of the task structure. Specifically, 
the complex and relatively uncontrolled sets of matrices used in the 
two studies may be such that a wide range of strategies, based primarily 
upon combinations of simple dimensional evaluations, can be applied 
without significant decrements in overall efficiency (a clear parallel 
here is Von Winterfeld's and Edwards', 1973,1982, 'flat-maxima' result; 
see Chapter 3, page 52, this volume). 
We have also noted, during the discussion of the first study, the 
potential significance here of the correlation, within general sets of 
gambles, between Expected Value and the basic risk-dimensions (cf. 
Payne and Braunstein, 1971). We can pursue this argument further 
by considering the correlational' relationships that exist, across the 
sets of randomly generated gambles, between the choices of the Expected 
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Value strategy and those of the basic heuristics that the Ss, 
on the basis of the protocol data, appear to be generally 
utilising. For simplicity the argument is restricted here to 
the 2 alternative cases11. 
The first observation that can be made is that, across a set 
of randomly generated matrices, the choices of the 'optimal' Expected 
Value strategy will tend to be positively correlated with those of 
the simple heuristic strategies (i. e. E, P, MIN, MAX, PMIN, PMAX, 
PMIN/MIN, PMAX/MAX). This is-in fact merely Thorngate's (1980) 
original finding. One sufficient condition for such a positive 
correlation is that a heuristic strategy should be 'semi-optimal'. 
By semi-optimal we mean-that the following hold: 
a. The heuristic Hj utilises, for each alternative 
X, a subset Ix of the total information Ix 
utilised by the Expected Value calculation, and 
does not utilise information not in IX (i. e. 
does not utilise 'irrelevant' information). 
and b. The heuristic Hi operates upon Ix in a way that 
its evaluation function fHi (I), which indicates 
the overall utility of alternative X, has a 
marginal monotonic increasing12. relationship 
with the Expected Value evaluation function, 
EV(Ix). 
In practical terms this is merely the formal statement of the fact 
that, with all other variables held constant, the higher, for example, 
an Alternative's maximum payoff the higher will be its Expected Value, 
or the lower the probability of attaining the minimum payoff (PMIN), 
the higher will be its Expected Value. Such a relationship holds for 
the heuristics E, P, MIN, MAX, PMIN, and PMAX, and, if we assume some 
form of simple compensatory trade-off between payoff and associated 
probability, for PMIN/MIN and PMAX/MAX as well. This means that 
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the more attractive an alternative is with respect to any such 
heuristic evaluation, the higher is its Expected Value also. 
This then influences ultimate choice. 
Not only will heuristic choices be positively correlated with 
Expected Value. They will also be non-negatively inter-correlated. 
An illustration of why this is so, for the simplest 2 outcome cases, 
is given in Appendix B. 6. Such inter-correlations directly reflect 
the dependence that exists between the heuristics as operators and 
consequently" the level of redundancy between the subsets of information, 
Ij, upon which they operate. In the limit a perfect inter-correlation 
means that two rules (e. g. PMIN and PMAX in the 2x2 condition) are 
perfectly dependent, and therefore that the subsets of information 
upon which they operate are totally redundant. Such rules always 
select the same alternative. Conversely, a zero inter-correlation 
implies that the choices of two rules are statistically independent 
(e. g. MAX and PMAX). Although no formal proof for this is offered, 
it follows. that between the two extremes. of inter-correlation two 
such 'semi-optimal' rules will more often both select the high Expected 
Value alternative than they will both select the low Expected Value 
alternative. Generalised to more than two rules, if overall 
correlations with Expected Value are positive, and. inter-cogrelations 
are non-negative, 
3, 
then the following will hold. For any single. 
randomly generated matrix, it is more likely that a majority of the 
rules will select the alternative with highest Expected Value than 
will a majority select the alternative with low. 
The argument above clearly simplifies. what is a complex statistical 
issue. It is, however, illustrated by the fact that for". fully. fifty- 
eight (97%) of the original sixty 2x2 matrices used as stimuli in 
Study 1 (Appendix A. 1) three or more of the five. rules E, P, -MIN, MAX, 
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PMIN select the alternative with the highest Expected Value. 
Similarly, in fifty-one (85%) of the sixty 2x4 matrices (Appendix 
A. 2) four or more of the seven rules E, P, MIN, MAX, ML, PMIN, PMAX 
select the alternative with the highest Expected Value. It is 
also interesting to note that, if these figures are compared to the 
basic rule efficiencies across these matrices (Tables 5.1 and 5.2), 
then a simple 'choose the alternative that the majority of heuristics 
select' meta-strategy is more efficient than any of its constituent 
rules. What this in turn implies, if indeed this latter finding 
can be generalised to other sets of randomly generated matrices, 
is that the individual who consistently employs any simple 'semi- 
optimal' strategy, such as Minimax, may be at a disadvantage in 
comparison to the S who employs an appropriate combination of such 
basic rules, a suggestion that would appear to be relevant to the 
current empirical findings. 
Theoretically, a clear parallel exists between our correlational 
analysis of the matrix task and a result from communications theory 
(e. g. Beer, 1966; Shannon and Weaver, 1949), where it has been 
demonstrated that a highly reliable communication system can be 
constructed from relatively unreliable components. And, as Hogarth 
(1982) notes, the inconsistent utilisation of information might be an 
entirely functional strategy in decision environments where varying 
informational dependability and redundancy exist (cf. our discussion 
of this, in Chapter 4, this volume). 
The analysis that we have outlined also has an appropriate forebear 
in psychology; the 'Lens Model' of Egon Brunswik (e. g. 1952,1956; 
see also Hammond, --1966). Brunswik, who was primarily concerned 
substantively with visual perception, was perhaps the first modern 
psychologist to stress the=purely probabilistic. nature of our. knowledge- 
ý, 
-, t 
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about the physical and social environment (cf. Tolman's and 
Brunswik's 'CaUS. al Texture of the Environment', 1935). Since 
Brunswik's work was prior to the introduction of the concepts of 
subjective probability to psychology his Lens Model is based upon 
the correlational statistics of the relative frequency approach to 
probability (cf. Chapter 1, this volume). Brunswik's primary premiss 
was that, in a world of only 'probable things', the functional aim 
of the organism is to infer 'distal'-states (e. g. the objective 
size of a stimulus in the visual field) upon the basis of only 
partially dependable 'proximal' cues (e. g. perceived retinal image 
size). Brunswik recognised that, while proximal cues are only 
partially correlated with environmental stimuli, they are also 
often positively Inter-correlated within the natural ecology, and 
hence are partially redundant sources of information. He was aware, 
later in his life, of the link that this created with the then infant 
communications theory. He proposed the central concept of vicarious 
functioning to describe the organism's utilisation of multiple, 
partially redundant, and only partially dependable, proximal cues 
in order to construct highly dependable final inferences about 
distal states. For example: 
'According to Shannon and Weaver, the chances of error 
[in a communications system] can be decreased by 
redundancy ... 'Redundancy may be exemplified 
by, 
but is by no means restricted to, verbal repetitiveness. 
When there is noise there is some advantage in not 
using a coding process that. eliminates all redundancy, 
for the remaining redundancy helps combat the 
uncertainty of transmission. 
The reader-will recognise that the vicariousness of 
psychological cues and means which we have come to 
acknowledge as the backbone of stabilized achievement 
may be viewed as a special case of receiving or sending 
messages through redundant, even though not literally 
repetitive channels. - The probability of error, -given- 
by the variety of possible causes, or effects, that 
'could result in, or be produced'by, the type. of event . 
t 
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'in question can thus be minimized. This is 
the case, for example, in the gain of the overall 
functional validity (. 99) over the ecological 
validity of the major retinal cue (. 70)_in our 
representative survey of size constancy in which 
the organism acts as an intuitive statistician ... (Brunswik, 1956, pp. 142-143). 
While it is important to recognise that our argument is post hoc, 
the concept of vicarious functioning within a redundant. information 
ecology would appear to describe our most interesting finding; that 
is, that individuals appear to be utilising, in a variable global 
strategy, a range of basic risk-dimension evaluations, each of 
relatively limited efficiency, and in a manner that increases overall 
achievement14. We should, however, also be wary of pressing this 
analogy too far, particularly since Brunswik in his writings is 
less than clear about the precise meaning of his vicariousness concept 
(beyond its not meaning consistent utilisation of any singular cue). 
Furthermore, and as Hake, Rodwan, and Weintraub (1966). point out, the 
correlational model from cybernetics, while describing achievement, 
is nevertheless still not a truly behavioural model, and that 'when 
viewed in this way Brunswik's statement [cf. the quotation above] merely 
says that inferences about the distal stimulus are made more effectively 
when the proximal stimulation is redundant' (1966, p. 279). 
While it is therefore clear that the notion of redundancy does 
not provide a behavioural explanation for our findings, our. somewhat 
lengthy theoretical discussion does clarify the important relationships 
that exist between the matrix task, the simple choice heuristics, and 
overall efficiency, in a way that-takes the analysis beyond Payne's 
and Braunstein's (1971) simple correlational statement. Also our 
analysis suggests a general, Yet : simple and efficient, global choice 
criterion; majority rule choice. Such a criterion is, more generally, 
the Maximising the Number of Attributes with Greater Attractiveness Rule 
I 
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(MNA) described in Table 6.1. Empirically, such a choice rule has 
been observed in studies of binary multiattribute choice by Russo 
and Dosher (1981), who term this the Majority of Confirming Dimensions 
heuristic (MCD). Significantly, they also note, congruent with our 
general argument here, that 'in most typical real world situations, 
the choice alternative with the majority of confirming dimensions 
would likely have the higher total utility' (1981, p. 22). 
In the context of the current findings, perhaps the simplest 
MCD strategy for choosing between pairs of alternatives would' be 
'choose the alternative which is favoured 
15 
by. two of MIN, MAX, 
and PMAX (or PMIN)'. Some evidence of the use of such a strategy 
is illustrated in the following protocol Excerpts: 
Excerpt 19: 2x2; S12; A50 
1: A chance of winning only £1 on this one, 
2: on number X ... MIN(X) -+ FAV(X) 
3: 35%, that', s ... 
4: Hm ... that's a third ... 
6: a one in three chances. PMIN(X) -+ FAV(X) 
7': And 65% win only gives you 103 anyway 
*., 
MAX(X) -+ FAV(X) 
8: So I think definitely be Y here. 
5: over a third ... 
Excerpt 20: 4x2; S16; C26 
1: Only a small chance of winning £916 
in Y ... PMAX(Y) -º FAV(Y) 
2: Least you can win in Z is 442 ... 
3: Least you can: win in X is 487 ... 
4: You could win 4% ... 
5: I'm going to choose Y, - 
6: Because you can't win less than 464 ... MIN(Y) f FAV(Y) 
7: and there is a chance of winning 916. MAX(Y) -+ FAV(Y) 
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Excerpt 21: 4x2; S25; C38 
1: High payout on W ... 
2: Don't stand to lose much either. 
3: Not really losing anything I suppose ... 
4: You stand to gain a significant 
amount whatever ... 
5: X you don't stand to gain as much ... 
6: With either... 
7: so that's out ... 
8: Y you have a 17% chance, 
9: of getting about £30 more than W ... 
10: but very high odds of getting pretty 
well nothing ... 
11: So you can give that one up ... 
12: Z ... 
13: Z is slightly tempting. 
14: But you only stand to gain £150 more, 
15: on less odds, 
16: and you stand to lose more ... 
17: Well 250 ... 
18: So again W looks better, 
19: from the point of vidw of odds, 
20: and money 
Excerpt 20: 2x4; S22; B22 
1: Again, looking at the top figures ... 
2: 18% in the case of Y ... 
3: 13% for a much smaller one with X ... 
4: But a 25% chance of not winning very 
much at all with Y, 
5: as opposed to a 39% of winning a much 
larger amount with X ... 
6: But the first, second and third wins 
of Y are much larger ... 
7: or"almost equal to, 
8: the largest of the lot for. X, 
9: and that's only a 13% chance 
10: So again Y. 
MAX(W) -r FAV(W) 
MIN(W) -º FAV(W) 
DOM(X, W) FAV(X) 
A 
PMIN(Y) -º FAV(Y) 
MAX(Z, W) -+ FAV(Z) 
PMAX(Z, W) -º AV(Z) 
MIN(Z, W) i FAV(Z) 
MAX(X, Y) i FAV(X) 
MIN(X, Y) - FAV(X) 
MAX 123(Y)1(X) -+ 
FAV(Y) 
PMAX(X) -º FAV(X) 
The four examples above provide further illustrations of some 
of the processes that have previously been highlighted (e. g. elimination, 
collapsing, and the general multi-stage characteristics of choice 
processes), but also share the feature that final choice is by means 
of a MAX, MIN, PMAX combination of evaluations (either absolute, 
relative, or some synthesis of both). At an even higher level of 
analysis such a strategy can be incorporated in a generalised model= 
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of the choice process for any N alternative by M outcome (N x M) 
matrix. Recall that in the 4 alternative protocols pre-screening 
strategies are common, whereas for the 4 outcome types collapsing (and 
sometimes cancellation) is observed. We can incorporate these two 
editing functions in a two-stage model of the choice process, as 
illustrated in Figure 6.2. 
Figure 6.2 of course depicts a generalised model of the choice 
process, and would require adaptation to apply to the more specific 
cases when either M or N is equal to two. We would not wish to 
claim that the general structure of this model is anything but 
familiar (cf. Montgomery's, 1983, 'Dominance Search Model'). Our 
model assumes that dimensional structuring, simplifying outcomes, 
and identifying contenders and rejecting non-contenders, are primarily 
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Generalised Model of NxM Matrix Choice Process 
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operations associated with the Level I pre-processing of a matrix. 
Such operations may result in only one contender remaining, at which 
point the choice process may terminate. Otherwise, there may be 
too many contenders (or none at all), and the decision-maker may 
then return to Level I, perhaps utilising different rules, or adjusting 
rejection/acceptance criteria (cf. Montgomery, 1983). However, if 
a suitable restricted subset of contenders remains, the model predicts 
a shift to perhaps more complex, multi-dimensional strategies (e. g. 
MCD) for final choice. The boundaries and relationships within 
the model should be regarded as fuzzy rather than crisp. For 
example, elimination may be upon the basis of a 'collapsed MIN', or 
MCD operate with one or more collapsed basic dimensions. Furthermore, 
as a generalised schema, this model cannot necessarily be utilised 
to predict the specific choice strategy of any individual. As has 
been noted, the protocol data indicate (and the task allows) great 
variety in individual processing, contingent upon features of 
specific matrices, and individual differences. Nevertheless, 
although the model is formulated in the context of data from, at the 
most complex, 4 alternative 4 outcome matrices, there would appear 
to be no reason to suppose that it cannot be readily generalised to 
more complex risky choices. 
Earlier, arguments were presented to support the contention that, 
in the 2 alternative case, some form of MCD rule might be highly 
efficient. In parallel with our model of the choice process, this 
argument can be extended to the N alternative case as follows. 
High efficiency will be maintained if the strategy utilised for 
elimination/acceptance of contenders has a high probability of 
retaining the high Expected Value alternative within the contender 
subset (cf. Klein, 1983). Inspection of the data in Tables 5.1 and 
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5.2 (Chapter 5) indicate that use of merely MAX or MIN in this way would ' 
be sufficient; i. e. these two rules are highly likely to rank the 
alternative with highest Expected Value either first or second. 
Furthermore, as the number of outcomes increases, some additional 
advantage might clearly be obtained by collapsing dimensions such 
as MAX and MIN, in order to preserve information. In Appendix B. 7 
we discuss a simulation that we have carried out, similar to 
Thorngate's (1980) original study, investigating the efficiency, 
across complexity conditions ranging from 2x2 to 8x8, of 
global choice strategies based upon the model of Figure 6.2. The 
findings of this study are clear. The general strategies based 
upon the behavioural model are as efficient as the E and P heuristics, 
" across all complexity conditions, and despite being based primarily 
upon less efficient simple dimensional evaluations (MIN, MAX and 
PMAX). This simulation, which it should be stressed should 
not be taken to be an individual model, illustrates the theoretical 
performance of some of the more common global choice strategies 
adopted by individuals. 
V. Conclusions 
The basic findings of the protocol study suggest, as was 
originally anticipated, that individuals adopt a dimensional task 
representation of the matrices based upon the maximum-minimum 
payoffs, and their associated probabilities of occurrence. These 
dimensions are then used by individuals to establish basic' 
evaluations, which are combined in an overall global choice 
strategy. A theoretical analysis of the task suggests that 
the correlational properties of. sets of randomly generated matrices 
(and particularly the inherent dependence between 'semi-optimal' 
r 
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rules that is implied by this) may be one reason why a range of global 
strategies, based only upon simple risk-dimensional evaluations, can 
be highly efficient. This interpretation is consistent with the 
' findings of the current and first studies. A general behavioural 
model of the choice process has been proposed, and (Appendix B. 7) a 
simulation study carried out based upon. this. 
We defer the füll discussion of these findings in the context 
of the starting point for the research, the heuristics, biases, and 
bounded rationality model, to a later point in this dissertation. 
However, an initial observation, congruent with Thorngate's (1980) 
original discussion of his own findings, is that individuals' overall 
choice strategies do indeed appear to be well adapted to general 
risky-choice. And this is despite the fact that they are based upon 
simple dimensional evaluations which are merely 'semi-optimal', and 
editing operations such as collapsing 
16 
and elimination. Furthermore, 
there would appear to be no reason why this result should not hold 
for more complex forms of matrix (although we defer here the important 
related issue of the external validity of our findings). This 
conclusion is, on the surface, at some variance with the implications 
of a large body of the current literature within Behavioral Decision 
Theory, and yet is nevertheless ultimately entirely consistent with 
this research if we consider not only the relationships between the 
strategies adopted by individuals and normative criteria, but also 
between the strategies and the task environment within- which behaviour 
takes place. However, much of the discussion here has been post hoc, 
and the next Chapter explores some of the empirical implications of 
the model that we have proposed. 
As a final, general, comment, note that these conclusions are, 
very much the product of the multi-methodological approach adopted 
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for the first two studies. Either study interpreted in isolation 
might have led us to rather different conclusions. Our findings, 
and arguments, would thus support the call by other researchers 
(e. g. Einhorn, Kleinmuntz, and Kleinmuntz, 1979; Svenson, 1984) 
for more multi-method research in Behavioral Decision Theory. 
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NOTES 
1. Indeed the great value of process-tracing methods (particularly 
verbal protocol techniques) over input-output studies is that 
an individual's actual structuring processes can be more directly 
accessed, with any theoretical structuring assumptions 
introduced by the researcher- likely to be made explicit in the 
coding scheme used to analyse the data. 
2. Interestingly, Svenson (1979) classifies ELA (MIN) and CMA 
(MAX) as compensatory, presumably upon the basis that. ordering 
in terms of best and worst aspect is itself a compensatory 
operation. However, one might argue that these rules are 
basically non-compensatory, since in all but the simplest 
cases they neglect a large proportion of potential trade-off 
information. 
3. One aspect of this limited applicability arises from the fact 
that under certain task conditions* non-compensatory rules 
may not lead to a unique choice, or any choice at all; for 
example, the disjunctive rule (DIS) will not lead to a unique 
choice if several alternatives have aspects above the 
selected criterion values di (or conversely no choice at all 
if the criterion values are too strict). A second aspect of 
this limited applicability is that utilisation may depend upon 
features of the task; for example, if dimensions cannot be 
assigned importance weights Elimination By Aspects (EBA) cannot 
be applied. 
4. The lack of highly specified prior hypotheses when conducting 
process-tracing studies has, to date, been relatively common 
practice, although recently Svenson (1983) has demonstrated 
the feasibility of reliably testing specific predictions. 
5. Note here our use of silent, rather than verbalised (i. e. 'as 
a think-aloud warm-up) practice trials. This is an important 
procedural issue, and one for which those decision-making 
studies where verbalisation techniques have been used do not 
provide entirely unanimous guidance. Svenson, in his early 
review article (1979) does not discuss this issue at all, but 
more recently (1983) has recommended a relatively extensive 
(i. e. twenty to thirty minute) training phase prior to main 
think-aloud trials, with the researcher during this period 
prompting the S when he or she falls silent for any length of 
time. Other researchers report merely a few simple warm-up 
trials (Fidler, 1983; Huber, 1980; Ranyard, 1982). -- 
Conversely, Payne (1976) and Montgomery (1977) do not report 
using any verbalised practice trials at all, ' and Payne, 
Braunstein, and Carroll (1978) suggest that 'it does appear that 
subjects can provide very useful amounts of protocol data 
after being given only simple instructions to "think-aloud"'. 
(p. 21). Our own procedure was based upon this advice. 
Although not discussed in the literature, one reason why it 
might be problematic to employ warm-up trials using the same 
stimuli as in the main verbalisation session of a study is 
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because it raises the possibility of expectancy effects (e. g. 
Rosenthal, 1966). Uncontrolled interaction between the 
Experimenter and Subject, such as prompting, runs the 
risk of this. Interestingly, and more recently, Ericsson and 
Simon (1984) recommend the use of general warm-up trials, with 
tasks unrelated to the main tasks. In hindsight this would 
appear to be an adequate compromise with respect to this 
issue. 
6. The significance of the use of the pilot data here is, as 
Ericsson and Simon (1984) recommend, that the coding scheme 
should-not be developed using the primary data. This may 
introduce unacceptable degrees of freedom into the coding 
process. 
7. Alternatively one might utilise three judges for coding (e. g. 
Russo and Dosher, 1981), and employ a majority rule criterion 
for disagreements, together with a fourth judge to arbitrate 
total disagreement. 
8. Clearly an evaluative statement might consist of a single 
phrase, or the combination of several phrases. , 
9. Note here, as Payne (1980) and Montgomery (1983) have indicated, 
that the structure and rules adopted within that structure are 
in many respects indivisible. Unique choice might result 
merely from the process of structuring itself. 
10. We neglect here the fourth hypothesis that was proposed; that 
Ss might be utilising any other type of efficient strategy. 
11. We would also expect our correlational argument to hold not 
only for randomly generated matrices, but also systematically 
generated ones (as used in the early tests of expectation 
based models of risky choice; see Chapter 2, this volume). 
12. A monotonic increasing relationship is defined to be one where 
f(x) 4C f(y) for every point x and y such that x<y (Jones 
and Jordan, 1970, p. 122). The term marginal is utilised 
hereto indicate that this relationship holds given that all 
other factors are held constant. 
13. Excluding here the trivial case where all inter-correlations 
are uniquely zero. 
14. The analogy between the current analysis and-Brunswik's , 
theoretical constructs can be taken furtherby imposing 
equivalent concepts upon the environment-organism leg of, 
his 'Lens Model', as shown in Figure 6.3 below: 
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Figure 6.3 
Parallel concepts: Brunswik's vicarious 

















Brunswik Model Matrix Correlational Model 
Distal environmental stimulus 
Proximal cue 
Ecological cue validity 




(multiple cue use) 
'Optimality' criterion (EV) 
Information subset operated 
upon by heuristic H. 3 
Heuristic H3 . choice efficiency 
Heuristic choice inter- 
correlation 
Global decision strategy 
Functional achievement Global strategy efficiency 
15. Here we utilise the term favoured in the generalised sense; 
that is, as either a relative or absolute evaluation. A pure 
form of Majority of Confirming Dimensions strategy would require 
that the dimensional evaluations be all relative. 
16. It is interesting to note here that in his-earlier discussion 
of the 'sagacious allocation' principle (Thorngate, 1979; also 
Toda, 1980; cf. our discussion of this in Chapter 4), one 
particular inferential procedure highlighted as being efficient, 
and well suited to an individual's cognitive capacity, is 
'chunking' (also, Miller, 1956). This of course is the,, 
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generalised form of the collapsing operation that is revealed 
in the current protocol data. Thorngate also notes the role 
of redundancy of information in social ecologies as follows: 
... heuristics are seen as grossly wasteful of 
information, and as breeding grounds of biases. 
Indeed as I read of their [e. g. Tversky and Kahneman, 
1974] discoveries and arguments I begin to wonder how 
a satisfactory social interaction can ever occur. 
Yet satisfactory interactions do occur quite often, 
and I think that it is judicious to. question the social. 
implications of their work. Many , 
'judgement and decision- 
making heuristics (e. g. the Elimination by Aspects 
heuristic discussed by Tversky, 1972) are indeed 
wasteful of information, but in social interactions 
information is usually so abundant and redundant that 
many of the most wasteful heuristics can do quite well 
in governing social performance' (Thorngate, 1979, 
p. 297). 
This suggestion-of Thorngate, although derived in the context 
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CHAPTER 7 
STUDY 3 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE 'VICARIOUSNESS' MODEL - 
AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 
Introduction and Summary 
The previous two empirical Chapters (Chapters 5 and 6) represent 
an integrated, multi-methodological approach to the issue of the 
functional aspects of heuristic use in the context of the classical 
risky choice paradigm. The first study demonstrates that, across 
sets of randomly generated matrices of varying complexity, individuals 
are at least as efficient as the best heuristics identified by 
Thorngate (1980). In the second study an attempt has been made 
to account for this result by utilising process-tracing techniques. 
Several findings have emerged from this second study. At a basic 
level of analysis individuals appear to structure the matrix task 
in terms of the payoffs, and their associated probabilities of 
occurrence, as basic 'risk-dimensiöns'. An important related finding 
is that the protocol data does not support expectation maximisation 
as a substantive descriptive model of the individual choice process. 
Nor, despite a certain level'of utilisation by Ss, can the E or P 
heuristics be regarded as general models of the choice process. 
Rather it appears that individuals'. global choice'strategies, can 
be described as combinations of the simple 'semi-optimal' risk- 
dimension evaluations, 'together with editing functions (conditional 
upon task complexity) such as. collapsing and elimination, utilised 
in such a way that bootstraps overall performance. A. theoretical 
explanation of the bootstrapping phenomenon has been proposed in 
terms of the correlational structure of the task. Specifically, 
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'ecology' of randomly (or for that matter systematically) generated 
gambles allow a range of global strategies based upon a combination 
of simple 'semi-optimal' evaluations to be highly efficient. The 
Majority of Confirming Dimensions (MCD) heuristic (cf. Russo and 
Dosher, 1981) has been identified as one such global strategy. 
A general two-stage behavioural model of the choice process, 
incorporating a number of the salient features of the protocol 
data, has-been proposed, and a simple computer simulation, similar 
to Thorngate's (1980) original study, has been cariied out upon 
the basis of this model. This simulation (see Appendix B. 7) 
indicates that the generalised behavioural strategy abstracted from 
the protocol data attains levels of performance equivalent to the 
highly efficient E and P rules. Since the behavioural model is of 
a very generalised nature, the simulation findings cannot necessarily 
be held to account for the performance of any individual S in Study 1. 
Nevertheless, these results are illuminating. 
The initial conclusion to be drawn from the first two studies 
is that, at least in the context of the randomly, generated choice 
matrices studied here, there would indeed appear to be a functional 
dimension to heuristic use. However, our theoretical explanation 
of thisfinding does to some extent rest upon post hoc arguments. 
Hence the study to be reported in the present Chapter seeks to 
corroborate our initial interpretation by testing a number of 
implications of the obtained model. 
Following the format adopted in the previous empirical Chapters, 
the current'Chapter is organised'in five principal sections: 
introduction, methods and materials, results, discussion,. and 
conclusions. 
,- 
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I. Study 3- Introduction 
-The model of the choice process developed in the discussion 
section of the preceding Chapter is grounded in the observation 
that there exists in the protocol data variability in global choice 
strategy, both between and within Ss. At a lower level of analysis, 
the global process is composed of a limited number of basic evaluative 
statements. These are primarily associated with the basic payoff 
and probability risk-dimensions, together, where appropriate, with 
editing operations such as collapsing and elimination. While, as 
we have noted, much of this analysis is post hoc, particularly with 
respect to the relationships between the strategies observed in 
the protocols and the efficiency findings of Study 1, some 
implications of the model discussed at the end of the previous 
Chapter can be subject to empirical test. 
One important implication of our model arises from the juxtaposition 
of global strategy variability (which we have paralleled with 
Brunswik's vicariousness concept) with the overall stable and high 
efficiency scores observed in the first study. This suggests that 
individuals might generally be able to avoid the 'sub-optimal' 
choices of any singular basic evaluative rule (e. g. E or MIN, etc. ). 
That is, individuals should remain efficient under task conditions 
specifically constructed to elicit low Expected Value choices from 
any-of the specific basic rules that are commonly used!. Such an 
effect might be achieved by an individual utilising (a) some form of 
global MCD meta-strategy and/or (b) strategy-switching, perhaps upon 
the basis of salient task characteristics (Klein, 1983;.. Payne, 
1982)2. The former suggestion is of course a corollary to the 
correlational argument, discussed in the previous Chapter, indicating 
why the MCD heuristic might be highly, efficient. The latter 
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suggestion, of strategy-switching, is implicit in our model, 
without being discussed in detail. 
Some evidence to support our contention exists. Klein (1983) 
has recently suggested that decision strategies may be selected 
by individuals upon the basis of whether, in the given context of 
choice, they are perceived to enhance the utility of the final 
outcome (e. g. a MIN strategy will be most likely to be utilised when 
there is a relatively large difference between the contender 
alternatives along the minimums dimension). She reports some 
success in predicting, upon the basis of a classification of the 
utility enhancing characteristics of a multiattribute task, the 
I, specific dimensions utilised by individuals, although is unable to 
predict the precise form of their choice strategies (e. g. CON 
versus DIS). 
Montgomery and Adelbratt (1982) report evidence of strategy- 
switching in complex gambles in a manner that preserves high Expected 
Value choice. Significantly, and congruent with our own analysis 
of the risky choice paradigm, they note that in one study (1982, 
Expt. 2) their Ss may be choosing high Expected Value alternatives 
simply because the, random procedure used to generate their stimuli 
gambles introduces a positive correlation between the risk-dimensions 
and Expected Value. As such the Ss'appeared to utilise Expected 
Value information (which was explicitly displayed to them) only to 
confirm the choices that they had already made upon the basis of 
simple dimensional, rules such as Maximax.. In a subsequent study 
(1982, Expt. 3) Montgomery and Adelbratt design a specific set of 
gambles with a negative, correlation between Expected Value and the 
maximum payoff dimension... Significantly, they note that,. in 
comparison to their original study, the Ss 'more seldom referred to 
- 236 - 
I 
winnings and more often to probabilities as main determinants of 
their choices but other reasons were about equally frequent in 
both experiments' (1982, p. 51). This suggests that some form of 
strategy-switching, induced by the change in salient task 
characteristics introduced by their manipulation, may have occurred. 
The basic rules that are of interest in the current study are 
the Equiprobable and Probable heuristics. Recall that these are 
the two most efficient basic heuristics (Thorngate, 1980), and 
that some evidence of their use by individuals was found in our 
second study. Interestingly, while both rules are equally 
efficient, they are based upon. rather dissimilar types of evaluations. 
The E rule depends solely upon payoff values, while the P rule 
depends primarily upon the probability relationship within an 
alternative. Note that one implicationof this is that the E rule 
is likely to be most 'optimal', and the P rule least 'optimal', 
when the probability values within alternatives are relatively 
homogeneous (i. e. close to N for an N outcome matrix). This is. 
because under such circumstances the variance associated with the 
Expected Values of the alternatives will depend primarily upon the 
payoffs alone. Conversely, the E rule will be least 'optimal', 
and the P rule most, when probabilities are inhomogeneous, «and'hence the 
variance in Expected Value depends primarily upon the probabilities3. 
If indeed, as our behavioural model, and the studies of. Klein (1983) 
and Montgomery and Adelbratt (1982) suggest, individuals vicariously 
employ heuristic evaluations based upon the 'semi-optimal' properties 
of both probabilities and payoffs, then it follows that-their choices 
are likely to remain relatively efficient across sets of'matrices 
constructed to elicit low, Expected Value choices from either the 
-payoff-based E or probability-based P rule. This is the hypothesis 
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we propose to test in the current study. 
To summarise briefly: the general behavioural model of risky 
choice proposed in the previous Chapter suggests that individuals 
may generally be able to avoid the 'sub-optimal' choices of any 
singular basic evaluative rule, such as E or MIN. More specifically, 
it is proposed here to investigate individual choice efficiency 
across sets of matrices designed to elicit 'sub-optimal' responses 
from the complementary E and P strategies. The behavioural model 
of the choice process predicts that individual choice will remain 
efficient under such task conditions. 
II. Materials and Method 
This section is divided into the following sub-sections: 
(i) Matrix Generation 
(ii) Basic Design, Materials, and Subjects 
(iii) Procedure. 
(i) Matrix Generation 
The matrices used as stimuli in the study were generated by 
means of computer programs written by the author in BASIC, and 
implemented upon the Multics mainframe at the'University of Bristol. 
The generation programs were based upon the ANALYZER program used 
in. Study 1 (see Appendix A. 7)4. Accepting that the major experimental 
manipulation must be restricted to the 2 alternative matrices (i. e. 
2 alternative 2 outcome or 2 alternative-4 outcome types), two 
types-of matrix were generated: firstly, where the E rule clearly 
chooses the low Expected Value alternative, and the P rule the 
-high; (E/P type); ' secondly, where the P rule chooses the low Expected 
Value` alternative, and the E rule the high (P/E type). Thus for 
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each of the 2 alternative complexity conditions (2 x2 and 2x 4), 
the basic generation program variants operated as follows. Firstly, 
a2 alternative (by 2 or 4 outcome) matrix was generated, and stored, 
using Thorngate's (1980) procedure. Secondly, the generated matrix 
was tested against a number of constraints, to check whether it 
was of the desired type (either E/P or -F/E). Thirdly, if the matrix 
satisfied the constraints it was stored for subsequent print-out, 
while if it did not a new set of payoff and probability values were 
generated and tested,. this procedure being iterated until a matrix 
of the desired type had been found. Finally, the program iterated 
the overall procedure until a pre-determined number of different 
matrices satisfying the constraints had been obtained. 
Two basic sets of constraints (implemented within different 
program variants) were employed. In order to generate i/P type 
matrices the following three constraints were used. Firstly, the 
difference in Expected Value between the two alternatives had to 
be above a criterion value, which was set at 25 units (as in 
Studies 1 and 2, the basic payoff values ranged from 1 to 999, and 
hence the theoretical Expected Value range was also from 1 to 999 
units). Secondly, the E rule should select the low. Expected Value 
alternative, with a difference in average payoff of at least 25 
units. Thirdly, the P rule should select the high Expected Value 
alternative, with a difference in the most probable payoffs (as 
defined by this rule) of at least 25 units. The criterion-values 
were set in order to avoid the generation of pairs of alternatives 
that satisfied the constraints, but were nevertheless highly: similar. 
An example of a2 alternative'2 outcome E/P type matrix generated 
by the program is given in'Figure 7.1. , Here alternative, X has an 
Expected-Value of 529, ' compared to the 481; of Y. - . The E rule selects 
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alternative Y, while the P rule selects X. 
Figure 7.1 
Example E/P Type Matrix (2 x 2) 
X. . 68 win 501; . 32 win 587 
Y. . 94 win 460.; . 06 win 807 
In order to generate P/E type matrices, a similar set of constraints 
was used. As before, the Expected Value difference had to be at 
least 25, the P rule had to choose the low Expected Value alternative 
with a difference of at least 25 units, and the E rule choose the 
high Expected Value alternative with a difference of at least 25 
units. An example of a2 alternative 2 outcome P/E type matrix 
generated by the program is given in Figure 7.2. Here alternative 
Y has an Expected Value of 495, compared to the 367 of X. The 
P rule selects alternative X, while the E rule selects Y. 
Figure 7.2 
Example P/E Type Matrix (2 x 2) 
X. . 46 win 448; . 54 win 298 
Y. . 55 win 103; . 45 win 975 
The reader is invited to compare, in the light of our discussion 
in the introduction, his or her intuitive choices for the matrices 
in Figures 7.1 and 7.2! 
The programs described above were used to generate four basic 
types of 2 alternative matrix: E/P 2 alternative'2 outcome (2, x, 2); 
PIE 2'alternätive 2 outcome (2 x 2); E/P 2 alternative 4 outcome 
(2 x-4); and P/E 2 alternative 4 outcome (2-x 4). 
The programs also contained an extra.. step. - Having generated a 
2 alternative matrix satisfying the constraints, a: 4 alternative 
derivative matrix was generated by adding (by. a similar process) 
two non-contender alternatives . to. the original pair, of-alternatives. 
k 
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Non-contender alternatives were constrained to have low Expected 
Value, average payoff, and most probable payoff in comparison to 
the basic pair of alternatives. The 4 alternative derivatives were 
generated in order to test a subsidiary experimental hypothesis 
arising from the behavioural model discussed in the previous Chapter. 
Specifically, it was expected that the addition of extra alternatives 
would induce a level of initial pre-screening by Ss, primarily based 
upon MAX or MIN dimensional processing. In the context of the 
current matrices, it was hypothesised that in the E/P conditions 
(i. e. where attention to payoffs alone would lead to a low Expected 
Value choice) use of such pre-screening in the 4 alternative conditions 
might lead to a number of the high Expected Value alternatives 
being rejected initially, decreasing overall efficiency. Conversely, 
in the P/E conditions (where attention to payoffs alone is likely 
to lead to a high Expected Value choice) the high Expected Value 
alternatives would be less likely to be rejected initially. Hence 
an interaction in the efficiency scores between presentation format 
(2 alternatives versus 4 alternatives) and matrix type (E/P versus 
'F/E) was expected. 
(ii) Basic Design, Materials, and Subjects 
The eight types of matrix generated by the program constitute 
the materials for a two (2 or 4 outcomes) by two (i/P or P/E type) 
by two (2 or 4 alternative presentation format) designs It was 
decided, primarily in order to control for the potential-contaminating 
influence of between-subject variability in strategy usage, to 
utilise a complete repeated-measures procedure. -- This. in. turn 
necessitated, because the total number-of matrices needed for an 
eight cell design isilarge, that'the study be carried out over two 
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sessions for each S. (It was considered inappropriate to require 
volunteers to spend more than 45 minutes on the task at any one 
time. ) 
A total of twenty-two matrices was generated for each of the 
eight cells of the design. Each of these eight groups of twenty- 
two was sub-divided in'half. Every S received half of the matrices 
within each cell (i. e. a total of eight groups of eleven) in his 
or her first session, and the remainder in the second session, 
subject to the following constraints. It was decided at the outset 
to manipulate the presentation format variable across the two sessions, 
in order to disguise the fact that identical basic pairs of alternatives 
were being used for the 2 and 4 alternative formats. That is, for 
each basic 2 alternative matrix presented in the first session, 
the corresponding 4 alternative variant (i. e. the same basic pair, 
plus the two non-contenders) was presented in the second session, 
and vice versa. Such a procedure confounds the session with the 
format variable, and, although this is partially balanced by. dividing 
the matrices within each cell between sessions, it was decided to 
introduce further counterbalancing by reversing the order of the 
sessions for half of the subjects. That is, if. the sets of 
matrices , obtained from dividing the stimuli between the two sessions 
are labelled A and B respectively, then approximately half of the 
Ss received the A-type matrices in their first session, with the B 
type in their second, while the other half received the B type first 
and then the A. The rather complex design produced by this 
counterbalancing is depicted in Figure 7.3. 
As Figure 7.3 illustrates, the matrixes within each set (A or B) 
can be collapsed into four basic blocks, -corresponding to-levels of 
, complexity . 
(e. g.. A(i)-A(iv)].. To each of these blocks-were added - 
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Figure 7.3 
Schematic Representation of Matrix Counterbalancing 
A TYp 
Matrices" 
(Total = 112) 
A(i): 2x2 
Nos. 1-11 i/P (2 x 2) 
Nos. 1-11 P/E (2 x 2) 
Nos. 1- 6 Random (2 x 2) 
A(il): Zx4 
Nos. 1-11 E/P (2x 4) 
Nos. 1-11 PIE (2 x 4) 
INos. 1- 6 Random (2 x4 
A(iii): 4x2 
Nos. 12-22 E/P (4 x 2) 
Nos. 12-22 P/E (4 x 2) 
Nos. 1- 6 Random (4 x 2) 
A(iv): 4x4 
Nos. 12-22 E/P (4 x 4) 
Nos. 12-22 P/E (4 x 4) 
Nos. 1- 6 Random (4 x 4) 
B Type 
Matrices 
(Total = 112) 
B(i): 4x2 
Nos. 1-11 E/P (4 x 2) 
Nos. 1-11 PIE (4 x 2) 
Nos. 7-12 Random (4 x 2) 
B(ii): 4x4 
Nos. 1-11 E/P (4 x 4) 
--º Nos. * 1-11 PIE (4 x 4) 
Nos. 7-12 Random (4 x 4) 
B (iii): 2x2 
Nos. 12-22 E/P (2 x 2) 
"-- Nos. 12-22 P/E (2 x 2) 
Nos. 7-12 Random (2 x 2) 
B(iv): 2x4 
Nos. 12-22 E/P (2 x 4) 
ý-- Nos. 12-22 PIE (2 x 4) 
Nos. 1- 6 Random (2 x 4) 
Note: Matrix numbers shown here correspond across presentation 
format manipulation. That is, a basic pair of alternatives 
and its corresponding 4 alternative variant is identified 
y the same number. Thus block B(i) contains the eleven 
E/P 4 alternative (by 2 outcome) matrices derived from the 
eleven basic 2 alternative (by 2 outcome) matrices shown 
in block A(i), etc. . 
six filler matrices, which had been produced by-unconstrained, random 
generation. This block A(i) contained all'of the 2'x. 2 matrices 
within the A set; i. e. the-eleven selectedE/P 2x2, the eleven 
P/E, 2 x 2, and, six 2x2 filler matrices: =The corresponding 4x2 
matrices to those in block A(i) (i. e. the basic pairs plus the'two 
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non-contenders) are all contained in block B(i), etc. 
The four blocks of twenty-eight matrices within each A or B 
set were made up into separate booklets, containing one matrix per 
page, and with the page order randomised for each individual booklet. 
Each booklet also had, as a frontispiece, a set of three practice 
matrices of the appropriate complexity type. Finally, the order 
of presentation of the four booklets within each A or B set was 
randomly determined for individual Ss. 
A total of twenty-seven Ss were recruited for the study (14 
male, 13 female). All were first-year psychology undergraduates 
at the University of Bristol, participating as part of a course 
credits scheme. 
(iii) Procedure 
Ss participated in the two sessions in groups of up to six. 
Prior to arrival at the first session, each S was randomly assigned 
to receive either the A matrices first, or the B first. The 
general procedure for the first session (regardless of whether A or 
B was being presented) was similar to that used in Study 1, and 
ran as follows. On the desk in front of the S was an envelope 
containing an instructions sheet plus the four booklets (either A 
or B) containing the selected blocks of matrices.. After an initial 
preamble, which was identical to that for,. Study 1, Ss were instructed 
to remove the large instructions sheet from their envelopes. - For 
all Ss this was the frontispiece of the 4 alternative 4 outcome practice 
booklet devised for Study -1 (as illustrated in Appendix A. 5),. giving 
an example 4x4 matrix, -together with the lottery, interpretation 
of the matrices. Utilising the identical script as in Study 1 
(see Appendix A. 6), Ex explained the instructions, the-_näture of the 
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matrices as gambles, the lottery analogy, and the similarity of the 
choices to certain 'safe' investment decisions. 
The procedure then deviated from that used in Study 1, as 
Ex pointed out that there were four parts to the first session, 
corresponding to the four small booklets to be found in the envelope. 
It was pointed out that the instructions sheet, depicting a4x4 
matrix, was illustrative, and that in fact each of these booklets 
contained a set of gambles of a different type: i. e. 2x2,2 x 4, 
4x2, and 4 x. 4. The basic differences between the four types of 
gamble were briefly explained, utilising examples displayed on large 
cards. Ex also noted that each booklet consisted of 3 practice 
gambles on the first page, plus the main gambles on subsequent 
pages, with one per page. The four booklets were numbered from 
one to four (randomised for each individual S) and Ss were instructed 
to work thorogh the gambles as they occurred in the booklets, and 
the booklets in numerical order. 
One important difference between this and the first study was 
the inclusion here of a token payment to the Ss, conditional upon the 
Ss playing, at the end of the second session, the lotteries associated 
with their choices for two selected matrices (one from each session). 
It was hoped that this would help to sustain Ss' interest in the task 
over the large number of matrices presented5. Ss were therefore 
instructed, prior to commencing the booklets in the first session, 
that their chöices were'not inconsequential, and would influence a 
small payment at the end of the study. Ss were told that they would 
be allowed to play, with a small payoff of the order of U. K. pence, 
the lotteries associated with their chosen alternatives-on two 
selected gambles. 
If there were no questions Ss were then allowed to work through 
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the four booklets in their own time. When they had finished, and 
checked through the booklets, they were individually signed up by 
Ex for the second-session. The times between sessions ranged 
between two and seven days, depending upon individual availablslity. 
In the second session no familiarisation instructions were given. 
Ss were merely told that they would be required to work through a set 
of four booklets of gambles, in the same way as in the first session, 
and reminded that their choices would influence a payment at the end 
of the session. When Ss had finished their booklets (either A or B 
types,, as appropriate) they were allowed to play the payoff lotteries 
for their choices on two of the matrices (which had been selected in 
advance by Ex). Winnings ranged between 20p and £1.50p. Finally; 
Ss were debriefed as to the nature of the study. 
III. Results 
For each of the. eight conditions of the design individual 
efficiency percentages were calculated for every S: i. e. percentage 
choice (out of twenty-two in each case) of alternatives ranked; lst 
by Expected Value. The raw data upon which the efficiency percentages 
are based are given in Appendix C. 1. 
The individual efficiency percentages were averaged across Ss. 
These averages, split into the 2 and 4 outcome conditions, are 
depicted in Figures 7.4 and 7.5 respectively. 
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Figure 7.4 
Subject Average Efficiency Percentages 
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The trends in the two graphs appear remarkably similar. In 
the P/E conditions efficiency scores are high, and equivalent to 
those obtained across the randomly generated matrices in Study 1 
(for Study 1,97%, 86%, 80%, and 72% in the 2x2,2 x 4,4 x 2, and 
4x4 conditiöns. = respectively). Efficiency scores in the E/P 
conditions are consistently less than in the P/E, partly contrary 
to our original expectation, which was that individuals would remain 
efficient under both conditions. Nevertheless, all of the averages 
are above chance levels. 
6 
As would be expected, efficiency scores are lower with the 4 
alternative format than the 2 alternative, although there appears', 
to be little evidence of the predicted interaction between matrix 
type and format. In hindsight, this may well be due to the fact 
that in every case the non-contenders generated by the computer 
program were such bad options that both were easily initially rejected 
by Ss (by any sensible criterion)', rendering the 2 and 4 alternative 
formats virtually identical for the purposes of final choice between 
contenders. Hence this study may not have allowed a critical test 
of this hypothesis. 
In order to gain an indication of the strength of the effects 
a three-way (outcome x matrix type x presentation format) Analysis 
of Variance was performed upon the basic efficiency percentages. 
As in the Study 1 analysis the raw percentage data were first arcsin 
transformed (cf. Lindman, 1974). The summary for the ANOVA7 is given 
in Table 7.1. 
The results of the ANOVA would appear to corroborate our 
discussion above, although once again, as in Study 1, -they should 
not necessarily be interpreted as being indicative of simple significance. 
The majority of accountable variance is due to the main-effect for matrix 
0 
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type (30%; p<0.001), while the main-effects for outcomes (1%; 
p<0.05) and format (2%; p<0.01) are significant, but weaker. 
One interaction term is significant, that of outcomes by type (4%; 
p<0.001). This appears to reflect the consistently greater 
absolute difference between the E/P and P/E scores in the 2 outcome 
conditions as compared to the 4 outcome conditions. Precisely why 
this effect has occurred is unclear, although it may be the case 
that in the 4 outcome conditions the use by Ss of collapsing 
operations, as discussed in the previous Chapter, is influential 
in the equalising of efficiency across the two types (E/P and P/E) 
of matrix. 
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Table 7.1 
Summary Table for 2x2x2 (Outcomes by Matrix 
Type by Presentation Format) ANOVA on 
Transformed Efficiency Percentages 
Degrees Sum 
of of -Mean, 
r"reeaom squares Square t variance 
Due to (df) (ss) (ms=ss/df) F Sig. Explained 
Subjects 
(Blocks) 26 7.07 - - - 
Outcomes 1 0.404 0.404 4.9 p<0.05 1% 
(2 or 4) 
Format 1 0.852 0.852 10.3 p<0.01 2% 
(2 or 4 
Alts. ) 
Type 1 10.832 10.832 131.0 p<0.001 30% 
(EIP or 
FIE) 
Outcomes 1 1.447 1.447 17.5 p<0.001 4% 
x Type 
Outcomes 1 0.001 0.001 0.0 N/S - 
x Format 
Type 1 0.003 0.003 0.0 N/S 
x Format 
Outcomes 1 0.006 0.006 0.0 N/S - 
x Type 
x Format 
Error 182 15.049 0.083 - - 
Total 189 28.59 - - - 
Grand 215 35.66 - - - 
Total 
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IV. Discussion 
Unlike the previous two studies, the discussion here will 
be brief. In particular we shall defer, until'. the next Chapter, 
discussion of the findings in the context of the initial focus 
for the research, the heuristics, biases, and bounded rationality 
model. 
The obtained data would appear to corroborate only partially 
our original principal hypothesis, that individual choices would 
remain efficient under task conditions designed to elicit 'sub- 
optimal' choices from the payoff-oriented E rule, or the probability- 
oriented P rule. Of course, the interpretation of these data will 
depend upon our definition of 'efficient, as utilised in the original 
hypothesis. If we interpret this as being generally above chance 
levels then. onr'originäl hypothesis, despite the significant 
differences between the E/P and PIE conditions, is indeed borne out. 
Conversely, if we interpret efficient to mean equivalent to the 
behavioural scores obtained across random matrices (i. e. Study 1), 
then the relatively low scores in the E/P condition take on an added 
significance. Our own view favours the former interpretation, 
particularly since it is clear that in the E/P conditions the scores 
are not in any sense inefficient (i. e. not consistently below chance 
levels). Hence we can conclude here that the data tend to support 
the predictions of the 'vicariousness' model; that is, that the 
global strategies adopted by individuals tend to preserve the overall 
utility of choice (cf. Klein, 1983) in the two contexts investigated. 
One subsidiary implication that can be derived from the present 
data is that, as'suggested in the previous Chapter, the E or P rules 
can be clearly rejected as models of the overall choice process (a , 
hypothesis that was initially derived in the context of the Study 1 
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findings). This follows-because, although the current study was 
not specifically designed to test this hypothesis, systematic use of 
one of these rules by Ss would have resulted in inefficient choices 
under one condition (E/P or P/E, as appropriate) and efficient under 
the other. Hence, although the protocol study did find a low, 
but nevertheless significant, use of these two strategies by 
individual Ss, our rejection of them as general models is supported 
by the present data. 
Notwithstanding the overall interpretation offered above, how 
might the significantly lower scores in the E/P conditions be 
explained? In hindsight, this may be a reflection of the proportionally 
greater utilisation by individuals of payoff-based (E, MAX and 
particularly MIN) as opposed to probability-based (P, PMIN and PMAX) 
evaluations (e. g. see Table 6.5). This suggests that individuals 
may be less willing (all other things being equal) to choose contrary 
to the payoff-based aspects of a matrix, when the probability 
relationships are only marginally at variance with the payoff 
structure. For example, we might expect individuals to find an 
alternative with high maximum, but a low minimum payoff acceptable 
only when there is a relatively large probability of attaining the 
maximum. When the probability of attaining the maximum is favourable 
to the alternative but only moderately so, choice might be based 
merely upon the minimum criterion. In effect, we are suggesting 
that it is only when the probability relationship within a matrix 
is made relatively more salient than the payoffs (e. g. Figure 7.1) 
that the proposed 'utility enhancing' shifts in choice strategy 
will occur. Hence, for a small number of specific E/P pairs (depending 
upon the precise matrix values) individuals may have selected the low 
Expected Value alternatives, as a result of continuing to depend upon 
payoff-based evaluations. Conversely, for all of the P/E pairs, used 
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here individuals may have been more likely consistently to avoid, 
upon the basis of payoff-based evaluations, the low Expected Value 
alternatives. This would explain the pattern of the present data, 
while being consistent with our general model. 
Although the preceding discussion is of course post hoc, it 
raises the following interesting question. In search of a clearer 
understanding of risky choice, how might we gauge the relative 
salience, or subjective relevance, of any particular feature of a 
risky option, and how can this be related to both the ultimate 
choice strategy to be adopted and overall choice efficiency? 
Such a question raises a number of complex questions, which might 
potentially lead us to a greater understanding of risky choice, 
but which we have, for practical reasons, been unable to address 
in the current programme of empirical studies. We comment more 
fully upon this in the next, concluding, Chapter. 
V. Conclusion 
The results of the third study would appear to give a partial 
degree of support to the original principal hypothesis; that individual 
choice would remain efficient across sets of matrices designed to elicit 
'sub-optimal' choices from either the, E or P rules. This in turn 
(unless the Ss have utilised entirely unanticipated choice strategies 
here) lends support to the general behavioural model derived from 
the protocol study (Chapter 6)8. More generally, since the matrices 
utilised in the present study are, in effect, a selected subset of 
the universe of randomly generated gambles used in Study 1, the 
results once again point to the robustness of individual choice 
strategies under generally specified task conditions. As, in Study 1, 
these results are somewhat surprising, particularly given the fact 
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that once again no attempt has been made directly to incorporate 
subjective factors, such as utilities for the payoffs, etc. In 
the next Chapter we reflect upon the combined findings of all three 
empirical studies, and discuss their implications with respect to 
initial focus of the empirical programme; the heuristics, biases, 
and bounded rationality model. 
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NOTES 
1. This is not to deny that we might be able to construct highly 
specific sets of matrices -under which systematic departure 
from Expected Value maximisation will be induced (e. g. Russo 
and Dosher, 1981; Tversky, 1969). Rather, our intereest 
here is, as it has been throughout this dissertation, in 
overall performance, under the most general task constraints 
possible:, 
2. In one respect use of an MCD meta-: strategy, particularly if 
utilised in the context of a variety of basic forms of dimensional 
evaluation, is analogous to strategy-switching. For example, 
an alternative with bad maximum and minimums might be rejected 
without recourse to consideration of the probability values, 
unlike one with a good maximum and bad minimum, where the 
probability values may be used in tie-break fashion. Both 
processes could be described in terms of a simplified MCD 
criterion, or as evidence of strategy-switching. 
3. This assertion is illustrated in the following examples: 
a. X. . 40 win 750; . 
60 win 340 
Y. . 45 win 400; . 55 win 500:. 
b. X. , . 10 win 750; . 90 win 340 
Y. . 02 win 400; . 98 win 500 
c. X. . 94 win 750; . 06 win 340 
Y. . 45 win 400; . 55 win 500. 
In the case of matrix (a) all probabilities are close to 0.5, 
and hence the E rule is likely to select the high Expected 
Value alternative (X, which it does select) and the P rule 
either alternative, depending upon the precise probability 
relationships. In the limit (when all probabilities are 
equal to 0.5) the E rule is equivalent to the Expected Value 
criterion, while the. P rule does not result in any choice at 
all! In example (b) the payoffs are the same as in example. 
(a), but the probability relationships are more inhomogeneous, 
and hence contribute greater weight to the variance associated 
with the Expected Values. Here, the E rule chooses the low 
Expected Value alternative (X) while the P. rule the high. 
Finally, example (c) illustrates an intermediate case, with 
both the E and P rules choosing the high Expected Value 
alternative W. 
4. The matrix generation program listings, which are not reported 
here in full, can be obtained from the author on request. 
5. Allowing participants to play, a number of their preferred 
options for actual stakes is a relatively common procedure 
where large numbers of gambles are used (e. g. see Aschenbrenner, 
1978; Montgomery, 1977; Ranyard, 1982; Tversky, 1967). 
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6. Applying the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to the distributions of 
choices for each of the basic 2 alternative matrices, as in 
Study 1, the following hold (at a level of p<0.05, two-tailed): 
for the 2x2 E/P type matrices nine distributions are 
significantly above chance, three are significantly below, and 
ten are intermediate (for which the null-hypothesis of 
random responding cannot be rejected); for the 2x 2F/E, 
twenty are above chance, none below, and two intermediate; 
for the 2x4 E/P type, ten are above chance, two below, and 
ten intermediate; and for the 2x4 P/E, fourteen are above 
chance, two below, and six intermediate. Although not 
unequivocal, these results would appear to indicate, particularly 
given the strictness of this criterion, that responses tend 
to be above, rather than below, chance levels. 
7. The 3-way ANOVA reported in Table 7.1 does not take full 
account of the fact that the design was repeated-measures. 
With such a design it is advisable to check the obtained F-ratios 
with those derived by breaking the residual error term into 
the components due to Subjects x Treatments. This was in 
fact performed, and it had no significant influence upon the 
overall analysis. Hence, for simplicity, the results of the 
basic 3-way analysis only are reported here. 
8. Although the question of precisely how far empirical evidence 
can be taken to be 'supportive' of any particular theoretical 
model is of course a highly complex and problematic philosophical 
issue (e. g. see Popper, 1935,1959). 
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CHAPTER 8 
GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Introduction 
The previous Chapter (Chapter 7) documents an empirical test 
of one important implication of the general behavioural model proposed 
in Chapter 6. Specifically, it was argued that individual choice 
would remain highly efficient across sets of matrices designed to 
elicit 'sub-optimal' (i. e. low Expected Value) 'choices from the 
highly efficient E and P rules. The findings of the study partially 
supported this hypothesis, and we have concluded that this, on balance, 
would tend to support the proposed behavioural model. 
We have refrained, in previous Chapters, from extensive discussion 
of methodological and theoretical qualifications that-might need to 
be placed upon the findings of the empirical studies, their 
implications for future research, or their wider interpretation 
in the context of the initial focus of the research: the heuristics, 
biases, and bounded rationality model. Discussion of these issues 
is the primary purpose of the current, concluding'Chapter to this 
dissertation. 
This Chapter is organised in two principal sections. Firstly, 
the collective findings of the research programme are reviewed. In 
the second section implications of the basic findings, and the 
theoretical position adopted here, Ware discussed: (a) in relation , 
to other general models of risky decision behaviour, and (b) in the 
context of the heuristics, biases, 'and bounded rationality model. 
I. Overview and Principal Findings 
This dissertation commenced, in Chapters 1 and 2, with an 
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historical review of the theoretical antecedents to, and early 
empirical research within, the field of Behavioral Decision 
Theory. 
In Chapter 1 the normative foundations, grounded in the 
disciplines of economics and statistics, of probability and (modern) 
utility theory were outlined. Despite appearances to the contrary, 
these theories were seen to be purely prescriptive frameworks, rather 
than explicitly psychological and descriptive. It was argued, in 
conclusion to this first Chapter, that this may be one important 
reason why the psychological study of judgement and decision today 
has an expressly normative aspect (cf. Einhorn and Hogarth, 1981). 
Specifically, the psychologist, by adopting the mathematical frameworks 
of modern decision science for the investigation of decision behaviour, 
cannot entirely separate his or her descriptive task from the 
prescription of the statistician. 
Chapter 2 reviewed the dominant research tradition associated 
with the initial development of Behavioral Decision Theory as a 
psychological discipline. This tradition sought to investigate 
the description of decision-making under risk within the theoretical 
frameworks inherited from normative probability and, utility theories, 
as outlined in Chapter 1. This developed. from the recognition by 
a number of psychologists (e. g. Edwards, 1954a) that the normative 
principles of decision science provided, as a first approximation, 
an appealing conceptual framework within which to explore empirically 
the processes of actual decision behaviour. And, initially at least, 
the focus upon methodological problems obscured the normative ,.; 
' implications, outlined -in 
Chapter. 1, of the adoption of, the models 
of decision science. - 
The empirical evidence accumulated during this early phase of 
1 
I 
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psychological research indicated that, despite methodological 
difficulties, models derived from the normative principle of 
mathematical expectation (e. g. EU, SEU) did indeed receive support, 
as descriptive principles, in the context of very general sets of 
risky options. ' However, a smaller group of findings, typically 
derived from studies involving highly specific sets of decision 
options (e. g. duplex gambles; 'paradoxes') indicated that the 
psychological processes underlying decision-making under risk might 
entail the use of strategies incompatible with the-normative theories. 
That is, the normative models were seen to be inadequate in a 
descriptive substantive sense. These latter studies also pointed 
to the possibility of building more 'psychological' models-within 
the emergent information-processing approach to cognition. 
The intellectual response to the apparent psychological 
sterility of the normative based models is documented in Chapter 3, 
where the development of the heuristics, biases, and bounded rationality 
model (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) . 
is outlined. This takes the 
review away from the immediate empirical concern of Chapter 2, 
that of decision-making under risk. The conceptual roots of this 
new research tradition are traced to the seminal work, in. the: mid-1950s, 
of Herbert Simon on bounded rationality, and Jerome Bruner and 
colleagues on the relationship between decision strategies and 
cognitive strain. The empirical precursors of the model can be seen in 
the clinical versus statistical prediction debate of the 1950s and 1960s, 
and work in the late 1960s on the Bayesian, conservatistn effect. 
Underlying the heuristics, biases, and bounded rationality, 
model is the notion that the individual judge or decision-maker, 
equipped with only modest computational capacity,, and faced, with, 
the complexities. of many real-world decision tasks, ýwill employ'a 
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range of simplifying strategies (heuristics) in order to reduce, 
or limit, cognitive strain. The empirical focus to arise from 
this notion has typically taken the form of seeking to demonstrate 
'departures' from a range of normative principles ('severe and 
systematic errors'; labelled biases), and to attempt to explain 
these in terms of individuals' use of basic cognitive heuristics. 
It has been argued that as a purely methodological approach to the 
issue of judgement and decision behaviour, this research, which 
has undoubtedly rescued Behavioral Decision Theory from the mechanistic 
models of statistics and economics (cf. Fischhoff, 1983), is 
unobjectionable. In this respect we would concur with Kahneman's 
and Tversky's (1982a) 'visual illusion' analogy: that is, 'departures' 
from normative standards are studied in order to uncover underlying 
psychological processes, in. precisel' thb-same way. thät illusions are 
studied to facilitate understanding of visual perception. 
However, Chapter 3 was concluded with the suggestion that the 
notion of bias has latterly obtained a generalisdd meaning, both 
within and outside the discipline of Behavioral Decision Theory, 
which transcends its original restricted methodological usage. 
Specifically, a proliferation of diverse studies demonstrating an 
equally diverse number of biases has come to be cited as support 
for the suggestion that the intuitive judge and decision-maker is 
intellectually flawed, and, in effect, a. 'cognitive cripple' (Slovic, 
1972). As such, the legacy of the normative models originally 
inherited from decision science has been thoroughly born out. It 
is perhaps worth here repeating Edwards' words, when he suggests 
that: 
'the net effect [of the heuristics, and biases research],. 
has been a significant contribution to the widely held, 
view that whenever, possible human intellectual tasks 
should be done by computers instead' (Edwards, 1983, 'p. 509). 
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Chapter 4, which concludes the principal review section of this 
dissertation, outlines a number of current critiques of the heuristics, 
biases, and bounded rationality model. Three general themes are 
explored. The first is the'suggestion that the essential 
conditionality of all normative models renders the labelling of any 
M- 
response unequivocally as error to be philosophically problematic. 
Secondly, it is argued that many empirical studies constructed 
within the heuristics and biases paradigm may suffer from as yet 
unresolved methodological problems of internal and external validity. 
Thirdly, it is noted that the general implications of the heuristics 
and biases research can be questioned if inference and decision are 
viewed from a (weakly) functionalist perspective. For example, 
the. limited focus of the calculative rationality of most normative 
models can be contrasted with other forms of clearly intelligent, 
and functional, human intellectual processes (cf. March, 1978). 
As a consequence of these three general : critiques it has been 
suggested that the acceptance (outlined at the end of Chapter 3) 
of the findings of the heuristics and biases research as evidence 
for the general fallibility of the human inference and decision 
system (the 'cognitive cripple' hypothesis) would at best be 
premature. 
Developing a number of themes to-arise from the general 
critiques, and following Thorngate (1980), it'is further suggested 
in Chapter 4 that the distinctive empirical focus of the heuristics 
and biases research upon the promotion of 'errors' in tightly 
controlled laboratory tasks has merely resulted in findings whose 
external validity with respect to the functionality issue should 
be highly circumscribed. The visual illusion analogy described 
. 
by Kahneman and-Tversky (1982a) is instructive here, since the k 
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existence of systematic visual illusions under specifically constructed 
laboratory conditions is not generally taken (unlike 'errors' of 
judgement and decision) to be evidence for the fallibility of 
specific perceptual processes, or of the perceptual system in 
general. In the current context this argument is pursued by 
suggesting that the lack of direct empirical investigation of the 
functional aspects of heuristic use has resulted. in a basic deficiency 
in the literature. This is clearly directly relevant to the 
validity of the generalised bias interpretation. And the ironic, 
and somewhat contradictory, nature of such a situation is highlighted 
by the fact that the heuristics, biases, and bounded rationality 
model indeed makes the assumption that the heuristics commonly 
employed by individuals are generally. functional (and hence their 
use; Tversky and Kahneman [1974]) and yet the associated literature 
provides no empirical evidence to support this assertion. 
Chapter 4 was concluded with the suggestion that theoretical 
progress within the heuristics and biases research may be inadequate 
in part because the unique focus upon the irrationality issue'-has 
obscured the basic rationality of the cognitive processes in many 
contexts. 
The first empirical study is reported in Chapter 5. This 
arises directly from the critique, in Chapter 4, 'of the heuristics 
and biases research, and links, because of-the task context selected 
for investigation, to the basic risky choice research discussed in 
Chapter 2. Specifically, the. first study attempts to investigate , 
one aspect (individual choice efficiency) of the functional dimension 
to heuristic use in the context of the classical risky'chöice 
paradigm. The basic study design is a simple input-output 
'behavioural replication' of Thorngate's (1980) simulation study. 
Subjects are required to make choices across sets of randomly generated 
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gambles (choice matrices) of four different levels of complexity. 
At one level of analysis, that of the basic performance 
criterion of choice efficiency, the findings of the first study 
are relatively unequivocal. Firstly, the ANALYZER analysis of 
the stimulus matrices generated for this study clearly replicates 
Thorngate's (1980) original finding that crude simplifying choice 
heuristics, and in particular the Equiprobable (E) and Probable (P) 
rules, can be highly efficient across sets of randomly generated 
matrices. The second important finding is that the behavioural 
data indicate that, partly counter to expectations, the average 
subject performs, in all four complexity conditions studied, at 
levels of efficiency that are at least as good as the best of 
Thorngate's. (1980) heuristics, the E and P rules. 
In the theoretical discussion of the first study, it is noted 
that, if we make the assumption that random generation is equivalent 
to systematic (e. g. factorial) generation of stimulus gambles, then 
the findings are congruent with those of the early general tests 
of expectation based models of decision-making under risk (reviewed 
in Chapter 2). Specifically, it would appear that choice amongst 
general sets of risky options closely mimic the prescriptions of 
expectation based principles, and that this may be the case, as 
Payne and Braunstein (1971) note, because-under general constraints 
the expectation rule may correlate with the concrete risk-dimensions 
upon which individuals' strategies are based. A corollary to this, 
raised in the current context, is that the decision-maker who 
utilises an efficient heuristic will (by definition) often choose 
'optimal' alternatives, and avoid 'sub-optimal' ones, and therefore 
,a ear if input-output data alone is analysed, to be utilising the 
normative rule under such general constraints. 
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The interpretation of the findings of the first study is 
conditional upon the assumption that individuals do indeed utilise 
efficient heuristic strategies when making risky decisions. In 
this respect the findings, while tentatively suggesting that there 
may indeed'be a functional dimension to individual choice strategies, 
raise far more questions than they answer. Of particular interest 
are the related questions of the internal representation of the 
matrix task constructed by individuals, and the choice strategies 
subsequently employed within that representation. 
The second study, reported in Chapter 6, forms the empirical 
core of this dissertation. The need to investigate, in detail, 
individuals' subjective task representations of the matrices, and 
the strategies employed therein, leads to the use of verbal protocol 
methodology. It is argued, following Ericsson and Simon (1980, 
1984), that such techniques can be reliable sources of data with 
which to model cognitive processes, if appropriate experimental 
procedures are employed. 
The basic design of Study 2 requires individuals to 'think- 
aloud' while making choices across a number of matrices selected from 
those used in Study 1. A number of findings emerge from this study. 
Firstly, and congruent with our expectations, the instructions to 
verbalise do not appear to influence radically the choice process. 
This is an important observation, since the principal focus of'the 
second study is to explain, in process terms, the performance levels 
obtained in Study 1, and hence the comparability of the two sets of 
data across these studies is important. --The second finding, once 
again congruent with our expectations from the literature, is that', 
individuals do not utilise expectation based strategies,, but appear,. 
to adopt a subjective task representation of the matrices-upon the 
- 264 - 
I 
basis of the maximum-minimum dimensions, and their associated 
probabilities of occurrence. These dimensions are then utilised 
to establish basic, and 'semi-optimal', evaluations of the choice 
alternatives, which are combined, together with (conditional upon 
matrix complexity) simple editing operations such as collapsing and 
elimination, to form an overall global choice strategy. Perhaps 
more surprisingly, it would appear that there exists a degree of 
variability, both between and within subjects, in the precise form 
of the global strategies, and this is despite. a marked conformity 
in (generally high Expected Value) choice. Furthermore, the 
basic evaluative dimensional heuristics underlying the global 
strategies cannot, in isolation, account for the high behavioural 
efficiency scores observed in Study 1. 
Resolution of the apparent paradox created by global strategy 
variability in the protocol data, but consistent and efficient 
choice outcomes in both Study 1 and Study 2,. is discussed in terms of 
features of the task. Specifically, it is argued that the correlational 
structure of sets of randomly, or systematically, generated risky 
options may be related to the observation that a range of global 
strategies based upon simple dimensional evaluations, and appropriate 
editing functions, can lead to consistent and highly efficient 
outcomes. This analysis is paralleled to Brunswik's (1952,1956) 
'vicariousness' model of achievement, and it leads us to conclude 
that individuals'-: - overall strategies are indeed well adapted to 
general risky choice. - 
The discussion in Chapter 6 also extends our argument, at the 
most general level of analysis, to an N alternative xM outcome model 
of the choice process, abstracted from a number of: the'operations 
highlighted "in the protocols. In Appendix B. 7 a computer simulation 
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is reported, similar to Thorngate's (1980) original study, investigating 
the efficiency, across several levels of matrix complexity, of the 
global choice strategy implied by the NxM behavioural model. 
Here it is found that the abstracted strategy is highly efficient, 
attaining levels of performance as good as the E and P strategies 
(although it is stressed that this result, while illuminating, should 
not necessarily be taken as an explanation of the performance of any 
individual subject in Study 1). 
In the final, and shorter, empirical Chapter (Chapter 7) one 
important implication of the. 'vicariousness' model derived from the 
protocol data is investigated. Specifically, it was predicted 
that individual choice would remain efficient under task conditions 
designed to elicit 'sub-optimal' choices from the payoff-based E rule, 
or the probability-based P rule. It was argued that individual 
strategies based upon an overall Majority of Confirming Dimensions 
rule (cf. Russo and Dosher, 1981) or vicarious utilisation of both 
payoffs and probabilities (cf. Klein, 1983) would lead to such an 
effect. 
The findings of the third study partially confirm the prediction, 
and are interpreted as giving qualified support to the proposed 
behavioural model of the choice process. 
, 
II. Implications 
The research; both theoretical and empirical, that is reported 
in this dissertation has been broad in scope, and inevitably raises 
more questions than it solves. --In this section we comment upon' 
some of the implications (and, where appropriate, limitations) of 
the overall research programme:, This exercise divides itself 
neatly into-two sub-sections. Firstly, the implications of the 
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research with respect to the specific issue of general models of 
risky decision are discussed. This is followed by a discussion 
of the research in the context of the initial stimulus for the 
empirical studies: the heuristics, biases, and bounded rationality 
model. Clearly it would be entirely inappropriate to raise new, and 
major, ' empirical or theoretical issues at this late stage. However, 
the comments in the current, section are in part the product of the 
author's reflection, following completion of the empirical studies, 
and latterly during the mechanical process of producing a final 
dissertation, upon the. cumulative message to arise from the research. 
And inevitably such a process raises new, and stimulating, empirical 
and theoretical insights. 
In the context of general models of risky decision, our first 
point of departure is the methodological breadth of the studies: 
from input-output,, to process-tracing, and finally computer simulation. 
This has both positive and'negative consequences. On the debit side 
is the fact that we have perhaps not 'fine-tuned' the empirical 
methods as much as might havebeen desirable, or pursued in follow-up 
studies interesting implications of particular findings. On the 
credit side,. a multi-method programme probably lends greater overall 
conceptual unity than would be attainable with any singular approach 
(for example, the input-output techniques of Study 1 allow insight 
into performance, and the process-tracing of Study 2 into the basic 
cognitive processes underlying that performance). On: balance, and as 
we note at the end of Chapter, 6, "the present research programme, 
illustrates, albeit in a circumscribed way, the utility of a multi- 
method perspective&, in decision research. 
Our second observation concerns the stimulus matrices employed 
in. the studies. ! Given that a majority-of investigations of decision- 
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making under risk have traditionally employed highly simplified (e. g. 
two-outcome) gambles, the matrix task (and particularly the most 
complex 4x4 condition) is somewhat unique. The problem that, 
throughout this dissertation, has stemmed from the choice of such 
general and complex stimuli, is that the prediction of individual 
choice strategies and efficiencies is rendered problematic. 
Likewise, the results of the study can be framed only in very general 
terms. This, of course, is a result partially of the principal 
focus to the research, the performance issue. One benefit of the 
use Of such stimuli is that, assuming that the lack of a loss 
dimension is not critical, the conclusions that are drawn appear to 
be readily generalisable in the context Of NxM risky choice (e. g. 
the behavioural model of Chapter 6). This might, not, have been the case 
had more specialised stimuli been employed. 
Perhaps the single most interesting finding concerns our 
analysis of the random generation (and, it is assumed, also systematic 
generation) paradigm in the discussion of the protocol data. Clearly, 
and as we note earlier, the protocols must be regarded only as data 
with -which to model the processes present. However, we believe 
that this analysis advances our understanding of the risk-dimensions 
versus moment oriented debate beyond Payne's and Braunstein's (1971) 
simple correlational statement. And the vicariousness concept, 
introduced to describe individual processing, is indicative of a 
degree of sophistication in global choice strategy that has only 
recently been discussed in the literature (cf. -Klein, 1983; Montgomery 
and Adelbratt, 1982)., This in turn raises a number of important 
empirical issues, relevant to both risky choice and, more generally, 
multiattribute choice, which we have been unable to pursue directly 
here; e. g. with respect to the relationship between strategy use and 
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both the salient features of an individual's task representation, 
and the 'semi-optimal' properties of the task1. One obvious 
candidate for further research here would be a specific process- 
tracing study--. of strategy selection, building upon the behavioural 
model of Chapter 6. Although much of decision behaviour is today 
characterised as being contingent (Payne, 1982) upon task 
characteristics, our analysis does suggest the feasibility of moving, 
within this framework, towards truly predictive descriptive models 
of multiattribute choice. 
The starting point of our research was the heuristics, biases, 
and bounded rationality model, and we have refrained thus far from 
extensive comment upon the implications of the empirical findings 
in this context. In many respects both our theoretical critique 
in Chapter 4 and the empirical studies in Chapters 5,6 and 7 
represent an integrated whole. This is because the studies derive 
directly from the observation that the lack of direct empirical 
investigation of the functional aspects of heuristic use represents 
a basic deficiency within the Behävioral Decision Theory literature. 
This in turn has resulted in a somewhat unique empirical programme, 
with a multi-method approach, derived from the need to investigate 
both pefformance and process within the specified task environment 
of randomly generated risky options. 
By reflecting first upon our critique in Chapter 4, the important 
differences between the empirical programme conducted here and the 
research typically associated with the heuristics and biases literature 
can be conveniently illustrated. ' 
It is significant that, -congruent with the general position 
adopted here, Einhorn and Hogarth suggest that 'before one'-compares-', 
discrepancies'between optimal models and"human judgements, it is. . 
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important to compare each with the environment' (1981, p. 55, emphasis 
added). That is, the. nature of judgemental competence cannot be 
addressed in isolation of the relationships both between the observed 
behaviour and the environment, and between the standard adopted for 
optimal comparison and the environment. The difference between 
the traditional 'conversational paradigm' (Kahnemen and Tversky, 
1982a) experiment typical of the heuristics and biases research and 
the more comprehensive approach advocated by Einhorn and Hogarth 
is represented in diagrammatic form in Figures 8.1 and 8.2. 
Figure 8.1 









Figure 8.1 represents the typical focus of research within 'conversational 
paradigm' experiments., Normative models, which are assumed appropriate 
for the laboratory task, are compared to subjects' responses, often with 
little or no substantive consideration of the, relationship of, either 
to plausible decision-environments. . While we would not: claim tobe 
raising anything-but a familiar issue to psychology, -it'is clear that 
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its significance with respect to the issue of competence of 
individual judgement and decision has been neglected by the majority 
of the heuristics and biases research. 
Figure 8.2 
Idealised Strategy for the Investigation 
-. of-Judgement 



















Figure 8.2 illustrates Einhorn's and Hogarth's (1981) suggestion, 
together with some of the factors (discussed in Chapter 4) that we 
deem relevant to the laboratory demonstration of behaviours as being 
'erroneous'. Comparison with Figure 8.1 summarises the reasons 
why we believe the typical interpretation of the heuristics and biases 
research (and in particular the 'cognitive cripple' hypothesis) is 
at present entirely inappropriate. 
Interpreting specific laboratory demonstrations of deviations 
from normative models within the framework provided by Figure 8.2, 
it becomes clear that three conditions need to be met if responses : 
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are to be held to be potentially dysfunctional. The first is that 
the normative model selected for comparison is indeed the best (by 
whatever criteria are deemed appropriate) for the specified decision- 
environment to which we wish to generalise our findings. For 
example, we might argue that expected deaths per annum is an appropriate 
'objective' index of the risks' associated with life-threatening hazards. 
Meeting this condition requires careful assessment of whether, given 
the conditionality of all standards, the assumptions underlying the 
normative model are indeed appropriate for the specific environment. 
In some cases this will lead to the rejection of particular models 
as being inadequate standards. 
The second Js that the.. notmative model- is . similarly -appropriate 
for comparison with responses in the small-world decision-environment 
operationalised in the laboratory task, and as subsequently structured 
by experimental subjects: Meeting this second condition requires 
not only consideration of the assumptions underlying the model, and 
their relation to the laboratory task, but also the more familiar 
methodological issue of internal validity. 
Thirdly, we need. to be satisfied that the findings of such 
laboratory experiments can be readily generalised to the appropriate 
decision-environments. This final constraint raises the equally 
familiar issue of the external validity, and representativeness 
(in the methodological sense), of such demonstrationsy: and is 
particularly significant given the contingent nature of much decision 
behaviour. 
It is perhaps ironic that a very general conclusion that might 
be drawn from our'= cumulative critique would be that it may be 
impossible to resolve the question of rationality by'any single 
empirical, means '(cf. Cohen, 1981). However, it. is clearly not our 
J 
.a 
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intention here to imply (either implicitly or explicitly) that 
Behavioral Decision Theorists ought to forego empirical inquiry 
for theoretical and methodological analysis, or for that matter 
critical philosophy! And it would certainly be unwise to suggest 
that any specific empirical study should be rejected as inadequate 
merely because it fails to meet all of the criteria suggested by 
our critical framework. In part this is reflected in the fact that 
it is perhaps something of a practical misnomer to demarcate at all 
between different research methodologies; e. g. naturalistic versus 
simulated, conversational versus protocol'. Different research methods 
have different strengths and failings, each will be valuable for 
certain purposes, and the utility of cumulative research findings will 
depend upon the extent to which theoretical progress is facilitated 
(Turner, 1981). Significantly, not only does the typical heuristics 
and biases research not meet most of our specific criteria,. as outlined 
in Figure 8.2, but neither does it, as we note at the end of Chapter 
4, exhibit a cumulative theoretical progression! 
The strengths (and weaknesses) of our own programme of studies 
are illuminated if we locate the findings within the framework 
provided by Figure 8.2. The first point of departure here is our 
principal empirical finding: that there does indeed appear to be a 
functional dimension to individuals' decision strategies in the 
context of general risky choice. We can be confident in this 
assertion since the empirical random generation paradigm effectively 
constructs such a 'task ecology' in the laboratory, and hence the 
results of Study 1, as we'--have noted, should readily generalise-to 
other sets of general, risky options'(e. g. "produced by systematic 
generation). Hence, it appears, all other'things being equal, that 
the results present a, clear counterexample`to the-'sub-optimal'- 
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responses elicited in specific risky choice contexts: for example, 
preference reversals (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979a) or intransitivities 
(Tversky, 1969). 
Our argument in the-preceding paragraph does depend critically 
upon one assumption: that the standard which we have ädopted for 
the appraisal of performance - efficiency with respect. to high 
Expected Value choice - is indeed in some sense defensible as 
'optimal' in the context of the risky choice paradigm. And, given 
our criticism of the heuristics and biases researchers for ignoring 
the conditbnality issue (the norm-environment relationship of 
Figure 8.2), this would appear to raise a contradiction. If the 
labelling of any response as 'erroneous' is indeed philosophically 
problematic, then how can we hold any findings as being demonstrative 
of functional responses? In the context of the current argument 
this contradiction is perhaps ultimately-insoluble. However, for 
pragmatic purposes we have to take the position here that solely 
within the general risky choice paradigm, and particularly when 
comparing our findings with those of other risky choice studies, 
expectation maximisation based upon the axiomatic foundations of 
coherence and consistency is one potentialguide to decision-making 
(cf. Phillips, 1984). This is not, to deny, of course, that other 
guidelines to decision might appear equally, or more appropriate, 
under some (unstated) structural circumstances. 
The third major, comment relates to the issue of contingency. 
Although, as we have argued, our general functionality conclusion 
is valid within the defined 'ecology', of general risky choice, the 
very uncontrolled nature of, this paradigm, as operationalised in 
the current studies, has resulted in findings that, are, not necessarily-, 
individually predictive. ' That is, we have: been, 
_unable. 
to define, - 
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I upon the basis of our studies, the precise conditions under which 
particular individuals will or will not utilise particular strategies 
and editing functions. This is of course not a simple question, 
and one which would have been difficult to resolve under any 
circumstances. As such the issue raised by the contingency of 
decisnn behaviour is a clear focus for subsequent research on 
individual cognitive processes, an effort which, our research 
indicates, should not be divorced from the issue of performance 
(cf. Klein, 1983). 
The internal validity of the current (or any) studies is a 
difficult question. However, the multi-method approach adopted-' 
here, and in particular the use, however time and resource consuming, 
of process-tracing techniques, allows at least a simple check, 
unlike the majority of the heuristics and biases research, upon 
the subjects' internal structuring of the tasks, and hence the 
reliability of the process model is enhanced. We would not claim, 
however, to have addressed here what is undoubtedly a highly complex 
issue in anything more than a cursory fashion. The need for a 
closer investigation of problem structuring processes is one 
future research effort illuminated by the current studies. 
Finally, and perhaps most critically, what conclusions can 
be drawn with respect to the external validity of our results 
in other contexts? As we'note in Chapter 4, a criticism of 
Thorngate's (1980) original study, and one which applies equally 
here, is that he does not address the question of heuristic efficiency 
over a range of naturalistic decision tasks. This in itself 
represents perhaps the. most exciting,. and challenging, future: 
research implication to arise from the current programme. We have 
concluded that. individual-choice is functional in the context of 
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general risky choice and, while it would be entirely inappropriate 
to generalise directly from this to, for example, the use of the 
availability heuristic or habitual response in everyday life, this 
result is nevertheless suggestive: firstly, because it casts a doubt 
upon the generality of the 'cognitive cripple' hypothesis; and, 
secondly, because the very fact that we have postulated, and found, 
a functional dimension to heuristic use indicates that a similar 
empirical effort would not be inappropriate in other contexts. 
%A related issue is that the lack of direct generalisability does 
not mean that the analysis here is irrelevant to 
decision-making in other contexts. The theoretical analysis of the 
relationships between strategies and informational redundancies 
can be clearly paralleled to a number of other studies:: specifically, 
Navon's (1978,1981) discussion-of conservatism; Ebbesen's, Parker's, 
and Konecni's (1977) study of driver risk-taking; and Phelps's and 
Shanteau's (1978) livestock judging experiments. All three sets 
of studies illustrate the potential efficacy of simple, and potentially 
'biased', behaviours, when these'are viewed in the context of a 
naturalistic redundant information environment. The. nature of 
informational redundancy and the relationship with strategy use 
are important issues for future study. 
III. Concluding Comments 
The issue of human intellectual capabilities is a question 
that has been debated for centuries and, if mankind survives his 
current 'technological miracle', will no doubt continue to be 
debated for centuries to come. The important role of science in 
this debate, and in particular the social responsibility of the 
scientist that this entails, should not be understated. As 
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Fischhoff, Pidgeon, and Fiske have noted: 
'If our science creates an unduly negative image 
of people's intellectual capabilities, then 
it aids those who would exclude the public 
from the management of its own affairs. If our 
science over- or underestimates people's abilities, 
then it limits its own ability to help them' 
(Fischhoff, Pidgeon, and Fiske, 1983, p. 174). 
The current research mdkes a limited contribution__ to the 
rationality debate and, if at times the position adopted here appears 
too charitable to people's intellectual capabilities, this must be 
viewed in the context of the predominant paradigm, which takes a 
markedly uncharitable position. Whatever the processes of scientific 
progress that ultimately arbitrate between these two competing 
viewpoints, and whatever the final outcome, the current effort is 
offered as a contribution to this development. In this context 
the combined empirical findings and theoretical critique presented 
here suggest that, as a generalised statement, the 'cognitive 
cripple' hypothesis may well be untenable. The conclusion that 
flows from this is that the issue of the cognitive fallibility, 
or otherwise, of the human inference and decision-making system is 
one that is currently far from resolution. 
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NOTES 
1. The relationship here between strategy and task variables is 
unlikely to be a simple one. For example, 'objective' 
features of a task may be represented in different 
subjective forms. This does not of course imply that 
we should return to EU or SEU explanations of choice. 
As Montgomery and Adelbratt note: 
... non-linear relations 
between subjective 
and objective values do not imply that the 
subjective values are integrated according to 
the SEU or EU models. That is, independently 
of the relationship between subjective and 
objective values, the decision-maker may ... 
look for certain concrete patterns of 
(subjectively) defined values or features 
rather than attempting to maximize an abstract 
composite measure, such as EV, EU, or SEU' 
(Montgomery and Adelbratt, 1982, p.. 56). 
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APPENDIX A. 1 
STUDY 1: 2 ALTERNATIVE 2 OUTCOME CHOICE MATRICES (2 x2 Tvpe) 
KEY: (Also to Appendices A. 2-A. 4, except where indicated) 
N: Matrix Number 
Nos. 1-10: Pilot Study Matrices/Main Study Practice Trials 












Distribution of Subject Choices across Matrices 
Choice Distributions that Fail to Satisfy Kolmogorov- 
Smirnov Criterion for Rejection of Random Responding 
Null Hypothesis (p < 0.05; two-tailed) 
Expected Value (Alternatives Ranked 1st Underlined) 
Alternatives Ranked 1st by Expected Value that also 
Dominate all Contenders 
E: Alternative Selected by Equiprobable Rule 
P: Probable 
MIN: Minimax 
MAX: Maximax " 
PMIN: Probable Minimum Rule 
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APPENDIX A. 2 
STUDY 1.: 2 ALTERNATIVE 4 OUTCOME CHOICE MATRICES (2 x4 Type) 
KEY: As Appendix A. 1, except: 
ML: Alternative Selected by Most Likely Rule 
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APPENDIX A. 3 
STUDY 1: 4 ALTERNATIVE 2 OUTCOME CHOICE MATRICES (4 x2 Type) 
KEY: As Appendix A. 1 
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APPENDIX A. 4 
STUDY 1: 4 ALTERNATIVE 4 OUTCOME CHOICE MATRICES (4 x4 Type) 
KEY: As Appendix A. 1, except: 
ML: Alternative Selected by Most Likely Rule 
PMAX: Probable Maximum Rule 
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APPENDIX A. 5 
STUDY 1: PRESENTATION FORMATS 
a. Frontispiece for 4 Alternative 4 Outcome (4 x4 Type) 
Pilot Booklet. 
b. Example Presentation Formats for 2 Alternative 2 Outcome 
(2 x 2), 2 Alternative 4 Outcome (2 x 4), and 4 Alternative 
2 Outcome (4 x 2) Type Matrices. 
I 
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a. Frontispiece for 4 Alternative 4 Outcome (4 x2 Type) Pilot 
Booklet; All Other Booklets (2 x 2,, 2 x 4, and 4x 2) Follow 
a Similar Format. 
INSTRUCTIONS - PLEASE READ CAREFULLY 
On the following pages are 10 sets of gambles. Each set gives 
you a choice between 4 alternative gambles (W, X, Y& Z), of which 
you must pick the one that seems the most favourable to you - i. e. 
the one gamble of the set that you would most prefer to play given 
the opportunity. 
Tick one 
A set looks like this: 
W. 10% win £888,45% win £766,6% win £808,39% win £624 
X. 35% win £661,16% win £798,1% win £614,48% win £725 V/ 
Y. 4% win £947,23% win £1,33% win £935,40% win £944 
Z. 34% win £757,25% win £246,19% win £91,22% win £593 
If, for example, you prefer gamble X you should tick it as shown. 
While these choices might at first appear somewhat complex and 
abstract, they are similar to certain types of investment decisions. 
It is sometimes useful to think of these as a choice between 4 
different lotteries. Suppose each lottery consists of a hundred 
tickets in an urn. On each ticket is written the amount that you 
will win if it is drawn. To play the lottery you draw one ticket 
at random from the urn, and win the amount written on it. Gamble X, 
above, would be the following lottery: 
v 
X. 35% win £661,16% win £798,1% win £614,48% win £725 
(35% + 16% + 1% + 48% = 100% Total) 
F44y 
Urn 'X' 35 Tickets 16 Tickets 1 Ticket 48 Tickets (Total 
Contains with £661 with £798 with £614 with £725 No. of 
written on written on written on written ol= 
100) 
The other three gambles in the set (W, Y& Z) can be represented 
in exactly the same way. The task would then be to decide which of 
the 4 urns to draw a ticket from, given that you can only draw from 
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b. Example Presentation Formats: 
(i) 2 Alternative 2 Outcome (2 x 2) Type 
Tick one 
X. 4% win £177,96% win £528 
Y. 74% win £383,26% win £455 
(ii) 2 Alternative 4 Outcome (2 x4) Type 
Tick one 
X. 26% win £283,29% win £839,25% win £114,20% win £274 
Y. 24% win £941,27% win £424,26% win £136,23% win £520 
(iii) 4 Alternative 2 Outcome (4 x 2) Type 
W. 53% win £211, 47% win £317 
X. 38% win £121, 62% win £70 
Y. 33% win £195, 67% win £438 
Z. 82% win £702, 18% win £854 
Tick one ' 
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APPENDIX A. 6 
STUDY 1: EXPERIMENTER'S GENERAL SCRIPT FOR MAIN SESSIONS 
Note: Text Within Square Brackets [] are Comments, 
otherwise all text as read by Experimenter. 
General script varied as appropriate within 
each complexity condition. 
= = 
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I 
1. Thank you for coming. As you are probably aware, this is 
a study upon some aspects of decision-making. 
2. Firstly, I'd like to ask you not to communicate with each 
other during the study, and to restrict any questions to 
matters of procedure; i. e. if there is something in the 
task that you are doing that you don't understand, then 
put your hand up. 
There will be a chance for general questions at the end. 
3. I would like us to start fairly rapidly. Now, decision- 
making is an area of psychology that has great relevance 
to many real-life contexts; e. g. business decisions. 
However, many real-life contexts are so complex to study 
that we often have to resort to looking at fairly abstract 
mathematical situations. For this reason you will today 
be making a series of choices involving gambles. 
In fact these are 'think on your feet' type situations, 
where there is-strictly no correct judgement; you have 
to decide what seems best. 
4. One major point that I would like to make is that I want 
you to make intuitive judgements. That is, in your heads 
entirely; so although you do have pens to tick your . 
choices in the booklet, I don't want you to use them for 
rough or any other calculations. 
5. Could you now take out the booklets from the envelope on your 
desk, and look at the first, thin one. 
You will have an opportunity to fully read the instructions 
in a minute. In fact this first booklet is a set of practice 
judgements. 
I shall read out the first paragraph on the-frontispiece [of 
the practice booklet - see Appendix A. 5]. 
'On the following pages are ten sets of gambles. 
Each set gives you a choice between 4 [2 - in the 
2 Alternative (2 x2 and 2x 4) conditions] 
alternative gambles (W, X, Y, and Z) [(X &'Y)], 
of which you must pick the one, that seems the most 
favourable. to you; that is the one gamble of the 
set that you would most prefer to play given the 
opportunity. -A set looks 
like this: ' 
6. [An illustration gamble, on a_large card, was now held up 
by the Experimenter. This gamble was the same, as the' 
example on the frontispiece of the practice booklet. A 
general explanation of the gambles was given noting (a) the 
fact that only one of each set should be chosen, (b) the 
meaning of the payoffs and probabilities (i. e. as pounds ' 
sterling and percentages respectively), (c) that within 
each alternative,: only one of the amounts would be won, (d) 
that all the percentages within one alternative added up to 
- 352 - 
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100%, and (e) that the values to win varied between a 
possible minimum of £1 and a possible maximum of £999. 
Finally, the lottery analogy (as on the practice booklet 
frontispiece) was explained. ] 
7. One point that you might ask is, given that these are gambles, 
where are the losses? 
In fact these gambles are similar to certain types of investment 
decisions, where there is almost no chance of losing money 
(for example, investment in the Post Office) but where you 
are uncertain about the eventual gain (or payoff); e. g. 
your gain might depend upon the changing interest rate, which 
is uncertain. 
So you could have: 
X- Invest in Post Office 
Y- Invest in the Abbey National 
8. Please try to think of the amounts as real pounds. 
9. Could you read through the instructions, and then you can start. 
Please work quickly, and on your own - these practice gambles 
shouldn't take long. 
If something is not clear put up your hand. 
Do not go straight on to the next booklet. Please wait until 
everyone has finished. Then I will tell you when to start 
the main booklet. 
O. K., you can start. 
[PRACTICE SESSION] 
10. [When all subjects had finished the practice trials] The main 
session will have the same procedure as before. Could you 
take the large booklet. I shall read the instructions on this: 
'Please tick one gamble for each set, in the same 
way you did for the practice booklet. Please 
work on your own and work'through the questions 
in the-order that they occur in the booklet. 
Answer all questions. ' 
11. When you have finished could. you check that you have done all 
of the sets in the booklet. 
12. O. -K., you can start. 
[MAIN SESSION] 
13. [Debriefing session. ] 
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APPENDIX A. 7 
ANALYZER PROGRAM (4 OUTCOME VARIANT) 
a. Program Flowchart (Basic Structure) 
b. Program Listing 
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i 
a. ANALYZER Program Flowchart (Basic Structure) 
Control down and to right except as indicated. 
LINE NUMBERS 
START 
INPUT PROBABILITIES[ 40 - 100 
AND PAYOFFS 








AGAIN 300 - 370 
SUM TO ONE N 
Y 
CALCULATE EXPECTED VALUE 400 - 410 
SET IN B(O ) 
CALCULATE EQUIPROBABLE 430 - 440 
SET IN B(1) 
CALCULATE PROBABLE 460 - 530 








PAYOFF VALUES 675 - 815 
FOR MAX, -MIN, PMIN 
AND PMAX 
PRINT 816 - 870 
CALCULATED VALUES 
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b. ANALYZER Program Listing (4 Outcome Variant); BASIC 
10 PRINT 'THORNGATE TYPE MATRICES' 
20 PRINT 'ANALYZER 4 OUTCOME TYPE' 
30 REM THIS PROGRAM ASKS FOR THE 8 VALUES ASSOCIATED WITH A THORNGATE 
4 OUTCOME ALTELRNATIVE. IT CALCULATES, AND PRINTS, THE 
FOLLOWING RULE/HEURISTIC VALUES - EV, E, P, MIN, MAX, 
ML, PMIN, PMAX. 
40 DIM A(7), B(3) 
50 PRINT 'INPUT OUTCOME VALUES' 
60 PRINT 'INPUT ORDER AS FOLLOWS' 
70 PRINT 'P1, U1, P2, U2, P3, U3, P4, U4? ' 
80 FOR I=Q TO 7 
90 INPUT A(I) 
100 NEXT I 
130 FORJ=0TO6 STEP2 
140 PRINT A(J), A(J + 1) 
150 IF A(J) < 0.01 THEN 200 
160 IF A(J) > 0.99 THEN 200 
170 IF A(J + 1) <1 THEN 200 
180 IF A(J + 1) > 999 THEN 200 
190 NEXT J 
195 GOTO 300 
200 PRINT 'INPUT ERROR' 
210 PRINT 'TRY AGAIN' 
220 GOTO 80 
300 IF A(O) + A(2) + A(4) + A(6) <> 1 THEN 320 
310 GOTO 380 
320 PRINT 'PROBABILITY SUM ERROR' 
330 PRINT 'INPUT PROBABILITIES AGAIN' 
340 PRINT 'P2, P2, P3, P4 ?' 
350 FOR K=0 TO 6 STEP 2 
360 INPUT A(K) 
370 GOTO 130 
- 356 - 
I 
380 LET B(2) =0 
390 LET D=0 
400 LET B(O) = A(O)*A(1) + A(2)*A(3) + A(4)*A(5) + A(6)*A(7) 
410 REM THE ALTERNATIVE'S EXPECTED VALUE IS NOW CALCULATED, 
AND SET IN B(O) 
431 LET B(1) = A(1) + A(3) + A(5) + A(7) 
440 REM EQUIPROBABLE CALCULATION NOW SET IN B(1). NOTE THAT 
FOR COMPARATIVE PURPOSES NO DIVISION BY THE NUMBER OF 
OUTCOMES IS NECESSARY 
460 FOR K=0 TO 6 STEP 2 
470 IF A(K) > 0.25 THEN 490 
480 GOTO 510 
490 LET B(2) = B(2) + A(K + 1) 
500 LET D=D+1 
510 NEXT K 
520 LET B(2) = B(2)/D 
530 REM PROBABLE CALCULATION NOW SET IN B(2) 
560 LET CML = A(O) 
570 LET ML = A(1) 
580 FOR M=2 TO 6 STEP 2 
590 IF CML = A(M) THEN 650 
600 IF CML > A(M) THEN 630 
610 LET CML = A(M) 
620 LET ML =A(M+ 1) 
630 NEXT M 
640 GOTO 670 
650 PRINT 'PROBABILITY TIE FOR TWO OUTCOMES - HAND CALCULATION 
NECESSARY' 
660 LET ML= 0 
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675 LET MAX = A(1) 
680 LET MIN = A(1) 
690 LET PMAX =0 
700 LET PMIN =0 
710 FOR M=1 TO 5 STEP 2 
720 IF MAX = A(M + 2) THEN 920 
730 IF MIN = A(M + 2) THEN 920 
740 IF MIN < A(M + 2) THEN 770 
750 LET MIN + A(M + 2) 
760 LET PMIN = A(M + 1) 
770 IF MAX > A(M + 2) THEN 810 
780 LET MAX = A(M + 2) 
800 LET PMAX = A(M + 1) 
810 NEXT M 
815 REM MAXIMUM AND MINIMUM PAYOFFS, TOGETHER WITH THE PROBABLE 
MINIMUM AND PROBABLE MAXIMUM PROBABILITY VALUES NOW 
SET IN MAX, MIN, PMIN AND PMAX RESPECTIVELY 
816 PRINT 'EXPECTED VALUE' , B(O) 
817 PRINT 'EQUIPROBABLE' , B(1) 
820 PRINT 'PROBABLE' , B(2) 
825 PRINT 'MIMIMUM' , MIN 
830 PRINT 'MAXIMUM' , MAX 
840 PRINT 'MOST LIKELY' ML 
850 PRINT 'PROBABLE MINIMUM' , PMIN 
860 PRINT 'PROBABLE MAXIMUM' , PMAX 
870 GOTO 935 
920 PRINT 'UTILITY TIE' 
935 PRINT 'ANOTHER GO' 
940 GET X$ 
950 GOTO 50 
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APPENDIX A. 8 
STUDY 1: RAW CHOICE DATA (SUBJECTS AND RULES) 
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Raw Choice Data (N - 60) for all Sublects and Heuristics 
Complexity Conditions 
Rank Order of Expected Value of Chosen Alternative 
2 Alternative 2 Alternative 4 Alternative 4 Alternative 
2 Outcome (2x2) 4 Outcome (2x4) 2 Outcome (4x2) 4 Outcome (4x4) 
Ist 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 
Subject 
Nos. 
1 58 2 50 30 48 11 1- 44 14 1 1 
2 56 4 50 10 46 13 1- 39 13 6 2 
3 57 3 52 8 52' 8 -- 50` 82 - 
4 57 3 54 6 50 8 2- 42 15 1 2 
5 60 0 53 7 50 10 -- 40 16 3 1 
6 59 1 51 9 42 16 2- 41 13 4 2 
7 57 3 54 6 39 18 3- 34 12 10 4 
8 59 1 48 12 48 11 1- 41 13 2 4 
9 58 2 44 16 47 8 5- 37 17 4 2 
10 60 0 53 7 55 @ 4 -1 34 19 7 - 11 60 0 47 13 48 12 - 46 12 1 1 
12 56 4 54 6 51 8 1- 45 10 5 - 
13 59 1 51 9 47 12 1- 47 93 1 
14 57 3 50 10 51 8 1- 48 92 1 
15 59 1 52 8 48 @ 11 1- 39 16 3 2 
16 58 2 51 9 45 13 2 55 5- - 
17 59 1 55 5 52 8 -- 47 10 3 1 
18 57 3 51 9 50 8 2- 44 11 4 1 
19 58 2 55 5 48 10 2- 48 11 - 1 
20 57 3 53 7 46 12 2- 37 15 5 3 
21 N/A N/A 44 12 31 N/A 
22 N/A N/A 49 8 3- N/A 
Heuristics 
Equiprobable, E 57 3 47 13 48 10 2- 43 12 3 2 
Probable, P 52 8 48 12 42 14 4- 46 10 4 - 
Minimax, MIN 53 7 44 16 38 20 2- 36 13 6 5 
Maximax, MAX 51 9 44 16 32 15 13 - 32 14 8 6 
Most Likely, ML 52 2 40 20 42 14 4- 36 16 6 2 
Probable 
Minimum, PMIN 40 20 35 25 21 19 12 8 21 19 12 8 
Probable 
Maximum, PMAX 40 20 38 22 21 19 12 8 19 22 12 7 
N. B. Subject data marked @ not included in Alternatives x Outcomes ANOVA. 
t, 
a 
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APPENDIX B. 1 
STUDY 2: EXPERIMENTER'S GENERAL SCRIPT 
FOR MAIN SESSIONS 
Note: Text within square brackets [] are comments, otherwise 
all text as read by Experimenter. 
General script varied as appropriate within each separate 
complexity condition. 
Where script is identical to Study 1 script (Appendix A. 6) 
the reader is referred to this. 
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1. Thank you for coming. As you are probably aware, this is 
a study on some aspects of decision-making. 
2. The main part of this session requires you to be taped 
thinking-aloud through a set of judgement tasks; that is to 
say, you have to verbally report what you are thinking as 
you make your choices. 
3. Firstly though I want you to make some practice judgements 
in order to familiarise yourself with the task. 
4. Now the first general point that I want to make is that you 
should restrict any questions that you have to matters of 
procedure; i. e. if there is something in the task you are 
doing that you don't understand please ask me. 
There will be a chance for general questions at the end. 
5' 
Identical to (3)-(8), Appendix A. 6. 
10. 
11. Could you read through the instructions, and then you can 
start. 
This shouldn't take you very long at all. 
[PRACTICE SESSION] 
12. [When the subject had finished the practice trials] O. K. 
now we can go on to the main part of the session. Take out 
the small booklet marked ... [marked as appropriate for 
complexity condition]. Here you are going to be doing the 
same types of judgements as in the practice, with some 
differences in format. 
13. The first difference is that there will be only one gamble 
per page. As before I want you to tick your choice for each 
gamble. 
14. The second difference is that as you are making your choice I 
want you to report (i. e. speak aloud) everything that you think 
of. I will keep the tape recorder going throughout the session, 
and so you should do the task as if it is not there at all. 
Also there is no need to speak directly into the microphone; 
it's very sensitive. 
15. The third difference from the practice trials is that each 
gamble is marked with a coloured identifier. When you start 
a new gamble the first thing that you should do is read out 
this identifier (so that I can tell which gamble you are on 
when I play the tape back). Note that there is no particular 
order to the identifier numbers. 
16. Is that all clear? 
Do you have any questions? 
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[The Experimenter answered any procedural questions. ] 
17. O. K. I shall switch the tape recorder on now, and recap 
on what you have to do. 
[The Experimenter switches the tape recorder on. ] 
18. Work through the gambles in the order that they occur in the 
booklet. 
The first thing you should do when you start a new page 
is read out the coloured identifier. 
As you consider each gamble please say everything that 
comes into your head, no matter how trivial it might seem 
to you at the time. 
You should finish each gamble by reporting the choice 
that you have made and then tick this in the booklet. 
As a final general point; don't speak as if to me 
particularly, but as if you were talking to yourself. 
Try to forget my presence in the room. 
19. You can go when you are ready. 
[MAIN SESSION] 
20. [Debriefing session. ] 
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APPENDIX B. 2 
STUDY 2: VERBAL PROTOCOL CODING SCHEME 
a. Coding Notation. 
b. Rule Categories. 
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a. Coding Notation 
Other than for the statements classified as 'other' or 'ambiguous', 
which were indicated by the symbols 0 and A respectively, every 
identified evaluative statement was coded in the same basic notational 
format, as follows: 
R(Ai, A. . _. 
) i F(ak) 
Where: R( ): A rule operator, indicating the 
type of evaluative rule used by 
the subject (see [b] below for 
the rule classifications). 
and: Ai, A. ... : The argument(s) of the rule 
operators, indicating the 
alternatives to which the rule 
has been applied. These 
arguments can take on the symbols 






'X higher average 
payoff than Y' 
'W a bad minimum' 
'Not much between 
the maximums on X 
and Z' 
: Means 'has led to the conclusion 
that'. 
An evaluation indicator, representing 
the type of conclusion reached; 
either favours (FAV), does not 
favour (FAV), or indifferent M. 
The argument of the evaluation 
indicator, showing the specific 
alternative, W, X, Y, or Z, to 
which the evaluation applies. 
Symbolic Formal Meaning 
E(X, Y) i FAV(X) X is more attractive than Y 
by the Equiprobable rule. 
MIN(W) FAV(W) W unattractive by Minimax rule. 
MAX(X, Z) -* IX indifferent to Z by Maximax 
rule. 
Note: The only major variation to this notation occurs in the 4 
outcome conditions, and concerns the rank ordering of the outcomes. 
Numerical subscripts were utilised here, as in the following 
examples: 
v 
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(i) 'The maximum on X is good ... 
and the next one is good also ... ' 
(ii) 'Top three payoffs on X better 
than the top two on Y ... ' 
(iii) 'The highest probability on Y, 
that's 37%, gives a good 
payout ... 
and the next highest pays 
well ... ' 
(iv) 'Bottom two on W bad ... ' 
MAX(X) -+ FAV(X) 
MAX2(X) -+ FAV(X) 
MAX123(X)12(Y) - FAV(X) 
PA(Y) FAV(Y) 
P2(Y) + FAV(Y) 
MIN12(W) FAV(W) 
(v) 'The top two on Z have a high 
70% chance ... PMAX12(Z) -º FAV(Z) 
b. Rule Categories 
(i) Expected Value (EV) 
Explicit use of expectation operation: combination of payoff 
with its associated probability of occurrence by multiplication 
(however approximate), or implicit reference to expected return, 
expectation, etc. 
'440 at 55% gives a good 200 EV(Y) - FAV(Y) 
on Y' 
'Expected return probably EV(X, Z, ) - FAV(X) 
better on X than Z' 
(ii) Eguiprobable Rule (E) 
Holisitic combination of all payoffs within a single alternative, 
without reference to probabilities. 
'Z average winnings O. K. ' E(Z) -º FAV(Z) 
'Payoffs on Y about the E(X, Y) -I 
same as X' 
(iii) Probable Rule (P) 
Search upon the basis of the most probable outcome(s) in an 
alternative, and then evaluation of the associated payoff(s). 
The probability value should not be evaluated. 
'Highest chance on Y gives 
an awful £1' 
'The chances are on x that 
I will get 440, 
and on Y 700, 
which is better ... ' 
P(Y) -+ FAV(Y) 
P(X, Y) f FAV(Y) 
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(iv) Minimax Rule (MIN) 
Evaluation of the minimum payoff(s) within an alternative. 
'Eliminate Y on that 34 ... ' MIN(Y) -+ FAV(Y) 
'Z guarantees a better payout 
than X' MIN(Z, X) - FAV(Z) 
(v) Maximax Rule (MAX) 
Evaluation of the maximum payoff(s) within an alternative. 
'Two good 900s in Y ... MAX 12 
(Y)-i- FAV(Y) 
'Z has the highest top ... ' MAX(W, X, Y, Z)-º FAV(Z) 
(vi) Probable Minimum Rule (PMIN) 
Evaluation of the probability of occurrence of the minimum 
payoff(s) within an alternative. Evaluation must be 
clearly on the probability only. 
'Bottom on X has a too 
high chance ... 
PMIN(X)-+ FAV(X) 
and also the top payoff, 
which is 955, 
is only 3%, PMAX(X) -+ FAV(X) 
so I can reject that one. ' 
(vii) Probable Maximum Rule (PMAX) 
Evaluation of the probability of occurrence of the maximum 
payoff(s) within an alternative. Evaluation must be 
clearly on the probability only. 
'The probability on the two 
high payoffs in Y is only 
20 in sum ... ' 
PMAX12(Y)-º FAV(Y) 
(viii) Probable Minimum/Minimum (PMIN/MIN) 
Joint evaluative statement containing reference to both 
the minimum payoff and its probability, but not multiplied. 
'Don't like this 30% at 57' 
'Low one is also acceptable 
with 15% chance at £442 on Z. ' 
PMIN/MIN( )f FAV( ) 
PMIN/MIN(Z)-+ FAV(Z)' 
ýh 
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(ix) Probable Maximum/Maximum (PMAX/MAX) 
Joint evaluative statement containing reference to both the 
maximum payoff and its probability, but not multiplied. 
'Highest that Z can offer is 
only 14% of 361, ' PMAX/MAX(Z) -º FAV(Z) 
'Y good because of 40% at 966. ' PMAX/MAX(Y) -º FAV(Y) 
W Other (0) 
Use of any other identifiable evaluation rule, not covered 
in coding scheme. 
(xi) Ambiguous (A) 
Use of clearly evaluative, but ambiguous, statement. 
Note: A final classification of rule, Strict Dominance (DOM), was 
used in the coding scheme. Here the S had to recognise 
that the lowest payoff on the dominant alternative was 
higher than the maximum of the contender. Since examples 
of the use of this rule were rare, it is classified as 
'Other' for the purposes of the data analysis (although it 
does occur in some of the illustrative protocol Excerpts). 
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APPENDIX B. 3 
STUDY 2: INTERJUDGE CLASSIFICATIONS FOR 
RULE CATEGORIES 
Note: Agreements shown on main diagonal. Each datum = one, 
coded pair. 
Category '0' indicates no classification at all 
by one judge. 
Coder 1: The author. 
Coder 2: Assistant 
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APPENDIX B. 4 
STUDIES 1 AND 2: COMPARISON OF SUBJECT 
SAMPLE CHOICE DISTRIBUTIONS 
Note: Matrices marked 'x' if majority choice different 
for the two Subject samples. 
Matrices unmarked if the majority choice the same 
for the two Subject samples. 
Matrices marked '? ' if unable to be compared across 
Subject samples by majority choice. 
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APPENDIX B. 5 
STUDY 2: CODED STATEMENTS (CODER 1), RAW DATAt 
RELATIVE vs. ABSOLUTE x DIRECTION OF 
FRImTJIh'PTrml 
Key: FAV(C) - Statement coded as favouring a S's final choice 
FAV(O) - Statement coded as favouring an alternative other 
than a S's final choice 
FAV(C) - Statement coded as not favouring a S's final choice 
FAV(O) - Statement coded as not favouring an alternative 
other than a S's final choice 
I- Statement coded as 'indifferent' between 
alternatives 
UC - Statements unclassifiable as relative or 
absolute (e. g. 'ambiguous' statements) 
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APPENDIX B. 6 
STUDY 2: HEURISTIC CHOICE INTER-CORRELATIONS 
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Positive intercorrelations between heuristic choices can be 
simply demonstrated by plotting the feasible regions (shaded) 
for pairs of heuristic evaluations. These generally show positive 
increasing relationships between such pairs. Our illustration here 
is restricted, without loss of generality, to the 2 alternative 
case only, and thus covers the E, P, MIN, MAX, PMIN, and PMAX rules 
only. Analysis assumes that payoff and probability values are 









since MAX > MIN 
1_ / 
/ 
and E- MAX + MIN 
2 







A similar argument holds for MAX-E. 
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since either P= MAX) with probability 
or P= MIN) = 0.5 
and MIN < MAX 
implies P< MAX 






since PG MAX 
and MAX < 2E 
implies P< 2E 
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t/ 
e. PMAX - PMIN 
-(PMIN) 
since PMAX = -(PMIN) 
(and negative PMIN is same evaluative direction as positive PMAX) 





0 PMAX 1 
0.5 
since if MAX MIN there exists a unique c 
such that c< MAX 
and c >-MIN 
and cE (0,1000) 
also if PMAX < 0.5 
then P= MIN 
<c 
while if 'PMAX > 0.5 
then P= MAX 
>c 
A similar argument holds for P- MIN. 
g. All other inter-correlations zero (i. e. PMIN - MIN, 
PMAX - MIN, PMIN - MAX, PMAX - MAX, PMIN - E, PMAX - E). 
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APPENDIX B. 7 
STUDY 2a: SIMULATION STUDY - BEHAVIOURAL 
CHOICE MODEL 
a. Procedure 
b. Heuristics Investigated 
c. Results 
d. Conclusions 
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a. Procedure 
The simulation study reported in this Appendix closely follows 
'the procedure outlined in Thorngate (1980). The computer program 
first fills an N alternative M outcome choice matrix by random 
number generation. 
Expected Values are calculated for each alternative, and 
these are then ranked. Heuristic choice is compared to Expected 
Value rank, and stored. This procedure is iterated two hundred 
times, and a percentage choice of first rank ordered alternatives 
(efficiency) score calculated for each heuristic. The simulation 
was run on an Apple II microcomputer. The program listing, which 
we do not report here, can be obtained from the author on request. 
b. Heuristics Investigated 
The heuristics investigated in the simulation were: 
(i) Equiprobable Rule (E) 
(ii) Probable Rule (P) 
(iii) Minimax Rule (MIN) 
(iv) Maximax Rule (MAX) 
(v) Probable Minimum (PMIN) 
(vi) Probable Maximum (PMAX) 
Heuristics (i)-(vi) operate as defined 
in Chapter 4 of this volume. 
(vii) Collapsed Minimum Rule (CMIN) 
This rule was based upon the 'collapsing' pre-processing 
strategy discussed in Chapter 6 of this dissertation. Within 
each alternative the payoffs on the M outcomes were first rank 
ordered in size. The lowest M/2 payoffs (M was constrained, 
without loss of generality, to even values only) were averaged, 
to give a 'collapsed minimum' value. The alternative within 
the matrix with the highest 'collapsed minimum' value was then 
chosen. When M=2, this rule is equivalent to Minimax (MIN), above. 
(viii) Collapsed Maximum Rule (CMAX) 
This rule is the converse strategy to CMIN. Payoffs were 
again rank ordered within each alternative. Then the highest 
M/2 payoffs were averaged, to give a 'collapsed maximum' value. 
The alternative within the matrix with the highest 'collapsed 
maximum' value was then chosen. When M=2, this rule is 
equivalent to Maximax (MAX), above. 
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(ix) Collapsed Probable Maximum Rule (PMAX) 
Within each alternative the payoffs on the M outcomes were 
again first rank ordered (as with the CMIN and CMAX rules). Then 
the highest M/2 payoffs were selected, and the probabilities of 
occurrence for these outcomes summed, to give a 'collapsed probable 
maximum' value for each alternative. The alternative within 
the matrix with the highest 'collapsed probable maximum' value 
was then chosen. When M=2, this strategy is equivalent to the 
Probable Maximum rule (PMAX) above. 
(x) Collapsed Majority Confirming Dimensions/Minimax Rule (CMCD/MIN) 
This rule is a two-stage strategy based primarily upon the 
general behavioural model for N alternative M outcome choice of 
Figure 6.3, Chapter 6. As with the CMIN, CMAX and CPMAX rules, 
the payoffs were first rank ordered within each alternative. 
Then the lowest M/2 payoffs were averaged to give a CMIN value, 
which was stored. The highest M/2 payoffs were averaged to 
give a CMAX value, which was stored. Finally, the probabilities 
associated with the highest M/2 payoffs were summed, to give a 
'collapsed probable maximum' valuel. CPMAX . In this way each 
alternative was simplified to a three dimensional vector (CMIN, 
CMAX, CPMAX). For an N alternative matrix, choice proceeded 
as follows. First the alternative with the lowest CMIN value 
was eliminated. This procedure was then iterated until only 
two alternatives (contenders) remained. Choice now switched to 
a collapsed Majority of Confirming Dimensions Rule between these 
two alternatives; i. e. the alternative was selected which was 
highest on at least two of the CMIN, CMAX,, and CPMAX values. 
When N=2 this rule is equivalent to a pure Majority of Confirming 
Dimensions Criterion (i. e. without elimination). When M=2, 
MIN, MAX, and PMAX are utilised instead of collapsed values. 
(xi) Collapsed Majority Confirming Dimensions/Maximax Rule (CMCD/MAX) 
This rule operates in the same way as the previous CMCD/MIN 
rule, but with one variation. Rather than eliminate non-contenders 
by means of the collapsed minimax principle, the alternatives are 
edited by means of a collapsed maximax rule. That is, the two 
alternatives with highest CMAX values are retained as contenders. 
Then final choice is made upon the basis of collapsed majority 
of Confirming Dimensions as before. 
c. Results 
Tables B. 7.1-B. 7.3 give the percentage of trials (over a total 
number of iterations of two hundred per complexity condition) on 
which the selected heuristics choose the alternatives with differing 
Expected Values. Due to the large amount of computing time involved 
in these simulations, particularly the most complex conditions, 
the simulation is limited to 2,4, orb alternatives with 2,4, or 8 
outcomes. _ 
- 385 - 
i 
Table B. 7.1 
Percentage of Trials on which the Selected Heur istic s 
Choose Alternatives with Different Ex pected Values 
in the 2 Outcome Conditions ,2x 2, 4x 2,8 x2 
(Iterations = 200) 
Rank Order of Expe cted Value of Chosen Alternative 
Heuristic Two Alts. Four Alts. Ei ght Alts. 
(2 x 2) (4 x 2) (8 x 2) 
1 2 12 3 4 1 2 3 4. 5 6 7, 
E 89 11 79 16 4 1 70 23 5 2 - -" - 
P 88 12 74 18 8 - 63 17 10 7 2 1 
MIN 80 20 65 28 5 2 60 27 9 4 - - - 
MAX 84 16 65 17 13 5 45 18 12 8 9 6 2 
PMIN 65 35 41 28 22 9 27 21 14 12 12 5 5 
PMAX 65. 35 41 28 22 9 27 21 14 12 12 5 5 
CMIN 80 20 65 28 5 2 60 27 9 4 - - - 
CMAX 84 16 65 17 13 5 45 18 12 8 9 6 2 
CPMAX 65 35 41 28 22 9 27 21 14 12 12 5 5 
CMCD/MIN 90 10 71 24 5 - 66 25 6 3 - - -. 
CMCD/MAX 90 10 77 16 6 1 65 17 7 5 4 2 - 
Table B. 7.2 
Percentage of Trials on which the Selected Heuristics 
Choose Alternatives with Different Expected Values 
in the 4 Outcome Conditions, 2x4,4 x 4,8 x4 
(Iterations = 200) 
Rank Order of Expected Value of Chosen Alternative 
Heuristic Two Alts. Four Alts. Eight Alts. 






E 82 18 73 20 7 - 57 25 9 7 2 1 
P 88 12 76 19 5 - 67 21 6 4 2 - 
MIN 64 36 53 27 15 5 42 28 14 11 4 1 
MAX 63 37 52 21 16 11 32 22 11 11 9 7 5 3 
PMIN 62 38 36 30 18 16 25 16 '15 10 '8 10 11 5 
PMAX 66 34 42 27 21 10 28 19 14 , 15 10 4 6 
,4 CMIN 73 27. 63 25 ' 10 2 47 28 14 8 2' 1 - - CMAX 76 24 66 20 10 4 41 25 15 9 5 3 1 =, .1 CPS 67 33 41 25 20 14 30 20 15 9 ; -'9 6 7 ''4 
CMCD/MIN 83 17 '75 17 8 1 55 26 13 5 -1 - - - CMCD/MAX, 83 17 76 15 7 2 54 24 '11 6 'r, 
ß 3 
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Table B. 7.3 
Percentage of Trial's on which the Selected Heuristics 
Choose Alternatives with Different Expected Values 
in the 8 Outcome Conditions, 2x8,4 x 8,8 x8 








Order of Exp 
Four Alts 






of Chosen Alternative 
Eight Alts. 
. (8 x 8) 
3 4" 567 8 
E 82 18 72 23 4 1 61 22 8 6 2 1 - - 
P 87 13 78 18 3 1 . 64 24 9 2 1 - - - 
MIN 71 29 52 25 15 8 40 20 13 10 8 5 2 2 
MAX 72 28 38 32 15 15 27 13 16 12 9 8 8 7 
PMIN 65 35 35 26 25 14 24 15 14 13 8 8 12 6 
PMAX 58 42 33 29 24 14 20 19 14 14 15 7 7 4 
CMIN 78 22 67 23 8 2 59 22 9 5' 3 2 - - 
CMAX 76 24 61 26 8 5 47 22 13 6 6 3 2 1 
CPMAX 66 34 40 31 19 10 28 19 12 12 10 7 8 4 
CMCD/MIN 85 15 73 21 5 1 62 26 8 3 - 1 - - 
CMCD/MAX 85 15 74 20 5 t 59 22 10 4 3 1 1 - 
d. Conclusions 
We"-"do not wish to. add extensive comment here, since the tabulated 
percentages appear relatively unequivocal. The results for the 
rules first investigated by Thorngata (1980) appear, again, to 
have replicated his original findings. With respect to the new 
rules, based upon aspects of the protocol data from our second 
empirical study, the 'collapsed'- dimensional rules (CMIN, CMAX, 
CPMAX) appear to perform at levels better than the simpler dimensional 
rules (MIN, MAX, PMAX) as the number of outcomes increases. This- 
is perhaps not such a surprising result, given that the latter 
'ignore' an increasingly large proportion of'the available information 
as outcomes increase. This result illustrates the benefits to 
the decision-maker, as outcomes increase, of simple 'chunking' operations 
such. as collapsing. More surprisingly perhaps is the performance 
of the two two-stage rules CMCD/MIN and CMCD/MAX, which have been 
based upon the general behavioural model derived from the, discussion 
of the protocol data. Both rules are clearly more efficient-than. 
the simpler CMIN, CMAX, " and CPMAX, and in fact perform at levels 
equivalent to the best of Thorngate's (1980) original heuristics, 
E and P: It would appear therefore that the process-tracing study 
has enabled us to isolate a number of simplifying strategies that. are 
indeed highly efficient, as are the Ss, in the context of the randomly 
generated matrices. Of course, this should not be taken as an explanatior; 
of the efficiency of any individual S. This is nevertheless an 
illuminating result! 
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APPENDIX C. 1 
STUDY 3: RAW CHOICE DATA 
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Study 3: Raw Choice Data (Frequency of 
Choice of Highest Expected Value Alternatives: 
Theoretical Maximum = 22 in all cases) 
Sub ect 2 Alternative 4 Alternative 2 Alternative 4 Alternative 
No. 2 Outcome (2x2) 2 Outcome (4x2) 4 Outcome (2x4) 4 Outcome (4x4) 
E/P P/E E/P P /E EP P/E E/P p/E 
1 16 17 17 19 17 19 20 16 
2 19 21 19 21 16 20 15 16 
3 15 20 13 17 18 21 16 19 
4 13 22 15 19 16 17 18 14 
5 19 20 13 17 15 13 16 12 
6 12 21 13 21 11 21 10 15 
7 19 20 18 21 15 21 16 21 
8 8 21 6 20 11 17 10 17 
9 10 21 9 19 11 17 7 16 
10 18 20 14 17 20 18 10 18 
11 17 22 10 22 12 20 11 20 
12 10 17 7 17 16 17 13 17 
13 14 19 12 20 12 17 16 20 
14 11 17 15 18 12 16 12 19 
15 16 19 11 15 19 17 15 14 
16 18 19 15 20 18 22 19 22 
17 12 19 10 18 16 16 11 16 
18 13 21 15 18 16 13 15 13 
19 16 20 15 21 16 22 13 18 
20 13 19 8 18 13 17 11 14 
21 11 18 11 17 17 17 19 15 
22 13 21 14 20 14 16 11 15 
23 14 14 17 -- 15 19 13 18 17 
24 13 11 13 12 12 12 12 12 
25 19 20 13 20 12 17 9 15 
26 13 22 14 19 14 18 12 16 
27 15 19 10 21 17 15 16 16 
14.3 19.3 12.9 18.6 15.0" 17.3 13.7 16.4 
